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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis systematically considers the law and policy on refugee status in the People’s 
Republic of China. It considers relevant Chinese legal provisions, applicable bilateral and 
multinational treaties, as well as China’s refugee policy and practice. It also presents and 
analyses first-hand information collected through interviews with refugees and aid workers. 
China is an emerging destination of refugees and other displaced foreigners. Although China is a 
party to the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, Chinese 
law contains no provisions governing the definition of a refugee or the determination of refugee 
status. Further, there is a gap between the criteria for asylum in the 1982 Chinese Constitution 
and the criteria for refugee status in the 1951 Convention.  
In practice, although the Chinese government has generally allowed the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees to process individual applications for refugee status, the Chinese 
government has practically performed the function of refugee status determination in large-scale 
influx situations through policy decisions. In these situations, the security, political, and strategic 
interests of China have often overshadowed China’s commitment under the 1951 Convention. 
China has been cautious about recognising refugees on its territory. However, the Chinese 
government has clearly demonstrated a growing interest in addressing the issue of refugee 
recognition within a more formalised framework.  
In conclusion, this thesis recommends that China adopt a legal refugee definition in line with the 
1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and develop a predictable and fair national 
RSD mechanism. 
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Preface  
I believe this thesis is incomplete without mentioning my trip to North Korea seven years ago. In 
2007, I applied for my very first passport at the Shanghai Exit-Entry Administration Bureau in 
order to travel abroad for the first time in my life. The destination was North Korea.  
I spent four days in North Korea. On my last day in North Korea, there was a power cut in 
Pyongyang. It happened just after dinner, when I was still in the restaurant at my hotel. As the 
hotel had only a few torches for guests, I had to walk to my room on the 10th floor in the dark. I 
could have used my cell phone to light my way, if foreigners were allowed to travel with cell 
phones in North Korea. But it was not the case.  
As I walked up the stairs, a North Korean man came down from upstairs with a lighter in his 
hand. We passed each other silently. I had learned quickly in North Korea that initiating a 
conversation with ordinary North Koreans may cause them trouble later. I continued walking, 
and then noticed that the man had stopped. He was standing at where we just passed each other, 
holding his lighter. I realised that he wanted to share the light from his lighter with me for a 
longer while. I still remember vividly that tiny, steady light in the darkness of Pyongyang. 
I left Pyongyang at midnight on a slow train to China. I looked through the darkness outside the 
window of the train and thought of the North Korean escapees whom I read about in Chinese 
newspapers. Many of them might have made their way to the Chinese border in the same 
intimidating darkness in the hope of finding a better world on the other side of the border. Most 
of them ended up illegally hiding in China or being returned to North Korea, as North Korean 
escapees have been regarded as illegal economic migrants by China. I could not help comparing 
them to the Indochinese who fled to my native Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region in South 
China in the late 1970s and the early 1980s. The Indochinese were recognised as refugees and 
stayed to build a new life in China. The huge difference between their fates made me wonder: 
who is a refugee in China?  
I knew there would be no easy answer to this question, but I was sure that it was a question that I 
did not want to leave unanswered. This thesis is my humble effort to do something in return for 
the man who shared the tiny, steady light in the darkness, and for all the ordinary North Koreans 
I met, who inspired me to never give up hope, love for life, and belief.  
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Introduction 
 
One refugee without hope is too many.  
– United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees1 
 
The rise of China as an emerging world power in the past few decades has led to significant 
changes to the landscape of migration in the country. Founded in 1949 with a communist 
government, the People’s Republic of China has not been a popular destination for foreign 
visitors until very recently. In 1980, only 740,000 foreigners entered China; the figure was 27 
million in 2011, more than 36 times the 1980 figure.2 Alongside the rising tide of regular and 
legal immigrants to China have come undocumented and irregular immigrants. In 2011, more 
than 20,000 foreigners were found illegally entering, staying or working in China.3 
A significant proportion of the irregular immigrants entering China are refugees, asylum seekers, 
and other displaced foreigners. Traditionally, China is a source rather than destination of 
refugees, however, China has witnessed a rapid growth in the number of persons seeking refuge 
on its territory in the past 20 years. There have been several large scale inflows of displaced 
foreigners from neighbouring countries into China in the past two decades. Since the mid-1990s, 
large numbers of North Koreans have continued to cross into China illegally. In 2009, more than 
30,000 displaced ethnic Kokangs from Myanmar flooded into China’s Yunnan Province on the 
Chinese-Myanmar border. In 2011 and 2012, more than 7,000 displaced ethnic Kachins from 
Myanmar escaped to China’s Yunnan Province. In addition, the number of individual asylum 
seekers and refugees, who came from as close as neighbouring Pakistan and as far as Mali in 
West Africa, has also been on the rise in recent years.  
China borders several of the most politically and economically problematic nations in the world 
(see Map 1). China has land borders with 14 countries. According to the Fund for Peace’s Failed 
States Index 2013, five of China’s neighbouring countries, namely Afghanistan, North Korea, 
Pakistan, Myanmar, and Nepal, fall within the “Alert” category, which means these countries 
have the highest vulnerability to collapse or conflicts among the 177 countries assessed in the 
index.4 China’s future exposure to refugee issues should not be underestimated.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 This was United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)’s main message to the public in 2012 which 
marked the 60th year of the 1952 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (the Convention). 
2 “xinshiji yilai waiguoren rujing renshu meinian dizeng 10% [Number of Foreigners Entering China Increases 10 
Per Cent Each Year Since Year 2000]” (25 April 2012) Xinhua <http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2012-
04/25/c_111842921.htm> (accessed 20 February 2014). 
3 “shewai jiazheng, waiguoren feifa jiuye duofa [Foreigners Frequently Found Illegally Working as Housemaids]” 
(26 April 2012) Xinhua <http://www.npc.gov.cn/huiyi/cwh/1126/2012-04/26/content_1719376.htm> (accessed 28 
April 2014). 
4 The 2013 Fund for Peace Failed States Index ranks 177 countries in terms of their volnerability to collapse or 
conflict. Countries in the “Alert” category have the highest vulnerability. The 2013 Fund for Peace Failed States 
Index is available at Fund for Peace <http://ffp.statesindex.org/rankings-2013-sortable> (accessed 10 March 2014).  
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Map 1 Map of China and its Neighbours 
 
Source: the United States Central Intelligence Agency, available at Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection, the 
University of Texas at Austin <http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/asia_pol_2012.pdf> 
(accessed 16 April 2014). 
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China’s refugee problem is tangled with some of the most politically and strategically sensitive 
issues in the Asia-Pacific region. For example, China is the most used and most accessible route 
for North Koreans escaping their country, a dictatorship and a long term ally of China. The 
exodus of North Koreans is believed to have the potential to lead to the collapse of North Korea, 
exposing China directly to the United States forces stationed in South Korea. Cross-border 
displacement from Myanmar to China is deeply intertwined with Myanmar’s longstanding 
ethnic problem, for which no easy solution is in sight. The Chinese-Myanmar border area is one 
of the world’s largest opium and heroin producing regions, where firearms have long been part 
of local life. Both sides of the Chinese-Myanmar border are predominantly inhabited by ethnic 
minority groups. 
As China’s economic strength and political influence continue to grow, how China defines a 
refugee will not only affect the life and hope of many displaced persons who are forced to flee 
their home, but also significantly impact the security and stability of the Asia-Pacific region. 
For years, few people have bothered asking the question of who is a refugee in China. On the 
one hand, China’s refugee law and policy have largely escaped international attention, despite 
the fact that China was one of the first Asian States to accede to the 1952 Convention relating to 
the Status of Refugees (the Convention) and its 1967 Protocol (the Protocol) (collectively the 
Convention and Protocol) and has been hosting approximately 300,000 Indochinese refugees 
since 1978. 5  It was not until China’s repatriation of North Korean escapees stirred up 
controversy in the international community that interest in China’s refugee law and policy began 
to emerge in the late 1990s. 
On the other hand, interest in refugee issues is just awakening within China. Unlike immigration 
countries like Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, where migration is an essential experience 
of their nationals and where refugee issues are well-debated important political and social issues, 
the refugee issue has not been a priority on the political agenda or at the centre of public 
attention in China. Except for the Indochinese refugees, the number of refugees and asylum 
seekers received by China had remained very low until the mid-1990s. Additionally, the Chinese 
government has treated refugees as a highly sensitive issue. There have been few publications or 
discussions about refugees or the refugee protection system in China. Systematic research on 
refugee law and policy did not exist in China until very recently. For example, the first book on 
international refugee law written in Chinese was published only in 2009.6  
The pressing issue of North Korean escapees and the frequent large-scale influxes of displaced 
ethnic minorities from Myanmar in the past few years have brought the Chinese government and 
Chinese scholars to look at refugee issues. Additionally, thanks to the media coverage of the 
high profile case of Edward Snowden, the United States whistleblower who fled to China’s 
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in June 2013 and who was rumoured to have 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 China is the second largest host country for Indochinese refugees.  
6 Liang Shuying’s book International Refugee Law, which was published in 2009, was referred to “the first of its 
kind in China” by Veerapong Vongvarotai, then UNHCR Regional Representative for China & Mongolia, in his 
foreword for the book. 
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approached Beijing for asylum,7 refugee issues have started to come to the attention of the 
Chinese society.  
However, China’s definition of a refugee has remained behind the “bamboo curtain”. Although 
China acceded to the Convention and Protocol in 1982, it has not enacted any national law to 
incorporate the provisions of the Convention and Protocol. China does not have a refugee law, 
and domestic Chinese law contains no provisions governing refugee definition or refugee status 
determination (RSD). China’s policy and practice in interpretation and application of the refugee 
definition provided under the Convention and Protocol have never been closely scrutinised or 
systematically considered. 
Against this background, this thesis examines China’s definition of a refugee and the existing 
refugee status determination procedures in China and makes recommendations on China’s future 
refugee definition. This thesis contains six chapters in addition to Introduction and Conclusion.   
Chapter I provides the historical and social background of China’s law and policy on refugee 
status. First, this chapter pieces together China’s experience with refugees and other displaced 
foreigners from the early 1900s to the early 21st century, demonstrating that the Communist 
government of China had dealt with very few asylum cases before the mid-1990s and that China 
has been increasingly challenged by refugee issues in recent years. Second, it analyses the 
relations between Chinese society and refugees, highlighting that Chinese society in general has 
little information about or interaction with refugees. 
Chapter II explains the concept of a refugee in the international refugee protection regime. This 
chapter focuses on the refugee definition under the Convention and Protocol (Convention 
Refugee Definition) and the impact of the practice of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) and regional arrangements on the refugee concept under international law. 
This chapter also looks at China’s involvement in the international refugee protection regime. 
Chapter III discusses the Chinese laws applicable to refugee status as well as the implementation 
of relevant multilateral and bilateral treaties in China. First, this chapter compares relevant 
Chinese legal provisions with the Convention Refugee Definition. Second, it considers China’s 
implementation of the Convention and Protocol. Third, it explores the role of certain bilateral 
treaties in China’s refugee policy. 
Chapter IV undertakes an analysis of China’s policy on refugee status since 1949, focusing on 
China’s differing treatment of the Indochinese refugees, the North Korean escapees, and the 
displaced ethnic minorities from Myanmar. This chapter argues that China’s treatment of 
displaced foreigners, varying from granting refugee status to providing humanitarian assistance 
without granting refugee status to denial of refugee status and forced repatriation, has mainly 
depended on its political and strategic interests. 
Chapter V looks at the existing RSD procedures in China and the institutions involved in the 
procedures. First, it introduces the role of UNHCR in China and the RSD services provided by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7  “Edward Snowden ‘Broadens Asylum Requests’ – Wikileaks” (2 July 2013) BBC 
<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-23139980> (accessed 28 April 2014). 
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UNHCR. Second, it examines the Chinese government’s decision-making procedures regarding 
the status of certain groups of displaced foreigners, to whom UNHCR generally has not had 
access. This chapter points out that China has not established a national mechanism or guideline 
for fair assessment of the status of displaced foreigners. 
Chapter VI is based on my field work in China, Myanmar, and South Korea from 21 March to 
30 April 2013. First, this chapter describes my border-crossing experience at two border towns 
in Yunnan Province, China, which illustrates the immigration control measures implemented by 
Chinese authorities on the Chinese-Myanmar border, providing a background for understanding 
the mode of cross-border movement of the displaced minorities from Myanmar. Second, this 
chapter presents the accounts of refugees and humanitarian workers working with refugees in 
terms of the interaction between refugees and Chinese authorities.  
In conclusion, this thesis recommends that China adopt a legal refugee definition which meets 
the minimum standard of the Convention and Protocol and develop a predictable and fair 
national mechanism for RSD.  
For the purposes of this thesis, unless otherwise expressed or implied by the context, China 
refers to the People’s Republic of China mainland, excluding the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region (Hong Kong), Macau Special Administrative Region (Macau), and 
Taiwan. 
Many of the Chinese legal and policy documents mentioned in this thesis do not have an official 
English translation. Unless otherwise stated or indicated by the context, all translation is mine. 
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Chart 1 Timeline of Key Events in China Mentioned in this Thesis 1949-2014 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2012: 1) China repatriated about 5,000 
displaced Kachins; 2) the Exit-Entry Law 
was promulgated. 
1949: the People’s Republic of China was 
founded. 
	  
1971: representation of the state of China at 
the United Nations transferred to the 
People’s Republic of China from Republic of 
China.  
1980: UNHCR established an office in 
Beijing. 1982: 1) China acceded to the 1951 
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees 
and its 1967 Protocol; 2) the 1982 
Constitution was promulgated. 
	  
2009: ethnic Kokangs from Myanmar fled to 
China. 
2011: ethnic Kachins from Myanmar fled to 
China. 
1978: 1) Indochinese refugee influx started in 
April; 2) China began to reform and open up. 
Mid-1990s: 1) the number of individual 
asylum seekers dealt with by UNHCR started 
to increase; 2) large numbers of North 
Korean escapees began to arrive in China. 
2013: the Exit-Entry Law entered into force. 
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Chapter I Refugees and Other Displaced Foreigners in China 
 
Those who are not of our kind must have a different mind. 
– Chinese proverb 
 
I Historical Background: Pre-1949 
Displaced aliens are not an unheard-of phenomenon in contemporary Chinese history. During 
the First World War, more than 300,000 ethnic Kazakhs, Uzbeks, Kyrgyzs, and Russians fled 
from Tsarist Russia to Xinjiang in Northwest China to escape military service or oppression of 
dissenters by the government.8 Following the Russian Revolution of 1917, tens of thousands of 
Russian exiles made their way to China, living mainly in Manchuria and Xinjiang. By mid-1924, 
about 60,000 Russian exiles were in China.9 Throughout the 1920s and in the early 1930s, 
escapees from Russia continued to arrive in China for both political and economic reasons.10 
From 1933 to 1941, about 30,000 Jews escaping Nazi persecution and the Holocaust in Europe 
found refuge in Shanghai.11  
In a sense, China was generous with these displaced aliens. The Russians and the Jews entered 
China with little difficulty and were well settled into the local community. For example, in the 
late 1930s, when many countries refused Jewish immigration in the wake of the global economic 
depression, Shanghai was the only major city in the world which desperate Jewish refugees from 
Europe could enter without a visa.12 In Xinjiang, displaced Russians received national treatment 
and were even able to assume important civil servant jobs in the local Chinese government.13  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8  “Tacheng de waiguo qiaomin [Foreign Sojourners in Tacheng]” (20 July 2011) Tacheng Municipality 
<http://www.xjtcsh.gov.cn/tcgk/rwsl/201107/t4028a8ab3145442001314701c94f04dd.html> (accessed 28 April 
2014); Jianhua Huang and Wenhua Ma “Yang Zhengxin yu eguo nanmin cuanrao Xinjiang shijian [Yang Zhengxin 
and the Influx of Russian Refugees in Xinjiang]” (1994) 4 Yili shifan xueyuan xuebao [Journal of Yili Teachers’ 
College] 74. 
9 Michael Marrus The Unwanted European Refugees in the Twentieth Century (Oxford University Press, Oxford , 
1985) at 60. 
10 “Foreign Sojourners in Tacheng”, above n 8. According to a report by the administrative head of Tacheng, Ruhai 
Li, on 23 December 1929, poor crop harvest and food shortage this autumn in the Soviet Union had driven many 
Russians into Tacheng. Li also noticed that there were a significant number of persons who fled to Tacheng for 
political reasons. Before and after 1930, the agricultural collectivisation movement in the Soviet Union also led to 
many escapes to China. 
11 The history of Jewish refugees in Shanghai during the 1930s and 1940s has been covered by many books and 
articles, eg David Kranzler, Japanese, Nazis and Jews, the Jewish Refugee Community of Shanghai 1938-1945, 
(Yeshiva University Press, New York, 1976); Pamela Rotner Sakamoto Japanese diplomats and Jewish refugees : a 
World War II dilemma (Praeger, Westport(Conn), 1998); Felix Gruenberger “The Jewish Refugees in Shanghai” 
(1950) 12 Jewish Social Studies 329; Suzanne Rutland “‘Waiting Room Shanghai’: Australian Reactions to the 
Plight of the Jews in Shanghai after the Second World War” (1987) 32 Year book - Leo Baeck Institute 407; Guang 
Pan “Shanghai: a Haven for Holocaust Victims” United Nations 
<http://www.un.org/en/holocaustremembrance/docs/paper15.shtml> (accessed 28 April 2014). 
12 Pan, above n 11. 
13 “Foreign Sojourners in Tacheng”, above n 8. 
 
	  
15 
It was not merely out of good will or generosity that China took them in and treated them kindly. 
After China was forced to open its door to Western powers after the Opium War (1839-1842), it 
never fully regained the power to control the entry and exit of aliens, especially those from 
Europe, or to regulate aliens on its soil until the early 1940s. As a consequence of a series of 
unequal treaties, foreigners enjoyed consular jurisdiction as well as many privileges over 
Chinese citizens. Displaced foreigners in China, being foreign, thus sometimes had a status 
superior to Chinese citizens. For example, Felix Gruenberger, who himself was a Jewish refugee 
in Shanghai, described how in Shanghai refugees were socially ranked lower than other 
foreigners but higher than Chinese citizens:14  
 
Apart from the Japanese occupation forces, there were three social groups in Shanghai. (1) The 
foreigners. These were the wealthy white Europeans, protected by their consulates, who made up 
a well-integrated group and who looked down upon anyone who had to do work which was lower 
than the standard for the white population. (2) The refugees. These consisted first of the Russian 
refugees and later of the central Europeans. These people were forced by their condition to accept 
work usually considered unfit for the “whites.” (3) The native Chinese. They did the lowest 
chores and received the lowest wages. 
 
Despite the large numbers of refugees China hosted before 1949, there was no legislation 
governing the acceptance or management of refugees and very little immigration legislation. The 
Nationalist government (1911-1949) introduced the first regulations requiring foreigners’ 
passports to be inspected upon entry in 1930.15 It was only on 14 November 1944, the eve of the 
Chinese victory over the Japanese, that legal requirements for aliens to apply for a residence 
permit to live in and an exit visa to leave China were put into place.16 Considering that China 
was constantly war-torn throughout the 1930s and 1940s, how effectively these regulations were 
implemented is a question. For instance, during the Anti-Japanese War (1937-1945), Shanghai 
was occupied by Japanese forces and foreigners did not need a passport or a visa to enter 
Shanghai.  
As such, the Nationalist government did not lay a good foundation for the development of a 
legal or institutional framework relating to handling refugees or other displaced foreigners in 
China. 
II Refugees and Other Displaced Foreigners in China: 1949-1982 
By the time the People’s Republic of China was established in October 1949, there were still 
more than 20,000 refugees in China, including persons of Austrian, Czech, Estonian, Greek, 
Hungarian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Norwegian, Polish, Romanian, Russian, Spanish, Ukrainian and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Gruenberger, above n 11, at 331. 
15 Guofu Liu Chinese Immigration Law (Ashgate, Farnham (UK), 2011) at 5.  
16 Liu, above n 15, at 5. 
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Yugoslav background.17 The majority were ethnic Russians who had fled the Soviet Union in the 
1920s.18 Though the newly-founded People’s Republic of China was excluded from the United 
Nations (UN) at that time, it allowed the International Refugee Organisation (IRO) and later 
UNHCR to operate in China. Having begun its operation in China in 1947, the IRO operated in 
China until 1952 when the organisation itself ceased, focusing on finding third country 
resettlement for refugees in China.19 UNHCR took over the IRO’s functions in January 1952 and 
maintained an office of a “special representative” in Shanghai.20 When a refugee had an offer of 
resettlement from a third country, the Chinese government would issue an exit visa to the 
refugee and the China Travel Service would arrange for the refugee to travel to Shanghai and 
from there to the China-Hong Kong Border.21 Since Beijing did not have diplomatic relations 
with most of the countries in the world, Hong Kong – then still British Hong Kong – served as a 
transit point of the refugee’s journey to the resettlement destination. UNHCR’s office in 
Shanghai was closed in 1956 and its functions were assumed by the official Chinese People’s 
Relief Association, but the operation of the exit of European refugees continued; by 1969, only 
around 1,000 European refugees were left in China, of whom 825 had found resettlement in 
another country and were awaiting exit permits.22 
The European refugees entered China and integrated into the local community long before the 
Chinese Communist Party rose to power. Although China gained some experience in co-
operating with international agencies during the exit of these refugees which might have been 
helpful in its repatriation of the Lao and Cambodian refugees in the 1990s, it is unlikely to able 
to draw upon its experience with the European refugees to deal with refugee influxes.   
After 1949, China did not have much experience of receiving refugees or other displaced 
foreigners until the arrival of Indochinese refugees in 1978. One the one hand, its economic 
backwardness and Socialist political system may not have looked attractive to outsiders. On the 
other, China had strictly restricted the entry of aliens in general; there was ubiquitous distrust 
and hostility towards foreigners, deriving from concerns about spying and China’s isolation in 
international society at that time.  
However, China did provide political asylum to a few foreigners from the 1960s to the early 
1980s. The most well-known individual who received asylum in China is probably the former 
King of Cambodia, Norodom Sihanouk. China granted him political asylum when he was 
deposed and sentenced to death in a coup led by the American-backed General Lon Nol in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Between 1952 and 1969, around 20,000 refugees exited China with the help of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR); prior to that, the International Refugee Organisation (IRO) resettled about 
19,000 to a third country between 1947 and 1952. Glen Peterson “The Uneven Development of the International 
Refugee Regime in Postwar Asia: Evidence from China, Hong Kong and Indonesia” (2012) 25 Journal of Refugee 
Studies 326, at 328 and 331. 
18 Peterson, above n 17, at 329.  
19 Peterson, above n 17, at 328. 
20 Before 1956, China issued exit visas on the condition that the refugee had obtained an entry visa for his or her 
resettlement country. From spring 1956 onwards, exit visas were issued without precondition. Peterson, above n 17, 
at 331. 
21 Peterson, above n 17, at 330. 
22 Peterson, above n 17, at 331. 
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1970.23 Norodom Sihanouk lived in China for about 5 years before returning to Cambodia in 
1975.  
Kyuichi Tokuda, who was a Japanese Communist Party leader, was granted asylum in China in 
the early 1950s. Tokuda had participated in the formation of the Japanese Communist Party in 
the early 1920s and later spent 18 years in prison.24 Following his release in 1945, he was 
elected Secretary General of the Central Committee of the Japan Communist Party and was 
elected a member of the House of Representatives.25 After he was purged from public office in 
1950 by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers during the Allied Occupation of Japan, 
he went into exile in China and died in Beijing in 1953.26  
Asylum was also provided to an Indonesian ambassador to China, Djawoto, in April 1966 in the 
midst of intensifying diplomatic and political tension between Beijing and Jakarta.27 Djawoto 
later assumed the position of Secretary-General of the Afro-Asian Journalists’ Association in 
Beijing and lived there for more than a decade. 
From the late 1960s to the early 1980s, China provided refuge to a team of Malayan Communist 
Party members in exile, who set up and run the Suara Revolusi Malaya (the Voice of the 
Malayan Revolution) radio station in China’s southern Hunan Province.28 From 1961 to 1980, 
Chen Pin (also known as Pin Cheng), a Malayan Communist Party leader, also lived in exile in 
China after the Malayan Emergency (1948-1960).29 
Several Vietnamese “defectors” were granted asylum in the late 1970s and early 1980s when the 
ideological rift between China and Vietnam was acute. Though the time they came to China 
coincided with that of the massive influx of Indochinese refugees, they came and received 
asylum in a different manner. In July 1979, the then Deputy Chairman of the Vietnamese 
National Assembly and former Vietnamese ambassador to China, Hoang Van Hoan, who had 
been known for his strong pro-Chinese sentiments, made his way to China after his flight from 
Hanoi to East Berlin stopped to refuel in Karachi, Pakistan.30 It was only a few months after the 
Sino-Vietnam war; Hoang was well received by China and spent the rest of his life in China. On 
2 December 1978 and 16 December 1981, the official newspaper of Communist Party of China, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Michael P Colaresi Scare Tactics: The Politics of International Rivalry (Syracuse University Press, Syracuse, 
2005), at 197; “qingyi wuxian xihanuke ‘liuwang’ zhongguo wunian jishi [Infinite Friendship: True Stories of 
Sihanouk’s 5 Years of ‘Exile’ in China]” China Net (21 July 2010) 
<http://culture.china.com/zh_cn/history/files/11022841/20100721/16035891_1.html> (accessed 28 April 2014). 
24 “waiguoren ruhe dedao zhongguo ‘bihu’ [How Can Foreigners Receive Asylum in China]” (18 December 2013) 
Sohu News <http://news.sohu.com/s2013/dianji-1291/> (accessed 11 April 2014). 
25  “Tokuda, Kyuichi” National Diet Library, Japan <http://www.ndl.go.jp/portrait/e/datas/407.html?cat=119> 
(accessed 11 April 2014). 
26 “How Can Foreigners Receive Asylum in China”, above n 24; “Tokuda, Kyuichi”, above n 25. 
27 David Mozingo Chinese Policy toward Indonesia, 1949-1967 (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1976) at 250. 
28 “How Can Foreigners Receive Asylum in China”, above n 24; “Malayan People's Army. 10th Regiment Archives” 
International Institute of Social History <http://www.iisg.nl/archives/en/files/m/ARCH02799.php> (accessed 11 
April 2014). 
29 Yinghong Cheng “magong zongshuji Chen Ping de chuanqi rensheng [The Legendary Life of the Former 
Secretary General of the Malayan Communist Party, Chen Ping]” Phoenix Weekly (online ed, Hong Kong, 16 
October 2013). 
30 Sung An Tai “Vietnam: the Defection of Hoang Van Hoan” (1980) 7 Asian Affairs 288 at 288.  
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the People’s Daily, reported that asylum was provided to a Vietnamese cadre and a group of ten 
Vietnamese including a pilot officer.31 The former, according to his interview with the People’s 
Daily, crossed into China because he felt under great pressure from the Vietnamese government 
after expressing his objection to anti-China policies and anti-ethnic Chinese measures in 
Vietnam. The latter escaped to China in a military helicopter due to discontent with Vietnam’s 
“cruel ruling and political persecution”.  
The first refugee crisis China faced was the Indochinese refugee influx, starting from 1978. In 
April 1978, large numbers of people began to flood into China from Vietnam. The majority of 
them, in hundreds of thousands, entered China from Vietnam by land and by boat through 
Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region, which is a main gateway between China and Vietnam 
(see Map 2); tens of thousands crossed into Yunnan Province from Vietnam and Laos.32 By the 
early 1980s, more than 280,000 people had arrived.33 About 98 per cent of them were ethnic 
Chinese who had been living in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia.34 
Upon their arrival, they received assistance from the Chinese government. Shelter, food, clothes, 
medicine and a daily allowance were provided to them by the local authority. The Office of 
Reception and Resettlement of Indochinese Refugees was established at the state and provincial 
level to facilitate and oversee the reception and resettlement process. In the small border town of 
Dongxing in Guangxi for example, the local authority assigned 240 government workers and 
hired another 240 external support workers to deal with the reception of the refugees. When the 
first refugees arrived, public buildings such as government offices, school dormitories, 
warehouses, canteens and meeting rooms as well as private houses were mobilised to 
accommodate refugees. As the number of refugees continued to increase, 13,000 square metres 
of makeshift houses were built in and around Dongxing for the refugees. The government also 
transformed a hotel into an elderly care centre to receive elderly, unaccompanied or sick 
refugees. Beds, mosquito nets, blankets, mattresses and other necessities were distributed to 
refugees. Doctors were sent to provide medical care to the refugees and vaccinations were 
provided. 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Li Zhang “Ta zenyang maoxian laidao zhongguo - fangwen yuenan ganbu ruantingyin [How He Risked to Come 
to China-Interview with VietnameseOfficer Ruan Tingyin]” Remin Ribao (China, 2 December 1978)  at 4; “wo 
youguan bumen genju zhongguo falü guiding yunxu qiaoqinglu deng shiren zai woguo juliu [Chinese Governing 
Department Allowed Ten Persons including Qiao Qinglu to Reside in China according to Chinese Legal Provisions]” 
Remin Ribao (China, 16 October 1981) at 1. Both are available at renmin ribao archive 1946-2003 
<www.rmrbw.net>. 
32 Shuying Liang guoji nanmin fa [International Refugee Law] (Intellectual Property Publishing House, Beijing, 
2009), at 276. 
33 Liang, above n 32, at 272. 
34  Jing Song “Vietnamese refugees well settled in China, await citizenship” (10 May 2007) UNHCR 
<http://www.unhcr.org/464302994.html > (accessed 28 April 2014). 
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Map 2 Administrative Map of China 
 
 
Source: the United States Central Intelligence Agency, available at <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/cia-
maps-publications/map-downloads/china_admin.jpg/image.jpg> (accessed 16 April 2014). 
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Later, the refugees were given jobs on Overseas Chinese Farms (OCF) in Guangxi Zhuang 
Autonomous region (equivalent of province), Guangdong Province, Hainan Province (part of 
Guangdong Province before mid-1980s), Yunnan Province, and Jiangxi Province in south and 
southwest China and refugees were transferred from the border area to resettlement places. 
Guangxi and Guangdong, where many of the refugees or their ancestors were originally from 
and where a climate similarity to Southeast Asian can be found, together hosted around 200,000 
refugees.35 A significant proportion of the refugees, with few occupational qualifications, were 
resettled on existing and newly established OCFs; refugees with a fishing background were 
provided with suitable facilities to resume their trade in fishing villages; others were absorbed by 
mines, factories and small township enterprises.36  
The refugee status of the Indochinese was recognised by the Chinese government at a working 
meeting on Indochinese refugees (the 1979 Meeting) on 4 August 1979, which was presided by 
then Chairman of China Li Xiannian and Vice Minister of the State Council Chen Muhua and 
attended by high ranking officials from provincial governments and Central Government 
ministries and departments involved in receiving and settling the Indochinese refugees. The 
meeting required that all Vietnamese, Laos and Cambodians who were expelled by Vietnamese 
authorities and escaped to China should be referred to as refugees without exception.37  
In addition to those who came directly from Vietnam and Laos, China also offered resettlement 
to 2,552 Indochinese refugees from refugee camps in Thailand in 1980.38 The majority of them 
were Lao and Cambodian refugees. Resettlement was also provided to 245 and 17 Indochinese 
refugees in 1981 and 1982 respectively.39 
In 1991, China signed a protocol with Laos on the repatriation of Lao refugees. With the 
coordination of UNHCR, 3,550 refugees voluntarily returned to Laos between 1991 and 1997.40 
During the same period, more than 30 Cambodian refugees were also repatriated through the 
coordination of UNHCR and cooperation between the Chinese and Cambodian government. 
There are currently about 5 families of Cambodian refugees and over 800 Lao refugees 
remaining in China.41 Nowadays, the number of Indochinese refugees living in China has grown 
to about 300,000. They are well integrated into the local communities and receive continuous 
support from the Chinese government and UNHCR.42 Their local integration is considered by 
the former UN High Commissioner for Refugees António Guterres as “one of the most 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Liang, above n 32, at 280. 
36 Tom Lam “The exodus of hoa refugees from Vietnam and their settlement in Guangxi-China's refugee settlement 
strategies” (2000) 13 Journal of Refugee Studies 374. 
37 Liang, above n 32, at 274. It is worth mentioning that China was not a party to the Refugee Convention and 
Protocol in 1979. 
38 David Feith Stalemate: Refugees in Asia (Asian Bureau Australia, Parkville, 1988), appendix. Cambodia has no 
land border with China. 
39 Feith, above n 38, appendix. 
40 Liang, above n 32, at 306. 
41  UNHCR “UNHCR Regional Representation in China” UNHCR 
<http://www.unhcr.org.hk/unhcr/en/about_us/China_Office.html> (accessed 28 April 2014). 
42 Lam, above n 36, at 378. 
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successful integration programs (of refugees) in the world”.43 Though they have not been 
naturalised,44 most of them have been registered in the household registration (hukou) system 
and obtained a Chinese identity card,45 which enables them to stay legally in China and enjoy a 
socio-economic status on a par with Chinese citizens,46 for example, they are allowed to work 
and entitled to social welfare and public education. Some of them have been issued a Chinese 
passport.47  
The influx of the Indochinese refugees led to the establishment of a UHNCR mission office in 
Beijing in 1980 and China’s accession to the Convention and Protocol in 1982. Why and how 
China recognised the Indochinese as refugees and the impact of the Indochinese refugee influx 
will be further considered in chapter IV. 
III Refugees and Other Displaced Foreigners in China: 1983-2013 
A UNHCR Refugees 
In the post-Indochinese influx era, the Office of UNHCR in Beijing has taken the lead to 
conduct RSD in China. China does not substantially involve itself in the RSD process 
administered by UNHCR.48 China acknowledges the refugee status of those who are identified 
as refugees through the RSD process conducted by UHNCR Beijing Office (UNHCR refugees) 
and allows them to stay temporarily in China until a durable solution, usually resettlement in a 
third country, is found by UNHCR for them.49 The number of refugees and asylum seekers 
received by China remained low until the mid-1990s, but has gradually increased since.50 
Published information about non-Indochinese refugees and asylum seekers prior to 1996 is 
extremely scarce. Muntarbhorn noted that non-Indochinese asylum seekers were numbered at 
fewer than 50 in 1990 and that “little is heard of their fate, but generally they have been treated 
on a case-by-case basis with the knowledge of UNHCR”.51 An UNHCR “Update on Regional 
Developments in Asia and Oceania” dated 19 August 1996 indicated that as of 1 January 1996, 
there were 288,300 refugees in China. Among them only 45 were non-Indochinese refugees, 
including 28 Somalis, eight Burundians, four Rwandans, three Iranians, one Sri Lankan, and one 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Song, above n 34. 
44 Song, above n 34. 
45 United States Committee for Refugees and Immigrants (USCRI) “World Refugee Survey” (2009) USCRI 
<http://www.refugees.org/resources/refugee-warehousing/archived-world-refugee-surveys/2009-wrs-country-
updates/china.html> (accessed 28 April 2014); Liang, above n 2, at 265.  
46 UNHCR, above n 41. 
47 Song, above n 34. 
48  Yuanjun Wang “guanyu jianli woguo nanmin baohu falv zhidu de jidian sikao [Several Thoughts on 
Establishment of Refugee Protection Mechanism in China]” (2005) 12 Public Security Research 46 at 47; UNHCR 
Regional Representation for China and Mongolia “Fact Sheet” (March 2014) UNHCR 
<http://www.unhcr.org/5000187d9.html> (accessed 28 April 2014). The RSD mechanism in China will be further 
considered in chapter V. 
49 UHNCR, above n 41. Note that art 46 of the Exit-Entry Law, which entered into force on 1 July 2013, allows 
refugees to reside in China, but whether this article is going to be implemented effectively is to be seen. See Chapter 
III. 
50 Liang, at 272. 
51 Vitit Muntarbhorn The Status of Refugees in Asia (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1992) at 66. 
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Sudanese. The rest were Indo-Chinese refugees.52 According to the statistics on the UNHCR 
website, the number of UNHCR refugees in China was well under 100 in the early 2000s, but 
has risen significantly in the past 10 years (see Chart 2). The number of asylum seekers and 
other persons of concern to UNHCR fluctuated in the past decade but is generally much higher 
than in the early 2000s. As at September 2013, 300,895 Indochinese refugees, 166 UNHCR 
refugees, and 332 asylum seekers were living in China according to UNHCR. The actual number 
of refugees and other displaced foreigners in China is estimated to be higher, as UNHCR does 
not always have access to refugees and asylum seekers in China.53 
 
Chart 2 Numbers of UNHCR Refugees and Asylum Seekers in China 2000-2014 
  
Source: UNHCR Online Statistical Population Database 
<http://popstats.unhcr.org/#_ga=1.62031726.356743116.1347279548> (accessed 27 January 2014); UNHCR 
Regional Representation for China and Mongolia “Fact Sheet” (March 2014) 
<http://www.unhcr.org/5000187d9.html> (accessed 20 August 2014).  
Note: the 2014 numbers are as in March 2014. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 UNHCR “Update on Regional Developments in Asia and Oceania”, EC/46/SC/CRP.44 (1986) at [74]. 
53 UNHCR’s requests to access North Koreans, the ethnic Kokangs and the ethnic Kachins in China were generally 
denied by the Chinese government. UNHCR “UNHCR Seeks Access to North Koreans Detained in China” (21 
January 2003) UNHCR <http://www.unhcr.org/3e2d81b94.html> (accessed 28 April 2014); UNHCR “China: 
UNHCR Calls for Access to Myanmar Refugees” (4 September 2009) UNHCR 
<http://www.unhcr.org/4aa108159.html> (accessed 28 April 2014); UNHCR “UNHCR Reaches Kachins Sent back 
from China” (7 September 2012) UNHCR <http://www.unhcr.org/5049cdba9.html> (accessed 28 April 2014). 
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Unlike Indochinese refugees who settled in local communities, UNHCR refugees are largely 
scattered in urban areas of China’s major cities (see Chart 3 and Map 2). To date, published 
information about the situation of UNHCR refugees in China remains relatively sparse.  
 
Chart 3 Demographic Composition of Populations of Concern to UNHCR in China in 2012 
Series 
number Location of residence Female total Male total Overall total 
1 Beijing City 9 29 38 
2 Fujian Province 13,211 14,198 27,409 
3 Gan Su Province * * * 
4 Guangdong Province 39,928 43,708 83,636 
5 Guangxi Autonomous Region 53,303 58,965 112,268 
6 Hainan Province 14,867 16,608 31,475 
7 Ji Lin Province * * * 
8 Jiangxi Province 824 891 1,715 
9 Langfang City 11 22 33 
10 Nanjing City 5 8 13 
11 Shaanxi Province * * * 
12 Shan Dong Province * * * 
13 Shanghai City  * * 
14 Tianjin City  * * 
15 Wuhan City 79 58 137 
16 Yiwu City * * * 
17 Yunnan Province 21,821 22,669 44,490 
 
Source: UNHCR (accessed 27 January 2014).  
Note: (1) statistics for Fujian, Guangdong, Guangxi, Hainan, Jiangxi and Yunnan include Indochinese refugees; (2) 
statistics displayed as asterisks (*) represent figures which are kept confidential by UNHCR to protect the 
anonymity of persons of concern. Such figures are not included in any totals. 
 
An article in 2004 in a Chinese magazine gave a glimpse into the stories and life of UNHCR 
refugees in China, and illustrates the treatment they receive from the Chinese government.54 It 
mentioned a refugee from Sri Lanka under the pseudonym of Hamai who was a leader of an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 Xiao Shao “shenghuo zai zhongguo de waiguo nanmin [Foreign Refugees Living in China]” Baixing [Ordinary 
People] (China, March 2004) at 50.  
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anti-terrorism organisation in Sri Lanka. Because Hamai organised influential anti-terrorism 
photo exhibitions around Sri Lanka, he was repeatedly threatened by terrorists and found himself 
in seriously dangerous situations several times. Hamai left Sri Lanka and was recognised as a 
refugee by UNHCR in China. He was living in a big city in China at the time of the article. The 
article also mentioned a Burundian who came to China as an exchange student in the late 1980s. 
When he was about to returned to his country after seven years study in China, large-scale ethnic 
conflicts erupted in Burundi. He was recognised as a “person of concern” by UNHCR and 
allowed to stay in China by the Chinese government. He rented an apartment in a Beijing suburb 
and lived with his wife and children. However, he was not allowed to work, though he had a 
master’s degree in industrial design, and had to live on a monthly allowance provided by 
UNHCR. With the help of UNHCR, he moved to Canada a few years later.  
A more recent article in 2013 shows that conditions of UNHCR refugees in China had largely 
remained the same in the past decade, but positive changes were emerge. This article in Global 
Time, which is a state-owned newspaper in China, introduces the story of Taonga, a 
Zimbabwean-artist-turn-refugee.55 Fleeing discrimination and threats for being homosexual in 
his native Zimbabwe, Taonga came to China to join his Chinese boyfriend in 2012 on a tourist 
visa and later registered as a refugee with UNHCR. Taonga was not allowed to work, open a 
bank account, or travel without approval. When he wanted to leave Beijing to attend a friend’s 
wedding in Sichuan Province, he was advised that it would be better to stay in Beijing because 
local authorities in Sichuan might have problems with his refugee identity. The article also 
mentioned that a teenage refugee from Pakistan, who fled with his family for religious reasons, 
had received home tuition from volunteers arranged by UNHCR and was enrolled in a Chinese 
public school as a result of the Chinese government’s policy decision in November 2012 to 
allow refugee children to attend public schools in China.  
As illustrated in the above articles, UNHCR refugees, as well as “persons of concern” to 
UNHCR, are allowed to stay in China temporarily until UNHCR finds resettlement for them in a 
third country or repatriation to their home country is possible. The Chinese government does not 
issue travel documents to UNHCR refugees or “persons of concern” to UNHCR, nor does it 
grant them the right to employment.56 They hold identification documents issued by UNHCR 
and rely on UNHCR for assistance in terms of food, accommodation, health care, and children 
education.57 In November 2012 the Chinese government began to allow children of UNHCR 
refugees to access public education in primary schools under the same condition as local 
children.58 This is a recent positive development in the treatment of UNHCR refugees in China. 
B Refugees and Other Displaced Foreigners Dealt with by the Chinese Government 
Despite the fact that China is not substantially involved in the RSD process administered by 
UNHCR, it dealt with at least three mass influxes of displaced aliens from neighbouring 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 Meilian Lin “Home away from home” Global Times (online ed, China, 22 December 2013).  
56 UNHCR, above n 41; Liang, above n 32, at 260. 
57 UNHCR, above n 41. 
58 UNHCR Regional Presentation for China and Mongolia, above n 48. 
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countries in the past 20 years, namely the arrival of North Koreans since the mid-1990s, the so-
called “Kokang Incident” in 2009 and the Kachin influx from 2011 to 2012, and it has generally 
denied UHNCR’s access to these displaced foreigners. 
In the mid-1990s when a food shortage hit North Korea heavily, large numbers of North Koreans 
began to risk crossing the shallow Tumen River into northeast China illegally in search of food. 
The inflow continues nowadays.59 As the Chinese government does not release information 
regarding the total number of North Korean escapees and UNHCR are not allowed to operate in 
the north-eastern provinces of China, where the majority of the North Korean escapees live, 
there is little reliable statistical information regarding the number of North Korean refugees in 
China. The estimated number of undocumented North Korean escapees in China varies from 
5,000 to 100,000.60 The Chinese government has insisted that North Korean escapees in China 
are illegal economic migrants, although scholars and human rights groups have argued that many 
of the North Korean escapees qualify for refugee status.61 Generally, North Korean escapees in 
China have no access to RSD procedures and face the risk of deportation if caught by Chinese 
authorities.  
Though China persists in its position that North Koreans in China are not refugees, China’s 
treatment of North Koreans has not always been consistent. A few local authorities allowed 
certain types of North Koreans, mainly females who are married to Chinese men and have 
children, and those who have lived in China for a long period without causing problems, to stay 
and even issued temporary resident permits or identification cards to them,62 though probably 
without the consent of the central government. 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 For discussion on North Koreans’ motivations to leave North Korea, see eg Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland 
Witness to Transformation: Refugee Insights into North Korea (Peterson Institute for International Economics, 
Washington DC, 2011), at 29; Human Rights Watch (HRW) “The Invisible Exodus: North Koreans in the People’s 
Republic of China” (November 2002) HRW <http://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/northkorea/> (accessed 28 April 
2014) at 9; Rhoda Margesson, Emma Chanlett-Avery and Andorra Bruno “North Korean Refugees in China and 
Human Rights Issues: International Response and U.S. Policy Options” (26 September 2007), available at United 
States Congressional Research Service Report for Congress <https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34189.pdf> 
(accessed 28 April 2014) at 6. 
60 Haggard and Noland, above n 59, at 2. See also eg United State Congressional-Executive Commission on China 
“2013 Annual Report” (10 October 2013), at 118, available at United State Congressional-Executive Commission 
on China <http://www.cecc.gov/publications/annual-reports/2013-annual-report> (accessed 28 April 2014). The 
report says that international scholars and media estimate the number is currently between 11,000 and 50,000.  
61 For legal analysis on the status of North Korean escapees, see eg Roberta Cohen “Legal Grounds for Protection of 
North Korean Refugees” (12 September 2010) Brookings  
<http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2010/09/north-korea-human-rights-cohen> (accessed 28 April 2014); 
Elim Chan and Andreas Schloenhardt “North Korean Refugees and International Refugee Law” (2007) 19 
International Journal of Refugee Law 215; Benjamin Neaderland “Quandary on the Yalu: International Law, 
Politics, and China's North Korean Refugee Crisis” (2004) 40 Stanford Journal of International Law 143. 
62 Liu, above n 15, at 91; “2012 nian zhongshan daxue moni lianheguo dahui nanmin anzhi yu nanmin quanli 
baozhang beijing wenjian [2012 Sun Yat-Sun University Moot UN Meeting on Refugee Settlement and Rights 
Protection Background Document]” (19 April 2012) School of Asian Pacific Study of Sun Yat-Sen University 
<http://saps.sysu.edu.cn/xsyd/zsdxmnlhg/96477.htm> (accessed 9 March 2013). 
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Map 3 Administrative Map of Myanmar 
 
Source: the United States Central Intelligence Agency, available at <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/cia-
maps-publications/map-downloads/burma_admin.jpg/image.jpg> (accessed 16 April 2014). 
Note: Myanmar moved the capital of the country to Naypyidaw in 2005. 
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Another influx is the arrival of ethnic Kokangs from Myanmar in 2009, which is generally 
known as the Kokang Incident in Chinese media (see Map 3). On 8 August 2009, tensions 
between Myanmar’s central government troops and the local army of the Kokang Special 
Region (the Kokang Region) in Shan State suddenly increased. 63 Panicked Kokangs began to 
flee to the bordering Nansan town in Yunnan Province, China. In the following weeks, as 
gunfire broke out and intensified in Kokang Region, about 37,000 civilians flooded into Yunnan 
Province.64 The Chinese government quickly opened seven temporary camps for the displaced 
Kokangs, setting up more than 1,000 tents and providing RMB 10 million (about USD 1.6 
million) worth of food, blankets, drinking water, medicine and daily allowance.65 The Minister 
of Public Security was sent to Yunnan Province to lead the “stability-keeping” (weiwen) work.66 
The Chinese government never referred to the displaced Kokangs as refugees (nanmin), only as 
border residents (bianmin), 67 although many Chinese mainstream media referred to them as 
refugees. In early September 2009, the displaced Kokangs gradually returned to Myanmar 
voluntarily as the fighting in Kokang eased, and the camps were removed.68 
On 9 June 2011, less than two years after the Kokang Incident, armed conflicts between 
Myanmar government troops and the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) forced about 40,000 
ethnic Kachins to flee towards the Myanmar-Chinese border.69 Though the situation of the 
Kachins appears to be similar to that of the Kokangs in August 2009, China seems to have taken 
a different approach to the Kachins. It was reported in mid-June 2011 that about 1,000 Kachins 
attempted to enter China, but only about 200 people, mostly elderly people and women with 
children, were allowed in by the Chinese border security forces.70 But a spokesperson for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63  Euro-Burma Office (EBO) “The Kokang Clashes – What Next?” (September 2009) EBO <http://euro-
burma.eu/doc/EBO_Analysis_No_1_(Kokang).pdf> (accessed 28 April 2014) at 4. 
64 State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China (SCIO) “Yunnan Sheng zhengfu jiu dangqian 
zhongmian bianjing jushi juxing xinwen fabuhui [Yunnan Government Holds Press Conference on Situation on 
China-Myanmar Border]” (31 August 2009) SCIO 
<http://www.scio.gov.cn/xwfbh/gssxwfbh/xwfbh/yunnan/200908/t398584.htm> (accessed 14 September 2011). 
According to the SCIO, the number is inclusive of Chinese citizens returning home from Kokang due to the armed 
conflict. 
65 SCIO, above n 64; “Kokang Capital Falls: ‘Not Shoot First’ Policy under Fire” (26 August 2009) Shan Herald 
Agency for News <http://www.shanland.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2695:kokang-
capital-falls-not-shoot-first-policy-under-fire&catid=86:war&Itemid=284> (accessed 14 September 2011). 
66 SCIO, above n 64. 
67 People’s Republich of China Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) press conference, Beijing, 1 September 2009. 
Transcripts of all MFA press conferences mentioned in this thesis are available at MFA <www.fmprc.gov.cn>. 
68 Jun Liu “30,000 ming guogan nanmin tashang miandian guitu [30,000 Kokang Refugees on Their Way Home]” 
(16 September 2009) China Weekly <http://www.chinaweekly.cn/bencandy.php?fid=60&id=4491> (accessed 14 
September 2011); Shan Nan “Beijing chaichu yingdi qianfan guogan nanmin [Beijing Removed Camps and 
Repatriated Kokang Refugees]” (1 September 2009) Asia News <http://www.asianews.it/news-
zh/%E5%8C%97%E4%BA%AC%E6%8B%86%E9%99%A4%E8%90%A5%E5%9C%B0%E9%81%A3%E8%BF
%94%E6%9E%9C%E6%95%A2%E9%9A%BE%E6%B0%91-16205.html> (accessed 13 September 2011). 
69 “Kachin IDPs Reach over 40,000 due to Civil War in Northern Burma” (2 September 2011) Kachin News 
<http://www.kachinnews.com/news/2040-kachin-idps-reach-over-40000-due-to-civil-war-in-northern-burma.html> 
(accessed 28 April 2014). 
70  Yan Naing Saw “Kachin Conflict Sparks Refugee Situation” (15 June 2011) The Irrawaddy 
<http://www2.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=21495> (accessed 28 April 2014); “Miandian keqin wuzhuan zan 
bu pohuai zhongmian youqi guandao deng zhongguo huiying [Burma’s Kachin Army Has not Ruined China-
Myanmar Oil and Gas Pipes, Awaiting China’s Response]” (6 June 2011) China News 
<http://www.chinanews.com/gj/2011/06-16/3115812.shtml> (accessed 28 April 2014). 
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China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) denied that the border was closed, saying that border 
residents from Myanmar had “come to China to live with their friends and relatives temporarily” 
and that China provided “necessary assistance in conformity with common practices on the basis 
of humanitarianism”.71 In late June and early July 2011, the Chinese authorities told displaced 
Kachins who were allowed into China earlier that fighting had terminated at their village and 
persuaded them to return to Myanmar.72 
Later, the Chinese government’s attitude towards the Kachins became more tolerant. Kachins 
seeking to enter China were generally allowed to enter and stay in Yunnan Province. By June 
2012, it was estimated that 7,000 to 10,000 displaced Kachins were staying in China’s Yunnan 
Province.73 The majority of them were living in groups at temporary camps, which were self-
built by the displaced Kachins or converted from warehouses, while others stayed with relatives, 
friends or in rented rooms.74 China provided little assistance to them, but allowed a few relief 
groups to access and to assist the Kachins.75 In August 2012, however, China began to send back 
the displaced Kachins who were staying in the camps. In September 2012, UNHCR estimated 
that about 5,000 Kachins had been sent back to Myanmar.76 Those who were staying in private 
houses were allowed to remain.77 
IV Refugees and Other Displaced Foreigners and Chinese Civil Society  
Chinese society in general knows very little about refugees. Most Chinese are not familiar with 
the notion of a refugee, and would be surprised to know that there are refugees in China. Their 
ignorance of refugees probably could be attributed primarily to the lack of available information 
of the subject in Chinese language. Publications and media coverage of refugees in Chinese 
media are rare; studies on refugees and refugee law are emerging only recently.78  
In the small volume of Chinese literature on refugees, a significant proportion is related to the 
Indochinese refugees and was produced in the late 1970s and early 1980s when they first arrived, 
usually focusing on the situation upon their arrival and denouncing the Vietnamese government. 
In-depth analysis on their legal status and follow-up research on the social impact of the influx 
or the refugees’ local integration are lacking. As years passed by, they somehow received 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 MFA press conference, Beijing, 16 June 2011. 
72  Kaung Ba “Kachin State Refugees Face Uncertain Future” (1 July 2011) The Irrawaddy 
<http://www2.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=21612> (accessed 28 April 2014); “Aid Groups Say China is 
Expelling Kachin Refugees” (23 June 2011) VOA <http://blogs.voanews.com/breaking-news/2011/06/23/aid-
groups-say-china-is-expelling-kachin-refugees/> (accessed 28 April 2014). The fighting, nonetheless, has been 
going on and off since the Myanmar government and the KIA have not succeeded in reaching a ceasefire agreement 
as of March 2014. 
73 HRW “Isolated in Yunnan: Kachin Refugees from Burma in China’s Yunnan Province” (June 2012) Human 
Rights Watch <http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/china0612_forinsertForUpload.pdf> (accessed 28 
April 2014) at 36. 
74 Interview conducted by the author (April 2013). 
75 Interview conducted by the author (April 2013). See also HRW, above n 73, at 11. 
76 UNHCR “UNHCR reaches Kachins sent back from China”, above n 53. 
77 Interview conducted by the author (April 2013). 
78 Liang Shuying’s book International Refugee Law, which was published in 2009, was referred to “the first of its 
kind in China” by Veerapong Vongvarotai, then UNHCR Regional Representative for China & Mongolia, in his 
foreword for the book. 
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decreasing attention from Chinese society. There have been only occasional reports on the 
Indochinese refugees in China in the past three decades in main stream Chinese media. By 2009, 
they had become “a silent community”.79 In particular, when the Indochinese refugees came, 
they were largely perceived as overseas Chinese returning to the motherland.80 The fact that they 
were settled on overseas Chinese farms has further caused confusion about their status and 
blurred their image as refugees.  
In recent years, more and more information about refugees in China is becoming available. The 
Kokang Incident in 2009 was a turning point. The incident was widely covered by mainstream 
Chinese media and stirred up some discussion on China’s refugee policy in newspapers and 
among netizens. The Kachin influx in 2011 and 2012 further attracted attention of a wider 
audience to refugee issues. At the meantime, stories of North Korean escapees, which used to be 
almost a taboo, began to appear in China’s mainstream media; there is also a small number of 
academic articles and theses on North Korean escapees.81  
In February 2012 the website of China’s national television posted an article on accepting 
refugees and asked readers two questions: (1) “what do you think of refugees?”, and (2) “what 
do you think of illegal border crossers (feifa rujingzhe)?”82 Each question came with three 
options which readers were invited to choose from.  The results are as shown in Charts 4 and 5: 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 Buzhi Ding, Zhen Xu and Jialin Liang “yige yi cunzai 30 nian de chenmo qunti: 30 wan nanmin zai zhongguo [A 
Silent Community that Have Existed for 30 Years: 300 Thousand Refugees in China]” (2009) Nanfang zhoumo 
(Southern Weekly) (online ed, Guangzhou, 15 Oct 2009). A possible explanation for their silence may be two fold. 
On the one hand, possibly due to the warming Sino-Vietnamese relations and China’s intention of not embarrassing 
Vietnam, the Chinese government has been low key about its effort in settling and continuously supporting the 
Indochinese refugees in China. On the other hand, the Indochinese refugees, who still do not have Chinese 
nationality, are subject to the Chinese government’s permission to live in China; this perhaps makes them cautious 
about catching social attention deemed undesirable by Chinese authorities. 
80 See Chapter IV and Chapter VI. 
81 Eg Jianan Ge “chaoxian tuobeizhe jiangshu chutao jingji: dongtian dujiang dao zhongguo [North Korean 
‘Escapees’ Tell Their Fleeing Stories: Crossing Rivers to China in Winter]” (24 January 2014) NetEase 
<http://news.163.com/14/0124/18/9JCGBCKK0001121M_all.html> (accessed 12 February 2014); “chaoxian 
tuobeizhe laihua jing dongnanya fuhan xiangxi luxian baoguang [Revealing Detailed Route Used by North Korean 
Escapees to Go to South Korea from China via Southeast Asia]” (26 December 2013) Sina 
<http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2013-12-26/015629082245.shtml> (accessed 28 April 2014); Ruobing Chen (ed) “yige 
‘tuobei’ jiating de 10 nian [Ten Years of a ‘North Korean Escapee’ Family]” (5 January 2012) Tengxun 
<http://news.qq.com/zt2011/shijie/nkrefugee.htm> (accessed 28 April 2014); Jianyi Piao and Zhipei Li “chaoxian 
‘tuobeizhe’ wenti de guojihua yanbian jiqi yingxiang [The Internationalization of the Issue of North Korean 
‘Escapees’ and Its Influence]” (13 August 2012) China Network for the Asian-Pacific Research 
<http://iaps.cass.cn/news/523644.htm> (accessed 15 August 2013); Yun Cheng “nanmin diwei guoji gongyue ji 
chaoxian ‘nanmin’ wenti zhi yanjiu [The International Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the Issue 
of North Korean ‘Refugees’]” (Master dissertation, Dalian Maritime University, 2007). 
82 Hansen Li (ed) “jiena guoji nanmin: chuyu liyi, yuanyu daoyi [Acceptance of International Refugees: out of 
Interest, Originated in Humanity]” (27 February 2012) China Network Television 
<http://news.cntv.cn/special/thinkagain/refugee/index.shtml> (accessed 28 April 2014). 
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Chart 4 What do you Think of Refugees?              Chart 5 What do you Think of Illegal Border Crossers? 
             
 
Although the number of participating readers is relatively small,83 the results of the survey, 
which is probably the first of its kind in China, show, to some extent, the sympathy and tolerance 
of Chinese society for refugees and asylum seekers. Nearly three quarters of the participating 
readers agreed that refugees’ human rights should be protected but China’s State interest should 
also be taken into consideration. In comparison, supporters for strict control of refugee inflows 
were less than 5.5 per cent of all participants, only about one quarter of those who supported 
refugee protection without restriction. More than half of the participating readers viewed illegal 
border crossers as refugees, despite Chinese authorities’ strong and persistent position on 
labelling North Korean escapees as illegal border crossers and illegal economic migrants and 
denying them refugee status. Those who viewed illegal border crossers as smugglers were 5.45 
per cent fewer than those were not sure about their view of illegal border crossers.  
The relaxation of control on refugee-related publications reflects China’s growing interest in and 
tolerance of refugees on its soil. However, there has never been any in-depth debate or 
discussion on refugee issues that involves a wider Chinese audience.  
This is mainly because refugees remain a sensitive topic in China.84 Where does the sensitivity 
come from? First, China still remians a source of refugees and asylum seekers. Chinese nationals 
seeking asylum in Western countries were often used by Western media to criticise China’s 
human rights conditions. In particular, since ethnic Tibetans and Uighurs are among the Chinese 
nationals seeking asylum in other countries, the Chinese government probably regards refugee 
issues as linked to the highly sensitive religious and ethnic issues in Tibet and Xinjiang 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 The results are based on 56 votes for each question as of 12 February 2014. 
84 Liu, above n 15, at 91; Lihong Lan and Xiuxia Shi “Reflection on the Latest Progress in Chinese Legislation on 
International Migration” (2013) 8(3) Frontiers of Law in China 618 at 635. 
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Autonomous Regions in China. China has reportedly requested other countries to send back 
Chinese asylum seekers.85 
It is worth mentioning that Chinese refugees and asylum seekers in third countries are generally 
not reported or discussed in China. The occasional media coverage of high-profile Chinese 
asylum seekers overseas probably has only generated negative feelings towards refugees in 
Chinese society. The story of Lai Changxing is a case in point. Lai was a businessman in 
Xiamen, Fujian Province in southern China, who was charged with bribery and smuggling by the 
Chinese government. Lai fled to Canada in 1999 and applied for refugee status there. Though his 
case was eventually turned down by Canadian authorities and he was extradited to China,86 the 
procedure took more than 10 years, during which Lai was able to enjoy a comfortable life in his 
luxury home in Vancouver, Canada. Had Lai successfully claimed refugee status in Canada, he 
would have been able to escape Chinese judicial procedures for his criminal offences in China. 
This might have given Chinese society the impression that the refugee protection system was 
helping criminals and betrayers of China like Lai. 
Ironically, while China’s efforts in locally integrating the Indochinese refugees were largely 
neglected by the international community, its deportation of North Korean escapees was caught 
in the spotlight in recent years and attracted international criticism. This probably results in 
China’s negative and defensive attitude towards domestic refugee issues.  
Another reason why ordinary Chinese are unfamiliar with refugees is that they lack interaction 
with refugees. As the Indochinese refugees live in six provinces and autonomous regions in 
South and Southwest China and UNHCR refugees are not allowed to work or attend Chinese 
universities or high schools, and need approval to travel,87 most Chinese have never met or 
known any refugee.  
Nevertheless, Chinese communities that have contact with refugees and asylum seekers have 
demonstrated a tradition of hospitality. The Indochinese refugees were generously hosted by 
local residents upon their arrival at the Chinese border, and later were well accepted by local 
communities when they were resettled.88  Korean Chinese communities in Northeast China were 
reported to have been sheltering and assisting North Korean escapees in the region despite 
disapproval from the government.89 The displaced Kokangs were well received by residents in 
China’s Yunnan Province; many Chinese citizens not only called for support to the displaced 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85 Jamil Anderlini “China presses Thailand to return Uighur refugees” Financial Times (Online ed, 3 April 2014), 
available at <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/35bbf33a-bb1d-11e3-948c-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3I4pBroPA> 
(accessed 20 June 2014). 
86 For more information of Lai’s case, see for example, “Canada to Deport Chinese Fugitive Lai Changxing” (22 
July 2011) BBC <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-14245141> (accessed 28 April 2014); “Why Lai 
Changxing's Appeal to Canadian Court Rejected?” People’s Daily (online ed, Beijing, 9 February 2004), available 
at <http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200402/09/eng20040209_134341.shtml> (accessed 28 April 2014). 
87 Lin, above n 55. 
88 See eg Liang, above n 32, at 277. 
89 See eg Haggard and Noland, above n 59, at 34; Ju Hui Judy Han “Beyond Safe Haven - A Critique of Christian 
Custody of North Korean Migrants in China” (2013) 45(4) Critical Asian Studies 533; James D Seymour “China: 
Background Paper on the Situation of North Koreans in China” (2005) Refworld 
<http://www.refworld.org/docid/4231d11d4.html> (accessed 28 April 2014) at 15. 
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Kokangs, but also volunteered at the camps set up for the displaced Kokangs.90 During the 
Kachin influx, Chinese civilians, both ethnic Jingpo and Han, from Yunnan Province and other 
parts of China, helped the displaced Kachins in many ways, such as providing accommodation, 
donating clothes and helping in negotiations with Chinese government officials to optimise the 
displaced Kachins’ chance to stay in China.91  
Because of the high sensitivity of the refugee topic in China and the resulting tight government 
control, except UNHCR and the Chinese government’s Office of Reception and Settlement of 
Indochinese Refugees (ORSIR), which support the Indochinese refugees, few organisations 
assisting or advocating for refugees exist in China. A small number of non-governmental 
organisations (NGO) and religious groups operate quietly or underground, helping the North 
Korean escapees or the displaced Kachins in China. There are no NGOs or law firms providing 
legal assistance relating to refugee status application in China.92 Consequently, refugees in China 
have little support and few means to make their voices heard in the Chinese society. 
V Conclusion	  
China is in a transitional position from a source country of refugees and asylum seekers to a 
country as both the source and the host of refugees and asylum seekers. This transitional position 
is crucial for understanding China’s law and policy on refugee status.  
China has had limited experience in handling refugees and asylum seekers. Such experience has 
occurred mainly around large-scale inflows from neighbouring countries. This characteristic of 
China’s experience with refugees, coupled with the traditional mistrust of foreigners in general, 
has contributed to China’s perception of refugees as a threat to national security and stability. 
The growing number of refugees and other displaced foreigners calls for regulated, effective 
refugee recognition and protection mechanisms in China. Presently, persons with refugee status 
in China generally fall into two categories: the Indochinese refugees and the UNHCR refugees. 
The differentiated treatment of these two subsets of refugees in China is not in line with the 
principle of non-discrimination set forth in art 3 of the Convention.93 Displaced foreigners who 
do not have refugee status in China also fall into two categories: those who have access to the 
RSD services of the Beijing Office of UNHCR, and those to whom China restricts UNHCR’s 
access. Repatriation of the latter subset of displaced foreigners in China, ie the North Korean 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90 See eg Piaobotanggula “guogan, jinye wumian weini qidao [Kokang, Praying for You in This Sleepless Night]” 
(28 August 2009) Tianya Forum <http://bbs.tianya.cn/post-news-141112-1.shtml> (accessed 14 February 2014); 
“jiaoda zhiyuanzhe zai Yunnan bianchun anquan duguo guogan zhanshi [Jiaotong University Volunteers Survived 
Kokang War]” (24 September 2009) Shanghai Jiaotong University 
<http://topics.sjtu.edu.cn/newsnet/shownews.php?id=22669> (accessed 23 April 2014). 
91 Interviews conducted by the author (April 2013). See Chapter VI for more information. 
92 “We have not yet identified any NGO or law firm that is offering refugees legal assistance in China; in fact, we 
understand that the government does not allow refugee-assisting NGOs to operate.” “China Pro Bono Directory” 
Fahamu Refugee Programme <http://www.refugeelegalaidinformation.org/china-pro-bono-directory> (accessed 17 
April 2014). 
93 See ch II. 
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escapees and the ethnic Kachins, raises the question of full compliance with the obligation of 
non-refoulement under art 33 of the Convention.94  
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Chapter II The Refugee Concept under International law 
 
Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution.  
– Article 14(1), Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
 
This chapter introduces the concept of a refugee in international law. Aiming to provide a 
background for the discussion in the following chapters on China’s recognition or non-
recognition of refugee status of displaced foreigners on its territory, it primarily focuses on the 
Convention and Protocol, to which China is a party, with an emphasis on issues relating to the 
Chinese context. This chapter also discusses the refugee for purpose of the UN and 
developments of the refugee definition in regional law, with an emphasis on the Asian region. 
I Refugeehood and Refugee Status 
The term “refugee” in the sense of international law is primarily defined in the Convention and 
Protocol, the most widely ratified international legal instruments relating to refugees. It is also 
defined, for the purposes of the UN, in the Statute of the Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR Statute), which sets out the mandate of the UN’s refugee 
agency. In addition, several regional arrangements, such as the 1969 Organization of African 
Unity Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa (OAU 
Convention), the 1984 Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, Colloquium on the International 
Protection of Refugees in Central America, Mexico and Panama (Cartagena Declaration), and 
Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council on standards for the 
qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international 
protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and 
for the content of the protection granted (EU Qualification Directive), and the Bangkok 
Principles concerning the Status and Treatment of Refugees (Bangkok Principles), provide a 
definition of a refugee at the regional level.  
The refugee definition in these instruments is divergent and subject to interpretation when 
applied domestically by States. Shacknove has insightfully pointed out that “[a] conception of 
‘refugee’ is not, strictly speaking, a definition. There are in fact dozens of definitions in effect 
within various jurisdictions”.95 He has noted that there is, however, something essential and 
universal about refugeehood:96 the bond between the citizen and the State, which constitutes the 
normal basis of society, has been severed in the case of the refugee.97 Similarly, Grahl-Madsen 
has noted that “[t]he concept of ‘refugee’ has no single, simple meaning”; he has also recognised 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95 Andrew E Shacknove “Who is a Refugee?” (1985) 95(2) Ethics 274 at 275. Shacknove noted that most States 
“have their own municipal definitions, the majority of which follow the construction of the UN [Refugee] 
Convention”, at 275. 
96 Shacknove, above n 95, at 275. 
97 At 275 and 278. 
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that certain characteristics set refugees apart from other persons and that “the crux of the matter 
is that the relationship between the State and the refugee has turned sour for political reasons”.98 
It is generally accepted that refugee law is a system principally concerned with providing a 
remedy to a fundamental breakdown in the relationship between individuals and their State.99 
Refugee status affords its beneficiaries surrogate protection in the absence of national protection 
usually provided by the country of their nationality or, in the case of stateless persons, the 
country of their habitual residence.100  
Hathaway and Foster have observed that “[r]efugee law may be the most powerful international 
human rights mechanism”.101 On the one hand, a person who is refugee at international law is 
entitled to claim a wide range of internationally binding rights in more than 100 countries which 
are parties to relevant international or regional refugee instruments.102 On the other, as Goodwin-
Gill and McAdam have noted, the international legal status of refugees necessarily entails legal 
consequences for States, the most important of which is to respect the principle of non-
refoulement.103  
According to UNHCR, recognition of refugee status by States is only declaratory:104 
 
[a] person is a refugee within the meaning of the 1951 Convention as soon as he fulfils the 
criteria contained in the definition. This would necessarily occur prior to the time at which his 
refugee status is formally determined. Recognition of his refugee status does not therefore make 
him a refugee but declares him to be one. He does not become a refugee because of recognition, 
but is recognized because he is a refugee. 
 
This position of UNHCR has been generally accepted by scholars.105 For example, Hathaway 
and Foster have noted that “as UNHCR has insisted, refugee status is not a status that is granted 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98 Atle Grahl-Madsen “International Refugee Law Today and Tomorrow” (1982) 20 Archiv des Völkerrechts 411, 
at 418. 
99 See eg James C Hathaway and Michelle Foster The Law of Refugee Status (2nd ed, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2014), at 288; Nïraj Nathwani Rethinking Refugee Law (Martinus Nijhoff, the Hague, 2003), at 70; 
Ward v Canada (Attorney General) (1993) 2 SCR 689, at 709; Horvath v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department [2001] 1 AC 489 (HL), at 495. 
100 UNHCR “Interpreting Article 1 of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees” (2001) UNHCR 
<http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3b20a3914.html> (accessed 20 April 2014), at [52]. 
101 Hathaway and Foster, above n 99, at 1. 
102 At 1. 
103 Guy S Goodwin-Gill and Jane McAdam The Refugee in International Law (3rd ed, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2007), at 1. 
104 UNHCR Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and 
the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, HCR/IP/4/Eng/REV.1 (reedited January 1992), at [28].  
105 Pirkko Kourula Broadening the Edges: Refugee Definition and International Protection Revisited (Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague, 1997), at 39. See also works supporting UNHCR’s view, eg Grahl-Madsen, above n 
98, at 428; Andreas Zimmermann and Claudia Mahlet “Article 1 A, para. 2 1951 Convention” in Andreas 
Zimmermann (ed) The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol: A Commentary 
(Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011) 281 at 299; Goodwin-Gill and McAdam, above n 103, at 51; Hathaway 
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by states; it is rather simply recognized by them”.106 An implication of this argument, as put 
forward by Hathaway and Foster, is that the entitlement to the rights provided relevant refugee 
instruments – “including not only critical civil rights, but also socio-economic rights and rights 
that enable pursuit of a solution to refugeehood” – persists until and unless the person concerned 
is found not to be a refugee.107  
Kneebone has noted that “in recognition of the ‘declaratory’ nature of refugee status, some basic 
rights adhere under the Refugee Convention to all refugees, irrespective of status.”108 She has 
further noted that these basic rights include the rights against refoulement and discrimination as 
to race, religion or country of origin, the right against penalisation for unlawful presence in the 
host country, and the right of free access to courts.109 
Goodwin-Gill and McAdam, recognising that in principle “determination of refugee status is 
declaratory, rather than constitutive”,110 have nonetheless pointed out that in practical termss:111  
 
the legal consequences which flow from the formal definition of refugee status are necessarily 
predicated upon determination by some or other authority that the individual or group in question 
satisfies the relevant legal criteria. 
 
Grahl-Madsen has also observed,112  
 
[i]t follows from the declaratory nature of the act of recognition that refugees are refugees also 
before they are recognised, but until recognition takes place, they are in a kind of limbo, … With 
many people in the “pipelines” for protracted periods of time, we are not only faced with 
enormous numbers, but it is difficult to tell who are ‘de facto refugees’ and who are not. 
 
UNHCR also acknowledged that “RSD [refugee status determination] is usually the ‘entry door’ 
to international protection and durable solution.”113 Indeed, although a person is a refugee as 
soon as that person fulfils the criteria contained in the applicable refugee definition, when or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
106 Hathaway and Foster, above n 99, at 1. 
107 James C Hathaway The Rights of Refugees under International Law (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
2005), at 11.  
108 Susan Kneebone “Introduction: Refugees and Asylum Seekers in the International Context – Rights and Realities” 
in Susan Kneebone (ed) Refugees, Asylum Seekers and the Rule of Law Comparative Perspectives (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2009) 1, at 7. 
109 Kneebone, above n 108, at 7: “These include the negative rights against refoulement (Art. 33) and discrimination 
as to ‘race, religion or country of origin’ (Art. 3). To this can be added Article 31, the non-penalization provision 
which applies to refugees ‘unlawfully’ in the country; that is, those who have entered or attempted to enter the 
territory without permission.22 Additionally all refugees are entitled to free access to courts of law ‘on the territory 
of all Contracting States’ (Art. 16(1))”. 
110 Goodwin-Gill and McAdam, above n 103, at 51. 
111 Goodwin-Gill and McAdam, above n 103, at 51, with footnote on the term “legal consequences”. 
112 Grahl-Madsen, above n 98, at 428. 
113 UNHCR “APC Regional Workshop – Refugee Status Determination (RSD) Discussion Paper: Refugee Status 
Determination Processes and Procedures in the Region” (10 March 2009), at [28], emphasis added. 
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whether “he fulfils the criteria contained in the definition” has hardly been self-evident and the 
claims that a person “fulfils the criteria contained in the definition” necessarily comes from one 
stakeholder or another, be it the refugee claimant, the State in which the refugee claimant 
requests asylum, UNHCR, academics, or other States which are not the host country of the 
refugee claimant.  
Furthermore, the question of whether or when a person “fulfils the criteria contained in the 
definition” has never been an easy one to agree on between and among relevant stakeholders.114 
Despite the wide acceptance of the Convention and Protocol, the interpretation of the 
Convention varies from country to country, even within countries.115 This reality is most vividly 
demonstrated by the Zaoui case, where an Algerian asylum seeker, having been denied refugee 
status in Spain and Belgium (twice), was declared a refugee by the New Zealand Refugee Status 
Appeal Authority.116 North and Chia have also forthrightly pointed out that “a refugee in Canada 
may not be a refugee in the United States, and vice versa”.117 
Within a certain jurisdiction, as a matter of binding decisions, the host State and/or UNHCR 
have performed the function of determining whether a person or a group satisfies relevant legal 
criteria for refugee status. 
II  The Definition of a Refugee under the 1951 Convention relating to the 
Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol  
A The 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol  
1 Status of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol 
The 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol are the 
cornerstone of the international refugee protection regime and the key international legal 
documents in defining who is a refugee. Grounded in article 14 of the 1948 Universal Human 
Rights Declaration,118 which recognises a person’s right to seek and enjoy asylum from 
persecution, the Convention was adopted in 1951 and entered into force in 1954. The 
Convention defines the term “refugee”, and sets a minimum standard for the treatment of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
114 For general discussions on this topic, see eg Hathaway and Foster, above n 99; Goodwin-Gill and McAdam, 
above n 103; Grahl-Madsen, above n 98; Shacknove, above n 95; Jean-Yves Carlier et al (eds) Who is a Refugee – A 
Comparative Case Law Studies (Kluwer Law International, the Hague, 1997); Kourula, above n 105; Jerzy Sztucki 
“Who is a Refugee? The Convention Definition: Universal or Obsolete?” in Nicholson and Twomey (ed) Refugee 
Rights and Realities (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999) 55.  
115 Anthony M North and Joyce Chia “Towards Convergence in the Interpretation of the Refugee Convention: A 
Proposal for the Establishment of an International Judicial Commission for Refugees” in Jane McAdam (ed) Forced 
Migration, Human Rights and Security (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2008) 225, at 225; Mary Crock, Ben Saul and 
Azadeh Dastyari Future Seekers II (The Federation Press, Annandale (NSW), 2006) at 86. See also part II C of this 
chapter. 
116 Zaoui NZRSAA Refugee Appeal No 74540, 1 August 2003. France, Switzerland, Belgium, and New Zealand are 
parties of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (the Convention). 
117 North and Chia, above n 115, at 225.  
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refugees.119 Initially drafted in the aftermath of the Second World War in response to the mass 
displacement in Europe,120 the Convention originally was limited in scope to persons fleeing 
events occurring prior to 1 January 1951 and allowed contracting parties to further limit the 
application of the Convention to persons fleeing events occurring in Europe prior to 1 January 
1951 (art 1B(1)). In 1967, the Protocol was adopted to remove these temporal and geographic 
limitations of the Convention. 
As of April 2014, there were 145 State parties to the Convention and 146 State parties to the 
Protocol. China has been a party to the Convention and Protocol since September 1982. In 
December 2011, UN member States reaffirmed their recognition of the “enduring value and 
relevance” of the Convention and Protocol and their importance as the “foundation of the 
international refugee protection regime”.121  
2 Rights of Refugees	  	  
The Convention lays down a number of fundamental principles of refugee protection, most 
notably non-refoulement, non-discrimination, and non-penalisation.122 The principle of non-
refoulement, found in art 33(1) of the Convention, prohibits State parties from returning refugees 
in any manner whatsoever to any place where their life or freedom would be threatened. This 
principle not only requires the State not to deport refugees on its territory, but also requires the 
State not to push back refugees at its border. The principle of non-refoulement is a non-
derogatory obligation of contracting States;123 State parties to the Convention are not allowed to 
make any reservation to it (art 42 of the Convention). The principle of non-discrimination, as set 
forth in art 3 of the Convention, prohibits States from discrimination between and among 
refugees on the basis of race, religion, and country of origin when applying the Convention.124 
According to the principle of non-penalisation under art 31(1) of the Convention, States shall not 
penalise refugees for illegal entry or stay provided that refugees present themselves without 
delay to the authorities and show good cause for their illegal entry or stay.  
The Convention and Protocol also afford a series of rights for refugees, such as freedom from 
arbitrary detention, freedom from penalisation for illegal entry, freedom from expulsion, the 
right to work, the right to public education, the right of free movement, the right to access courts, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
119 UNHCR Refugee Protection: A Guide to International Refugee Law (UNHCR and Inter-Parliamentary Union, 
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120 Gil Loescher Beyond Charity: International Cooperation and the Global Refugee Crisis (Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 1993) at 57. 
121 Ministerial Communiqué, HCR/MINCOMMS/2011/6 (8 December 2011), at [2], cited from UNHCR The State 
of the World’s Refugees 2012: In Search of Solidarity (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012), at 37. 
122 UNHCR, above n 118. 
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(i); UN General Assembly Resolution 51/75 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 
A/RES/51/75 (12 February 1997), at [3]; UN General Assembly Resolution 52/132 Human Rights and Mass Exodux, 
A/RES/52/132 (27 February 1998), Preamble. However, Goodwin-Gill and McAdam have noted that “the (legal) 
obligation to respect this principle, independent and compelling as it is, may be difficult to isolate from the (political) 
options which governs the availability of solutions.” Goodwin-Gill and McAdam, above n 103, at 1. 
124 Through the development of international human rights law, State parties are also required to apply the 
Convention without discrimination on the basis of sex, age, disability, sexuality, or other prohibited grounds.  
UNHCR, above n 118; Hathaway, above n 107, at 248.  
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and the right of resolution. It is important to understand that the Convention and Protocol only 
serve as statements of the minimum rights of the refugees; State parties must not provide less 
protection, but may provide wider protection to refugees or extend their protection to non-
refugees.  
3 Limitations of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 
Protocol	  
The Convention and Protocol are not without limitations. Most notably, the Convention and 
Protocol do not impose on State parties a legal obligation to grant asylum. Although there are 
references to asylum in the Final Act of the Conference of Plenipotentiaries and in the Preamble 
to the Convention, the Convention does not impose an obligation upon States to grant asylum to 
refugees. 125    
Secondly, the Convention and Protocol do not establish any particular procedure for RSD or 
admission of refugees to be followed by States. They therefore leave to States the choice of 
means as to implementation at the national level.126 
Thirdly, the Convention and the Protocol do not establish an effective supervision mechanism. 
UNHCR is given the task to supervise the implementation of the Convention and Protocol.127 
Nevertheless, unlike treaty supervisory mechanisms formed under the Convention against 
Torture or the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child, UNHCR does not have the function 
of reviewing State reports or determining individual or inter-State complaints.128 Additionally, 
although according to art 38 of the Convention the International Court of Justice (ICJ) is the 
relevant forum for settling any dispute between States relating to the interpretation and 
application of the Convention, this jurisdiction of ICJ has never been invoked.129  
B  The Definition of a Refugee under the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees 
and its 1967 Protocol  
The Convention provides a general definition of a refugees under art 1A(2) (the Convention 
Refugee Definition),130 which, read together with the Protocol, defines a refugee as any person 
who: 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
125 UNHCR, above n 104, at [25]: “the granting of asylum is not dealt with in the 1951 Convention or the 1967 
Protocol”; Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Khawar [2002] HCA 14, Mc Hugh and Gummow 
JJ: “the term ‘asylum’ does not appear in the main body of the text of the [Refugee] Convention; the Convention 
does not impose an obligation upon contracting states to grant asylum or a right to settle in those states to refugees 
arriving at their borders”. 
126 Goodwin-Gill and McAdam, above n 103, at 54. 
127 Preamble of the Convention.  
128 Guy S Goodwin-Gill “Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees & Protocol Relating to the Status of 
Refugees” (2008) UN Audiovisual Library of International Law <http://legal.un.org/avl/ha/prsr/prsr.html> 
(accessed 28 April 2014). 
129 Katie O’Byrne “Is There a Need for Better Supervision of the Convention?” (2013) 26(3) Journal of Refugee 
Studies 330 at 333. 
130 Article 1 A(1) deals with persons considered to be refugees under the provisions of international instruments 
preceding the Convention. 
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owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his 
nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of 
that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual 
residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it. 
 
Central to this definition is the “persecution” criterion, ie it is owing to well-founded fear of 
persecution that a person is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of 
the country of origin. The focus is the risk of persecution. Persecution does not have to have 
happened, but there should be a real chance of persecution. 
Another characteristic of the Convention Refugee Definition is that the reasons for fear of 
persecution are limited to five grounds, namely race, religion, nationality, membership of a 
particular social group and political opinion. To qualify as a refugee, a person must establish that 
there is a nexus between the fear of persecution and one or more of the enumerated grounds.  
A third feature of the Convention Definition is that it requires a refugee to be outside the country 
of nationality or, in the case of a stateless person, outside the country of habitual residence. This 
means a person must cross an international border to qualify as a refugee.  
In addition to stipulating who is a refugee, the Convention also specifies who is not. Those who 
do not need or deserve includes persons protected or assisted by other UN organs or agencies 
(art 1D), persons protected by the State of their residence (art 1E), persons who committed a 
crime against peace or humanity, a war crime, or a serious non-political crime (art 1F), and 
persons who has been guilty of acts contrary to the principles and purposes of the UN (art 1F). 
C Interpretation and Application of the Convention Refugee Definition  
1 General Principles 
The interpretation of the Convention Refugee Definition is a matter of much discussion. 
Although according to Lord Steyn “there can be only one true interpretation of the treaty” and 
each State “must search, untrammelled by notions of its national legal culture, for the true 
autonomous and international meaning of the treaty”,131 virtually every word of the core phrases 
of the Convention Refugee Definition has been subject to interpretive dispute.132 
Not only does interpretation of the Convention Refugee Definition raise many complex issues, 
but there is no single authoritative entity acting as the final arbiter on issues of interpretation of 
the Convention.133 McAdam has forthrightly pointed out that there is no uniform international 
practice or single interpretation of the Convention.134 As mentioned above, the ICJ is the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
131 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department; Ex parte Adan [2001] 2 AC 477 (HL), at 516 (Lord Steyn). 
132 Daniel J Steinbock “The Refugee Definition as Law: Issues of Interpretation” in Frances Nicholson and Patrick 
Twomey (eds) Refugee Rights and Realities: Evolving International Concepts and Regimes (Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 1999) 13 at 14. 
133 Hathaway and Foster, above n 99, at 3. 
134 McAdam, above n 138, at 77. 
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relevant forum for settlement of disputes relating to the interpretation and application of the 
Convention between State parties,135 but this mechanism has never been invoked,136 and the 
prospect of it being used is remote.137 UNHCR has a supervisory role in relation to the 
implementation and application of the Convention, however, it does not have the authority to 
mandate any particular interpretation of the Convention Refugee Definition.138  
As Hathaway and Foster have observed, as a matter of binding law, the task of determining the 
Convention’s “true autonomous and international meaning” has fallen principally on domestic 
decision-makers – officials, specialist tribunals, and courts.139 Goodwin-Gill has also pointed out 
that, in the absence of a formally established treaty supervisory body, “it is the totality of the 
state parties themselves which are competent to provide authoritative interpretation”.140  
As observed by the International Law Commission, interpretation of treaties is “to some extent 
an art, not an exact science”.141 According to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, a 
“treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to 
the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose”.142 Further, the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties requires States to take into account subsequent 
agreement and practice as well as relevant rules in international law when interpreting a 
treaty.143  
The Convention has been acknowledged as a “living instrument”.144 The meaning of the core 
phrases of the Convention Refugee Definition, as part of a “living instrument”, has evolved since 
the inception of the Convention in 1951, although the Convention Refugee Definition has 
sometimes been criticised as outdated.145 The evolving interpretation of the Convention refugee 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
135 Article 38 of the Convention: “Any dispute between parties to this Convention relating to its interpretation or 
application, which cannot be settled by other means, shall be referred to the International Court of Justice at the 
request of any one of the parties to the dispute”. 
136 O’Byrne, above n 129, at 333. 
137 North and Chia, above n 115, at 240. 
138 Jane McAdam “Interpretation of the 1951 Convention” in Andreas Zimmermann (ed) The 1951 Convention 
relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol: A Commentary (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011) 75, 
at 79; Hathaway and Foster, above n 99, at 3. 
139 Hathaway and Foster, above n 99, at 3. 
140 Guy S Goodwin-Gill “The Search for the One, True Meaning…” in Guy Goodwin-Gill and Helen Lambert (eds) 
The Limits of Transnational Law: Refugee Law, Policy Harmonization and Judicial Dialogue in the European 
Union (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2010), at 207 in footnote 8. 
141 International Law Commission “Reports of the Commission to the General Assembly” (1964) vol II International 
Law Commission Yearbook 200 at [5], cited from McAdam, above n 138, at 82, further references cited there. 
142 Art 31(1). 
143 Art 31(3): “3.There shall be taken into account, together with the context: (a) any subsequent agreement between 
the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions; (b) any subsequent practice 
in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation; (c) any 
relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties”. 
144 Susan Kneebone and Maria O’Sullivan “Article 1 C” in Andreas Zimmermann (ed) The 1951 Convention 
relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol: A Commentary (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011) 
481 at 531, further references cited there. 
145  Guy S Goodwin-Gill “The Refugees Convention: Why not Scrap it?” (2005) Chatham House 
<https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Research/International%20Law/ilp201005.pdf> 
(accessed 20 June 2013), at 1. 
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definition has been extensively explored in scholarly writings.146 One pertinent example is the 
notion of “membership of a particular social groups”, which has developed significantly through 
expansive interpretation.147 It is also well-known that the interpretation of “persecution” has 
been influenced by the development of international human rights law and humanitarian law, in 
particular the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (the Convention against Torture) (adopted 10 December 1984, entered into force 26 
June 1987) , after the birth of the Convention.148  
It should be noted that the debate on where the boundaries of the Convention Refugee Definition 
should lie, which has lasted for decades, continues. While UNHCR has recently observed that, if 
the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol were to be properly applied, they would 
address most international protection needs,149  Steinbock has reminded us that while the 
identified purposes of the Convention clearly serve to protect important human rights, they are 
not co-extensive with the entire body of international human rights law.150  
Although this is not the right place for a thorough discussion on the interpretation issues of the 
Convention Refugee Definition, it may be useful to refer to what has been pointed out by 
Shacknove:151   
 
an overly narrow conception of “refugee” will contribute to the denial of international protection 
to countless people in desperate circumstances whose claim to assistance is impeccable; 
conversely, an overly inclusive conception is also morally suspect and will financially exhaust 
relief programmes and impune the credibility of the refugee’s privileged position among host 
populations, whose support is crucial for the viability of international assistance programmes.  
 
2 Application of the Convention Refugee Definition in Mass Influx Situations 
The phenomenon of large-scale influx of refugees, commonly known as “mass influx”, is a 
dominant feature of the refugee problem today worldwide.152 The term “mass influx” does not 
appear in the Convention or the Protocol. As noted by Durieux and McAdam, there is no precise 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
146 See generally Hathaway and Foster, above n 99; UNHCR, above n 104; Goodwin-Gill and McAdam, above n 
103; Andreas Zimmermann (ed) The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol: A 
Commentary (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011); Grahl-Madsen, above n 98. 
147 See eg Hathaway and Foster, above n 99, at ch 5.9; Zimmermann and Mahler, above n 105, at pt XI. 
148 See eg Goodwin-Gill and McAdam, above n 103, at ch 3.5; Hathaway and Foster, above n 99, at ch 3. 
149 UNHCR “Safe At Last? Law and practice in selected EU Member States with respect to asylum-seekers fleeing 
indiscriminate violence” (Geneva, July 2011), available at UNHCR <http://www.refworld.org/cgi-
bin/texis/vtx/rwmain?docid=4e2ee0022> (accessed 8 October 2014), at 9. 
150 Steinbock, above n 132, at 35. 
151 Shacknove, above n 95, at 276. 
152 Bonaventure Rutinwa “Prima Pacie Status and Refugee Protection” (2001) UNHCR New Issues in Refugee 
Research Working Paper No 69, at 1. 
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legal definition of the concept of mass influx.153 According to UNHCR, a mass influx situation 
may, inter alia, have some or all of the following features:154  
 
(i) considerable numbers of people arriving over an international border; (ii) a rapid rate of 
arrival; (iii) inadequate absorption or response capacity in host States, particular during 
emergency; (iv) individual asylum procedures, where they exist, which are unable to deal with 
the assessment of such large numbers. 
 
Rutinwa has noted that although mass influx situations had existed before the present refugee 
protection regime was formulated in 1950s, they became a global experience and a prominent 
issue in refugee policy only in the 1980s and the 1990s.155 It has since been a challenge for 
States to devise appropriate mechanisms to respond to mass influx refugee situations.156 
The Convention Refugee Definition is often considered primarily individualistic.157 It is well 
known that RSD procedures are generally designed for the determination of individual 
applications.158 In mass influx situations, on the one hand, the large numbers of arrivals usually 
makes individual refugee status determination impracticable,159 on the other, the evident and 
immediate need for emergency assistance and protection demand an urgent response.160 
As noted by UNHCR, Jackson, and Durieux and McAdam, there is nothing inherent in the 
provisions of the Convention or Protocol to preclude the application of the Convention Refugee 
Definition in mass influx situations,161 or in group determination of refugee status.162 In fact, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
153 Durieux and McAdam, above n 161, at 17. For further discussion on different opinions on what constitutes a 
mass influx, see Mathew Albert “Governance and Prima Facie Refugee Status Determination: Clarifying the 
Boundaries of Temporary Protection, Group Determination, and Mass Influx” (2010) 29(1) Refugee Survey 
Quarterly 61 at 84-87. 
154 UNHCR Excom Conclusion on International Cooperation and Burden and Responsibility Sharing in Mass 
Influx Situations, No. 100 (LV) - 2004 (8 October 2004) .  
155 Rutinwa, above n 153, at 1. 
156 At 1. 
157 Eg Goodwin-Gill and McAdam, above n 103, at 133; Helene Lambert “The Next Frontier: Expanding Protection 
in Europe for Victims of Armed Conflict and Indiscriminate Violence” (2013) 25(2) International Journal of 
Refugee Law 207 at 207;  
158 UNHCR, above n 113, at [27]. 
159 UNHCR Protection of Refugees in Mass Influx Situations: Overall Protection Framework, EC/GC/01/4 19 (19 
February 2001), at [3]. 
160 UNHCR, above n 159, at [3]. 
161 UNHCR The Scope of International Protection in Mass Influx, EC/1995/SCP/CRP.3 (2 June 1995), at [12]; 
UNHCR, above n 159, at [17]; Ivor C Jackson The Refugee Concept in Group Situations (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, The Hague, 1999), at 2; Jean-François Durieux and Jane McAdam “Non-Refoulement through Time: 
The Case for a Derogation Clause to the Refugee Convention in Mass Influx Emergencies” (2004) 16(4) 
International Journal of Refugee Law 4 at 9: “there is a common misperception that the Convention does not apply 
to mass influx situations because its definition of a refugee is ‘essentially individualistic’. Yet the Convention itself 
contains nothing to suggest its inapplicability in cases of mass influx”.  
162 Australian Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs “Protection of Refugees in Mass Influx 
Situations: An Australian Contribution to UNHCR’s Global Consultations on International Protection” (2001) 
Australian Government <http://www.immi.gov.au/media/publications/refugee/unhcr/mass_influx.htm> (accessed 
18 October 2013), at [6]: “In our view, volume is not necessarily the critical variable when considering group 
determination and interim protection and should not outweigh other considerations. These tools may be equally 
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applicability of the refugee definition in group situations was recognised during the drafting of 
the Convention.163 As pointed out by UNHCR:164  
 
The stumbling block has been less the Convention itself and more the individualised processes 
put in place to implement it, coupled with a perception of the Convention as an instrument of 
integration. 
 
The traditional response to mass influx situations has been to use prima facie determination of 
refugee status or acceptance on a group basis,165 made on the obvious refugee character of the 
individuals concerned and the subject circumstances leading to the mass displacement,166 
without going into any formal, individual determinations.167 This method is widely used in 
Africa and Latin America and has also been resorted to by UNHCR in line with its Statute and 
subsequent General Assembly resolutions.168 
More recently, principally in Europe but also in Australia and the United States,169 States have 
managed mass influx situations through the device of “temporary protection”, which allows 
them to extend protection to the groups concerned without initially going into individual status 
determinations,170 when, based on certain indicators, the need for international protection is 
expected to be of a reasonably short duration.171 According to UNCHR, the granting of 
temporary protection “neither pronounces on nor compromises eligibility under the Convention 
but, in the interim term, ensures that immediate international protection needs are met”,172 and it 
has been acknowledged that individual procedures under the Convention can be kept “on 
hold”.173  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
appropriate and cost-effective responses to much smaller groups of people than implied when used in conjunction 
with the term ‘mass-influx’”. Albert has also argued group determination does not limit to mass influx situations, 
see Albert, above n 153. 
163 Jackson, above n 161, at 2 and 85; Durieux and McAdam, above n 161, at 9; Dallal Stevens “Shifting 
Conceptions of Refugee Identity and Protection: European and Middle Eastern Approaches” in Kneebone, Stevens, 
and Baldassar (eds) Refugee Protection and the Role of Law: Conflicting Identities (Routledge, Oxon, 2014) 73 at 
76. 
164 UNHCR, above n 159, at [17]. See also Jean-François Durieux “The Many Faces of ‘Prima Facie’: Group-Based 
Evidence in Refugee Status Determination” (2010) 25(2) Refuge 151 at 153: “a ‘highly individualistic’ approach [to 
the Convention Refugee Definition] is misguided and should be questioned as a matter of principle”. 
165 UNHCR, above n 159, at [4]; Durieux and McAdam, above n 161, at 11. 
166 Durieux and McAdam, above n 161, at 11. 
167 UNHCR, above n 159, at [4].  
168 UNHCR, above n 159, at [7]. 
169 Sztucki, above n 114, at 65; UNHCR, above n 159, at [4]. 
170 UNHCR, above n 159, at [4]. 
171 According to UNHCR, “[t]emporary protection is also appropriate for dealing with influxes where the cause of 
flight is still unclear; where it is objectively apparent that the group largely consists of persons who, under an 
individualized system, would qualify for complementary protection; or in the context of a harmonized regional 
approach”. UNHCR Ensuring International Protection and Enhancing International Cooperation in Mass Influx 
Situations: Advance Summary Findings in the Study Commissioned by UNHCR, EC/54/SC/CRP.11 (June 2004), at 
[6].  But see Australian Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, above n 162; Albert, above n 153.  
172 UNHCR, above n 171, at [6]. 
173 UNHCR, above n 159, at [4]. 
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As mentioned in chapter I, China’s experience with the Indochinese refugees, the North Korean 
escapees, and the displaced minorities from Myanmar all involve large-scale inflows of 
displaced persons from neighbouring countries. The situations of all these groups have some of 
the features of mass influx identified by UNHCR.174 Rutinwa has pointed out that prima facie 
determination was used in Asia during the Indochinese refugee crisis;175 refugees fleeing 
Vietnam were accorded prima facie refugee status until the adoption of the CPA, which requires 
individual assessment, in 1989. 176  Indeed, China’s recognition of the refugee status of 
Indochinese refugees appears to be group recognition.177 As mentioned in chapter I, there is no 
evidence that the Indochinese refugees in China were assessed individually before or after 
China’s announcement of its recognition of their refugee status in August 1979. In the situation 
of the North Korean escapees, while no evidence indicates that individual situations were 
accessed for the purposes of refugee status determination, China has explicitly denied that they 
are refugees.178 On the contrary, China’s response to the displaced Kokangs and the displaced 
Kachins bears some resemblance to “temporary protection”. It hosted the Kokangs without 
recognising or denying their refugee status; it also hosted the Kachins for more than one year 
although claiming that they were not refugees.179  
It is not a secret that many States are remarkably reluctant to recognise displaced persons 
arriving en masse in their territory as refugees.180 UNHCR has acknowledged the “unduly heavy 
burden” on receiving States in mass influx situations,181 and has repeatedly emphasised the need 
to ensure admission to safety, protection from refoulement, and basic humanitarian treatment 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
174 They all involve “considerable numbers of people arriving over an international border”. The Indochinese 
refugee influx, the Kokang Incident, and the Kachin influx are also characterised by “a rapid rate of arrival” and 
“inadequate absorption or response capacity in host States, particular during emergency”. In the situation of the 
North Korean escapees, in the absence of accurate statistics, it is commonly considered as a mass influx situation, 
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Consultations on International Protection Mechanisms of International Cooperation to Share Responsibilities and 
Burdens in Mass Influx Situations, EC/GC/01/7 (19 Feburary 2001),  at [11]. 
175 Rutinwa, above n 153, at 2. 
176 Rutinwa, above n 153, at 2. 
177 Most of the Indochinese refugees received by China arrived between 1978 and 1982. There is no statistics 
showing new arrivals after 1988. Dayou Xiang “rang shiren liaojie guangxi jiedai anzhi yinzhi nanmin de 
zhenxiang [Let People around the World Know about the Truth of Guangxi’s Receiption and Settlement of 
Indochinese Refugees]” (2011) 1 Overseas Chinese Journal of Bagui 3 at 3. See also chs I and IV. 
178 See chs I and IV. 
179 See chs I and IV. 
180 For example, Indochinese boat people were referred to as “displaced persons” and “asylum seekers” for many 
years by the international community as a whole until they were “elevated” to refugee status; despite abundant 
evidence of ethnically-based persecution of the Bosnians fleeing from Bosnia and Kosovo en masse, European 
States were reluctant to place the “refugee” label on them. Durieux and McAdam, above n 161, at 7; Sztucki, above 
n 114, at 65 (with further reference); Khalid Koser and Richard Black “Limits to Harmonization: The ‘Temporary 
Protection’ of Refugees in the European Union” (1999) 37 (3) International Migration 521 at 526. 
181 UNHCR Excom Conclusion on Protection of Asylum-Seekers in Situations of Large-Scale Influx, No. 22 (XXXII) 
– 1981 (21 October 1981), at [IV (1)]. 
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rather than to “provide immediately the full standards of treatment foreseen under the 1951 
Convention”.182  
Kourula has rightly pointed out that large-scale population movements require striking a balance 
between the right of States to regulate and manage the admission of aliens to their territories and 
the adherence to the principles of refugee law.183 It remains an issue open for debate, however, 
as to where the balancing point should be. For example, while the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees, Ogata, has observed the device of temporary protection as an 
instrument balancing the protection of the needs of people with the interests of states receiving 
them,184 Lambert and Durieux and McAdam have observed that temporary protection was used 
in most European States as a way to suspend or by-pass normal asylum procedures.185 
3 People Fleeing Armed Conflict and the Situation of Displaced Ethnic Kokangs and 
Kachins from Myanmar 
To be clear, armed conflict usually causes large-scale cross-border displacement, but not all 
persons fleeing armed conflict arrive at the country of asylum as part of a large group. Mass 
influx situations are often caused by armed conflict, but they also occur as a consequence of 
other events; for example, the mass influx of Indochinese refugees in China and Southeast Asian 
countries was not a result of armed conflict. 
The Convention does not explicitly extend its protection to people fleeing armed conflict. As 
pointed out by Mr Robinson of Israel during the Conference of Plenipotentiaries in 1951, 
“[t]here is no provision … for refugees fleeing from hostilities unless they were otherwise 
covered by article 1 of the Convention”.186  
Although there is nothing in the Convention Refugee Definition itself which would exclude its 
application to persons caught up in armed conflicts,187 the circumstance of persons fleeing war 
continues to challenge the interpretation and application of the Convention Refugee 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
182 UNHCR, above n 159; UNHCR, above n 161; UNHCR Excom, above n 181; UNHCR, above n 154; UNHCR 
Excom General Conclusion on International Protection, A/AC.96/839 (11 October 1994). 
183 Kourula, above n 105, at 102. 
184  Sadako Ogata, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees “Statement at the intergovernmental 
consultations on asylum, refugee and migration policies in Europe, North America and Australia”, Washington DC, 
May 1997, as cited in Koser and Black, above n 180, at 523. 
185 Lambert, above n 164, at 209: “Hence, a political compromise had to be found; a policy of ‘temporary protection’ 
was developed and was implemented in most European states as a way to suspend or by-pass normal asylum 
procedures”; Durieux and McAdam, above n 161, at 7: “The debate surrounding temporary protection throughout 
the 1990s was dominated by an urge to avoid ‘refugee’ terminology, without, however, giving the impression that 
the application of the Convention was suspended. States were forced to admit that there had to be Convention 
refugees among the beneficiaries of temporary protection, but they did not want to be bound by legal constraints. 
The device they used was a temporary suspension of asylum procedures, or at least of asylum decisions, coupled 
with the discretionary grant of an ad hoc ‘interim’ status.” 
186 Statement of Mr Robinson of Israel, A/CONF.2/SR.22, at 6. 
187  UNHCR “Information Note on Article 1 of the 1951 Convention” (1 March 1995) Refworld 
<http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b32c8.html> (accessed 8 November 2013), at [8]; Goodwin-Gil and McAdam, 
above n 103, at 126: “The fact of having fled from civil war is not incompatible with a well-founded fear of 
persecution in the sense of the 1951 Convention”. 
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Definition.188 For example, the stark variation of refugee recognition rates for Afghan, Somali 
and Iraqi asylum seekers in different European countries indicates significant divergences in 
interpretation and application of the Convention Refugee Definition with regard to persons 
fleeing armed conflicts.189 Goodwin-Gill and McAdam have observed that decision-makers too 
often perceive civil conflicts “as giving rise to the situations of general insecurity that somehow 
exclude the possibility of persecution” and pointed out that a “closer look of the background of 
the conflict and the ways in which it is fought will often establish a link to the Convention”.190 
The UNHCR Handbook maintains the view that “[p]ersons compelled to leave their country of 
origin as a result of international or national armed conflicts are not normally considered 
refugees under the 1951 Convention or 1967 Protocol”, emphasising that these persons enjoy 
protection under international humanitarian law.191 However, UNHCR has also noted that:192 
 
many of those fleeing today’s armed conflicts do come within the refugee definition of the 1951 
Convention because these conflicts are rooted in ethnic, religious or political differences which 
specifically victimize certain groups.  
 
It has been generally accepted by UNHCR, a number of States, and scholars that persons fleeing 
armed conflict may qualify as refugees under the Convention, although the mere fact of having 
fled from armed conflict does not per se suffice.193 Hathaway and Foster have noted the general 
acceptance of the principle that, with respect to claims of refugee status by persons fleeing war, 
“whatever the number of people affected, the relevant issues are the seriousness of the harm that 
may eventuate, and its causal connection to a protected form of civil or political status”.194  
In the seminal Salibian decision, the Canadian Federal Court of Appeal stated:195 
 
[a] situation of civil war in a given country is not an obstacle to a claim provided the fear felt is 
not that felt indiscriminately by all citizens as a consequence of the civil war, but that felt by the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
188 Hathaway and Foster, above n 99, at 177; Vanessa Holzer “The 1951 Refugee Convention and the Protection of 
People Fleeing Armed Conflict and Other Situations of Violence” (September 2012) UNHCR Legal and Protection 
Policy Series, PPLA/2012/05, <http://www.refworld.org/docid/50474f062.html> (accessed 8 September 2014). 
189 Holzer, above n 188, at 2; UNHCR, above n 149, at 17. 
190 Goodwin-Gill and McAdam, above n 103, at 126.  
191 UNHCR, above n 104, at [164]. 
192 UNHCR “Self-Study Module 2: Refugee Status Determination: Identifying who is a refugee” (1 September 2005) 
UNHCR <http://www.unhcr.org/publ/PUBL/43144dc52.pdf> (accessed 28 April 2014), sec 2.3.4. UNHCR has also 
expressed the same view in other documents, eg UNHCR Note on International Protection, A/AC.96/850 (1 
September 1995), at [11]; UNHCR, above n 100, at [20]-[21]. 
193 Holzer, above n 188, at 1, further reference cited there. However, Holzer also noted discrepancies in State 
practice: “[i]n some States, it results in a higher standard of proof of persecution for people who have fled armed 
conflict and other situations of violence, while in others, such situations require a differentiated risk”. 
194 Hathaway and Foster, above n 99, at 177. 
195 Vahe Salibian v Canada (Minister for Employment and Immigration) (1990) 3 FC 250, at 258, cited from 
Hathaway and Foster, above n 99, at 180. 
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applicant himself, by group with which he is associated, or, even, by all citizens on account of a 
risk of persecution base on one of the reasons stated in the definition. 
 
Indeed, whereas persons fleeing truly generalised or indiscriminate violence have always had 
difficulty in establishing a nexus between their fear as a consequence of the armed conflict and 
any of five grounds provided in the Convention Refugee Definition,196 the mere fact of having 
fled armed conflict does not preclude the finding of a well-founded fear of being persecuted for 
any of the five Convention grounds.197 First, however many people are similarly affected, if a 
person is at risk of being persecuted for reasons of any of the five Convention grounds, the 
person should qualify for refugee status under the Convention.198 Second, where large groups are 
seriously affected by a government’s policies or by the breakout of uncontrolled communal 
violence, it appears to be wrong in principle to limit the concept of persecution to measures 
immediately identifiable as direct and individual.199 On the one hand, the Convention Refugee 
Definition does not require a refugee claimant to show that he or she would be individually 
targeted.200 On the other, as noted by Goodwin-Gill and McAdam, general measures are 
frequently directed at groups identifiable by reference to the Convention reasons for 
persecution.201 
In Würzburg, the German Administrative Court found that Bosnian Muslims fleeing a Serb-
controlled area were not simply victims of generalised war or violence:202 
 
[in a context of civil war] persecution is established when the behaviour of the state forces aims 
at the physical extermination of the ethnic, cultural or religious identity of a part of the 
population. 
 
The same statement of the German Administrative Court in Würzburg may well apply to the 
displaced ethnic Kokangs and ethnic Kachins in China, who fled military clashes between the 
Myanmar government troops and local ethnic military forces. The ethnic dimension of the armed 
conflict in Kokang Region and Kachin State is clear. Additionally, interviews with displaced 
Kachins also indicate that there is likely to be a link between the fear and their ethnicity.  
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4 Refugee sur Place and the Situation of North Korean Escapees 
Whilst in most cases refugees leave their home country because of a fear of being persecuted,203 
it is well-recognised that the Convention does not require the fear of being persecuted to arise 
before refugees leave their home country.204 The Convention Refugee Definition simply requires 
that a refugee “is outside the country of his nationality”;205 the present tense ensures that persons 
in need of protection sur place are protected by the Convention on an equal footing with those 
who flee after the risk of persecution is apparent.206 A person who was not a refugee when he or 
she left their country, but who becomes a refugee at a later date, is called a refugee sur place.207 
The classic sur place refugee claim derives from a significant change of circumstances in the 
country of origin at a time when the claimant is abroad for reasons wholly unrelated to a need for 
protection.208 For example, students, migrant workers, and diplomats who initially intended to go 
home after their study or work placement abroad may later find they cannot return home because 
of a Convention reason. Sur place claims deriving from events occurring after the claimant’s 
departure from the country of origin are usually looked upon favourably.209 
A sur place refugee claim can also arise as a result of the person’s activities outside her country 
of origin.210 For example, participation in political activism abroad against the government of the 
home country, association with recognised refugees, or conversion to another religion intolerable 
in the home country may lead to such sur place claims.211 Sur place claims deriving from the 
claimant’s own activities outside the country of origin are often suspected as manipulated.212 
As Hathaway and Foster and Zimmermann and Mahlet noted, unauthorised departure from the 
home country may form the basis of a refugee status claim sur place.213 According to Hathaway 
and Foster, if the sanction for illicit travel abroad is severe enough to effectively undermine the 
fundamental human right to leave and to return to one’s country enshrined in art 12 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the country of origin treats 
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unauthorised departure as an implied political opinion of disloyalty or defiance, the criteria of 
the refugee definition are met.214 This scenario is relevant to the discussion on the status of the 
North Korean escapees in China under international law. 
As mentioned in chapter I, China has generally claimed that North Koreans escapees entering 
China are economic migrants, not refugees. Since assessment of the individual situations of 
North Korean escapees in China is impractical under China’s current policy,215 in the limited 
existing academic scholarship on the status of the North Korean escapees in China under 
international law, the majority of the authors have argued that the North Korean escapees who 
flee to China, regardless of their motivations for departing North Korea, should qualify as 
refugees sur place on the basis that North Koreans leaving North Korea without authorisation 
would be regarded as betrayers of the regime and would face severe punishment in North 
Korea.216  
In light of Hathaway and Foster’s theory above, the key test of whether North Korean escapees 
qualify as refugees sur place lies in whether the punishment for unauthorised border crossing in 
North Korea amounts to persecution and whether North Korea treats unauthorised border 
crossing as implied political opinion of disloyalty. It is well known that North Korea strictly 
limits international travel of its citizens to such an extent that, according to the UN Human 
Rights Council, the travel restriction practically amounts to a total travel ban for ordinary North 
Koreans.217 Such restriction on international travel is enforced through “extreme violence and 
harsh punishment”.218 It is generally recognised that unauthorised departure from North Korea is 
now regularly considered by North Korean authorities as treason,219 a crime punishable by a 
minimum of five year “reform through labour” under art 62 of the North Korean Criminal Code, 
or an offence of “anti-state or anti-people crimes”.220 Although it has been noted that not all 
North Korean escapees have been imprisoned or severely punished and the severity of 
punishments for unauthorised departure has varied considerably over time,221 given the large 
numbers of cases of reported torture of North Korean escapees and the arbitrary nature of the 
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punishment (without trial),222 it is reasonable to conclude that North Koreans who have left 
North Korea without authorisation and are unwilling to return to North Korea can claim to have 
a well-founded fear of persecution for the reason of (real or imputed) political opinion.223 
An implication of this conclusion is that almost every person of North Korea’s 25 million 
population would be able to claim refugee status sur place in China as long as they manage to 
leave North Korea unless they are otherwise excluded by the Convention, since North Korea 
does not even issue passports to its citizens except a small number of elite persons.224 Few 
countries today would find it attractive to guarantee refugee status to 24 million people from a 
neighbouring country; China is no exception. 
Furthermore, the legal discussion on the legal status of the North Korean escapees under 
international refugee law also involves the issue of dual nationality, which could render the 
argument of refugee sur place irrelevant.225  
5 Dual Nationality and the Situation of North Korean Escapees 
Article 1A(2) of the Convention stipulates that: 
 
[i]n the case of a person who has more than one nationality, the term “the country of his nationality” 
shall mean each of the countries of which he is a national, and a person shall not be deemed to be 
lacking the protection of the country of his nationality if, without any valid reason based on well-
founded fear, he has not availed himself of the protection of one of the countries of which he is a 
national. 
 
It is clear from this provision that a person with dual or multiple nationality would be considered 
as a refugee only if she is either unable or legitimately unwilling to avail herself of the protection 
of the government of any of her nationalities. Because of the surrogate nature of the protection 
afforded by refugee law, it is an underlying assumption of refugee law that, wherever available, 
national protection takes precedence over international protection for the displaced person 
concerned.226 
In examining whether a person has dual or multiple nationality, it is necessary to distinguish 
between the possession of a nationality in the legal sense and the availability of protection by the 
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country concerned.227 A nationality may be deemed ineffective if it does not entail the protection 
normally granted to nationals.228 For example, in Tji, the Australian Federal Court held that if the 
putative state of citizenship “does not accept that [its nationality] law apply in the way 
[assumed]”, the nationality is ineffective.229  The UNHCR Handbook further states that:230 
 
As a rule, there should have been a request for, and a refusal of, protection before it can be 
established that a given nationality is ineffective. If there is no explicit refusal of protection, 
absence of a reply within reasonable time may be considered a refusal. 
 
Hathaway and Foster have noted that concerns of ineffectiveness would arise where the benefits 
of nationality, while theoretically available, cannot in practice be accessed by the person 
concerned, for example, when the person is “unable to travel to or enter the territory where the 
rights associated with nationality are in principle available”.231  
In the case of North Korean escapees, it is commonly understood that under South Korean law, 
North Koreans are South Korean citizens from birth unless their parents were both non-Koreans 
(that is either North Korean or South Korean).232 According to art 3 of the South Korean 
Constitution, “[t]he territory of the Republic of Korea shall consist of the Korean peninsula and 
its adjacent islands”.233 Under art 2 of the Korean Nationality Act, any person falling in one of 
the following categories “shall be a national of the Republic of Korea at birth”: (1) a person 
whose father or mother is a national of the Republic of Korea at the time of a person’s birth; (2) 
a person whose father was a national of the Republic of Korea at the time of the father’s death, if 
the person’s father died before the person’s birth; (3) a person who was born in the Republic of 
Korea, if both of the person’s parents are unknown or have no nationality.234  
Since North Koreans (except those born to two foreign parents) are South Korean nationals from 
birth under South Korean law,235 the issue at stake is the effectiveness of the South Korean 
nationality, not the possibility of acquisition of South Korean nationality. It is self-evident that 
for North Koreans in North Korea, the South Korean nationality is ineffective. The North 
Koreans whose South Korean nationality is in question here are North Korean escapees who 
were born to at least one Korean parent.  
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To examine whether their South Korean nationality, as provided by South Korean law, is 
effective, the following questions need to be answered. Does South Korea accept that its 
nationality law applies in the way it is commonly understood? Does South Korea offer 
protection to North Korean escapees as its citizens? If the answers to these questions are yes, is 
the protection offered by South Korea available to North Korean escapees?  
In the Young Soon Lee case in 1996, the Supreme Court of South Korea confirmed that a 
plaintiff, a North Korean national with a Chinese Foreign Resident Card, is a South Korean 
citizen.236 Hwang, who is a leading human rights lawyer and the principal drafter of the 2013 
South Korean Refugee Act which incorporated the Convention into South Korean law, 
conformed in his expert report to the United Kingdom Upper Tribunal that South Korea did not 
consider its Refugee Act applicable to North Koreans, who are considered not as aliens but as 
citizens of South Korea. 237  It appears that the common understanding of South Korean 
nationality law is in harmony with South Korea’s interpretation of its own nationality law.  
It is well recognised that South Korea usually does endeavour to provide protection to North 
Korean escapees and to assist them to travel to South Korea.238 Lee noted in 2001 that “in 
practice, South Korea’s overseas missions used to accept North Korean escapees and issue 
passports or necessary travel documents if they seek asylum or temporary refuge there”.239 In 
1997, South Korea passed the Protection of North Korean Residents and Support of Their 
Settlement Act (the Protection Act),240 which is designed to provide protection and support to 
North Koreans defecting from North Korea (art 1). Article 7 of the Protection Act provides that: 
  
1. Any person who has defected from North Korea and desires to be protected under this Act shall 
apply for protection to the head of an overseas diplomatic or consular mission .... 
2. The head of an overseas diplomatic or consular mission...who receives such an application for 
protection...shall without delay inform the fact to the Minister of National Unification and the 
Director of the Agency for National Security Planning. 
3. The Director of the Agency for National Security Planning notified pursuant to the provision of 
Paragraph 2 shall take provisional protective measures or other necessary steps and shall without 
delay inform the Minister of National Unification of the result. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
236 Young Soon Lee SC 96 Nu 1221, 12 November 1996, cited from Vitit Muntarbhorn Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, E/CN.4/2006/35 (23 
January 2006), at [61]; Jeewon Min “Surrogate Protection in Canada and Potential Nationality in South Korea: Does 
a North Korean Asylum-Seeker Have a ‘Genuine Link’ to South Korea?” (2013) CARFMS 
<http://carfms.org/sites/default/files/North%20Korean%20Refugee%20Status%20In%20Canada%202013%20Essa
y%20Contest%20CARFMS%20web.pdf > (accessed 12 February 2014), at 11. 
237 GP, above n 232, at [96]. 
238 Eg Muntarbhorn, above n 236, at [62]; Seymour, above n 89, at 25; HRW, above n 59, at 30; KK, above n 232; 
GP, above n 232. 
239 Lee, above n 216, at 148, referring to A Directory of the ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Seoul, 3 April 1983), 
emphasis added. 
240  Law number 6474, Partial revision on 24 May 2001, available at Reworld 
<http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b4ef28.html> (accessed 18 October 2014).  
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The 2005 White Paper on Korean Unification issued by Ministry of Unification also stated 
that:241 
 
In the case of North Korean refugees residing in a third country who file an application for 
protection, the South Korean Government will provide temporary protection through its consulate 
in the third country and assist them in entering South Korea. Upon entry into South Korea, the 
Government will decide on his/her protection based on the results of a joint investigation by 
relevant government agencies. 
 
However, the Protection Act specifically excludes certain categories of North Korean escapees 
from its protection under art 9,242 and North Korean escapees falling within the scope of this 
article have reportedly been denied the right of entry to South Korea.243 As Wolman has noted, if 
a North Korean asylum seeker is “covered by one of the article 9 exceptions of the Protection 
Act, the right of entry to South Korea would be questionable at best, and nationality should be 
presumed ineffective”.244 
Additionally, where South Korean foreign missions explicitly refuse, or do not respond within 
reasonable time, to assist North Korean escapees to entry South Korea, the protection associated 
with the putative South Korean nationality of the North Koreans concerned can be deemed 
ineffective. A mid-level official at the South Korean Ministry of Unification admitted that in 
1997 the basic policy of accepting all North Koreans who wished to migrate to the South was 
instituted and communicated to embassies and consulates.245 However, he explained that South 
Korean diplomatic missions had a discretion in considering relations with the host country:246 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
241 Republic of Korea Ministry of Unification “Peace and Prosperity: White Paper on Korean Unification” (2005), 
cited from Muntarbhorn, above n 236, at [62]. 
242 Such people include: “1. International criminal offenders involved in aircraft hijacking, drug trafficking, 
terrorism or genocide, etc; 2. Offenders of non-political, serious crimes such as murder, etc; 3. Suspects of disguised 
escape; 4. Persons who have for a considerable period earned their living in their respective countries of sojourn; 
and 5. Such other persons as prescribed by the Presidential Decree as unfit for the designation as persons subject to 
protection.”  
243 KK, above n 232, at [55].  
244 Wolman, above n 221, at 811. South Korea has not be entirely consistent and clear when applying art 9 of the 
Protection Act. It seems that South Korea has also provided protection to persons falling within the scope of art 9. 
See GP, above n 232, at [43], referring to Dr Pillkyu Hwang’s expert evidence. See also KK, above, n the 232, 
Tribunal noted that “[a]rticle 9 of the 1997 Act is not a criterion for decision on citizenship: it is a criterion going 
only to special protection”, at [50], and quoted In, a South Korean lawyer, “diplomatic officers are controlling the 
number of the entry of North Koreans into South Korea, … because of the increasing number of application for 
entry into South Korea by North Koreans since 2005 and the shortage of the temporary facility in housing support 
for them. Therefore, a person who is expected to be refused protection will be refused of even entering into the 
country. In that sense, in UK and Canada embassies, the consuls might have taken a position that as person refused 
protection was not a candidate for South Korean citizenship. In strict legal perspective, it is a wrong interpretation 
which is against the Protection Act, the Nationality Act, and the Constitution”, at [55]. 
245 HRW, above n 59, at 31. 
246 HRW, above n 59, at 31. 
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If cooperation between the embassy and the host country is smooth, then it is easy. If the country 
severely opposes our facilitating resettlement in South Korea, then the embassy won’t accept them. 
If the country protests severely, we won’t accept them. 
 
This policy is best exemplified by the practice of the South Korean embassy and consulates in 
China. As mentioned in chapter I, China generally insists in repatriating North Korean escapees 
to North Korea. After a series of high profile incidents of North Koreans seeking asylum in 
foreign embassies and consulates in China, the Chinese authorities have tightened security 
around foreign embassies and consulates, including the South Korean embassy and consulates, 
to prevent North Korean escapees from entering those premises.247 Although the South Korean 
government has avidly advocated against China’s repatriation of North Korean, once threatening 
to bring the issue to the UN Human Rights Commission,248 it is well known that, in practice, 
South Korean diplomatic officers are reluctant to deal with North Korean escapees seeking 
assistance at the South Korean embassy or consulates in China.249  
Since North Korean escapees in China generally do not have access to the protection associated 
with the South Korean nationality, the South Korean nationality of North Korean escapees in 
China is ineffective in the current situation and they should qualify for refugee status unless 
otherwise excluded in accordance with the Convention. However it should be noted that if China 
no longer restricts North Korean escapees from approaching the South Korean embassy and 
consulates in China, unless South Korea changes its current nationality law or policy toward 
North Korean escapees, North Korea escapees in China who do not fall within art 9 of the 
Protection Act are likely to have access to the protection of South Korea as South Korean 
nationals. In that case, they should no longer qualify for refugee status. In August 2014, China 
released 11 North Korean escapees, who were arrested by Chinese police on the Chinese-Lao 
border in the same month, to South Korea.250 It was the first time China allowed North Korean 
escapees to go to South Korea directly from China.251  
It should be pointed out that the approach of the Chinese government and the South Korean 
government demonstrated that, as observed by Deng,252 the issue of North Korean escapees is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
247 See ch IV. 
248 Daming Li et al “zhonghan yin ‘tuobeizhe’ gekong duizhi [Tension between China and South Korea due to 
‘North Korean Escapees’]” (23 February 2012) Xinhua <http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2012-
02/23/c_122744929.htm> (accessed 20 June 2012). 
249 Wolman, above n 221, at 801; Andrei Lankov "North Korean Refugees in Northeast China" (2004) 44 Asian 
Survey 856 at 863. 
250  Mark Stone “N Korean Defectors Held On Laos Border” (15 August 2014) Sky News 
<http://news.sky.com/story/1317909/n-korean-defectors-held-on-laos-border> (accessed 20 August 2014). 
251 North Korean escapees arrested by Chinese authorities are normally repatriated to North Korea. In a few cases, 
China previously allowed North Korean escapees who successfully sought asylum in foreign embassies to go to 
South Korea via a third country. 
252 Yiwen Deng “shifang tuobeizhe bingfei Beijing gaibian lichang [Releasing North Korean Escapees Does not 
Mean Beijing Has Changed its Position” Financial Times Chinese Edition (online ed, 18 August 2014), available at 
< http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001057773?full=y> (accessed 20 October 2014). 
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more of a political one than of a legal one. Any attempts of creating a viable solution for the 
North Korean escapee crisis in China should take this into consideration. 
D China’s Accession to the Convention and Protocol 
When the Convention and Protocol was drafted, the People’s Republic of China, which was 
established in October 1949, was excluded from the UN. The state of China was represented by 
the Taiwan-based Republic of China until 1971.  
China began to consider joining the Refugee Convention and Protocol in 1979 during the 
Indochinese refugee crisis. On 1 September 1979, then Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr Hua 
Huang, agreed to “consider carefully” the invitation to join the Convention and Protocol in his 
reply to UNHCR.253 On 24 September 1982, China acceded to both instruments, being one of the 
first Asian State parties to these key legal instruments on refugee protection.254 It was also one of 
the first communist countries to accede to the Convention and Protocol.255 China remains one of 
the few East and Southeast Asian State parties to the Convention and Protocol today.  
Upon its accession to the Convention and Protocol, China made reservations on the latter half of 
art 14 of the Convention, which concerns artistic rights and industrial property, art 16 (3) of the 
Convention, which concerns access to courts, and art 4 of the Protocol, which concerns 
settlement of disputes. The Convention and Protocol were extended to Macau upon its handover 
in 1999 from Portugal to China, but not to Hong Kong which was returned by the United 
Kingdom to China in 1997.  
It is worth noting that though the Indochinese refugee crisis undoubtedly played a crucial role in 
China’s accession to the Convention and Protocol,256 China’s accession was probably also 
driven by Beijing’s desire to obtain international approval. Following China’s opening up and a 
revival of interest in law in the late 1970s, China ratified a series of international human rights 
instruments as well as a significant number of other international legal instruments in the early 
1980s. Of the 27 human rights instruments to which China was a party as of 2012, eight were 
ratified between 1981 and 1984.257 It is perhaps hard to tell what understanding China had of the 
Convention Refugee Definition and its obligations under the Refugee Convention and Protocol 
and whether it had a clear idea of its capacity and willingness to commit to the Convention and 
Protocol after accession. It was, however, most likely that the Chinese leadership at that time did 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
253 State Council Public Announcement 1982 NO14 Proposal on Reviewing, Discussing the Decision to accede to 
the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the Protocol relating to the Status of Refugee (10 June 1982).  
254 Japan acceded to the Convention and Protocol in 1981 and 1982 respectively. The Philippines acceded to both 
instruments in 1981. Turkey and Yemen were also parties to the Refugee Convention and Protocol prior to China’s 
accession. UNHCR Bureau for Asia and the Pacific “Regional Update” (March 2014) UNHCR 
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256 See ch IV. 
257 SCIO “2012 zhongguo renquan shiye de jinzhan [2012 Progress of Human Rights in China]” (14 May 2012) 
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not foresee that China, a Third World communist country producing rather than receiving 
refugees for decades, would become an increasingly popular destination for refugees, in just 20 
years’ time. The domestic implementation of the Convention and Protocol will be discussed in 
part III A of chapter III. 
III  Refugees for the Purposes of the United Nations 
A  United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
The Office of UNHCR was established in 1950, one year prior to the adoption of the Convention. 
The historical background of the establishment of UNHCR is that the major western powers, 
especially the United States, were looking for an international refugee agency that would not 
present a threat to their sovereignty or add new financial obligations.258 Therefore, the office of 
UNHCR was created as a small temporary organisation with narrow authority and an initial life 
span of three years. According to the UNHCR Statute, UNHCR acts under the authority of the 
General Assembly of the UN (para 1) and follows policy directives given by the General 
Assemble or the Economic and Social Council (para 3).  
Its core responsibilities, as stated in the Statute, are to provide legal protection for refugees under 
the auspices of the UN and to find durable solutions to the refugee problem through voluntary 
repatriation or assimilation in new national communities (para 1). It is to engage in additional 
activities as the General Assembly may determine (para 9). The UNHCR Statute also states that 
the work of UNHCR should be “entirely non-political” (para 2). 
Created as a modest institution with little independence and limited functions, UNHCR “has had 
little power other than moral authority and persuasion” to achieve its mandate.259 Through its 
involvement in refugee matters, UNHCR established itself as an impartial humanitarian 
organisation with unique expertise and experience on refugee law and forced migration.260 States 
relied on UNHCR for advice, information and assistance, which, in time, improved UNHCR’s 
negotiation power with States. Gradually, UNHCR grew into the world’s leading international 
refugee organisation with considerable independence and moral authority. Headquartered in 
Geneva, it now has field and regional offices in 126 countries, providing assistance to nearly 34 
million people.261 In 2003, its mandate was extended by the UN General Assembly “until the 
refugee problem is solved”.262  
A challenge for UNHCR is that despite the “non-political” nature of its work, it operates in a 
political environment. Since UNHCR receives only a modest budget from the UN to support its 
administration work, it has to raise the funds from donor States to finance its operations. This 
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funding mechanism renders UNHCR dependent on voluntary donations from States and 
arguably enables donor States to exercise influence on the work of UNHCR. For example, States 
can “bookmark” their donations, ie designating their donations to particular groups or regions of 
their choice rather than making general or unconditional donations. UNHCR has constantly 
faced the question of “whether and how to adapt its own work and mandate to better serve the 
interest of States” in its history,263  and will continue to face the same question. 
B  Refugees for the Purposes of the United Nations and Expansion of UNHCR Mandates 
The UNHCR Statute, which was adopted in 1950, defines a refugee in a way that is very similar 
to the Convention. The Statute first provides that the competence of UNHCR extends to any 
person who is considered a refugee under a number of earlier arrangements (para 6A(i)) and who, 
as a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951, is outside her country of origin and is 
unable or unwilling to avail herself of the protection of that country, owing to well-founded fear 
of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality or political opinion or for reasons 
other than personal convenience (para 6A(ii)). The Statute further includes in UNHCR’s 
competence:264 
 
[a]ny other person who is outside the country of his nationality, or if he has no nationality, the 
country of his former habitual residence, because he has or had well-founded fear of persecution by 
reason of his race, religion, nationality or political opinion and is unable or, because of such fear, is 
unwilling to avail himself of the protection of the government of the country of his nationality, or, 
if he has no nationality, to return to the country of his former habitual residence.  
 
The UNHCR Statute’s definition of a refugee is hence without geographic or temporal limitation. 
Since 1957, UNHCR has been authorised to assist displaced persons who do not fall within the 
refugee definition provided by the Statute.265 As a result of various resolutions of the UN 
General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), 266 UNHCR is mandated to 
assist a range of persons “of concern”, including not only refugees but also other groups of 
people in need of protection or assistance.267 Gradually, UNHCR’s definition of refugee was 
also broadened. A refugee under UNHCR’s mandate is defined as:268  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
263 Betts et al, above n 258, at 5. 
264 Para 6B. 
265 Goodwin-Gill and McAdam, above n 103, at 24. 
266 See Betts et al, above n 258, ch 2, 3 and 4; Goodwin-Gill and McAdam, above n 103, ch 2.3.2.  
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any person who falls within the refugee definition as contained in Article 1A(2) of the 1951 
Convention or who is outside his/her country of origin or habitual residence and is unable to return 
there because of serious and indiscriminate threats to life, physical integrity or freedom resulting 
from generalized violence or events seriously disturbing public order. 
  
UNHCR’s involvement in national refugee status decision-making processes is grounded in its 
supervisory role and State parties’ commitment to cooperate with UNHCR under the Convention 
and Protocol. Both the Convention and Protocol provide for cooperation between States and 
UNHCR, which extends to RSD according to arrangements made in various States. 269 
Participation in national RSD process allows UNHCR to monitor closely matters related to 
refugee status and of the entry and removal of asylum seekers.270 UNHCR also provides regular 
guidance on issues of interpretation. At the request of States members of the UNHCR Executive 
Committee, UNHCR issued the Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee 
Status (UNHCR RSD Handbook) in 1979, which is relied on by States as an authoritative source 
of interpretation of the Convention Refugee Definition. 
Many State parties have established their own national RSD criteria in accordance with the 
Convention. Though UN General Assembly resolutions can extend UNHCR’s mandate, it is 
commonly acknowledged that they do not directly impose obligations on States to expand their 
refugee protection.271 The gap between a “mandate refugee” and a “Convention refugee” 
therefore may raise questions when UNHCR and States have different opinions.272  
As mentioned above, UNHCR does not have the power to force its opinion on a State, but a 
State ought to give due consideration in good faith to UNHCR’s opinion. 
C  China and UNHCR 
China is a member of UNHCR’s governing body, the Executive Committee of the High 
Commissioner's Programme (Excom). Cooperation between UNHCR and China dates back to 
the early 1950s when a UNHCR Special Office operated in Shanghai to evacuate the European 
refugees between 1952 and 1956.273 UNHCR returned to China almost a quarter century later in 
February 1980 when UNHCR established a task office in Beijing to respond to the Indochinese 
refugee influx.274 
In a broader sense, interactions between UNHCR and China never really stopped between 1956 
and 1980, although they often happened in an indirect way. For example, in 1958, the state of 
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China, then represented at the UN by Taiwan, became a member of UNHCR Excom.275 It was 
the first country in the East and Southeast Asian region to become a member of the Excom. 
When the representation of the state of China at the UN transferred from Taiwan to the People’s 
Republic of China in 1971, UNHCR ExCom terminated the membership of the former in 1972. 
Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan, then UN High Commissioner for Refugees, noted in February 1972 
that the entry of the People’s Republic of China to the UN:276  
 
is important not only in the political field but also to UNHCR specifically because China is a 
member of our Executive Committee. … When the People's Republic became a member, it 
automatically had the right to avail itself of their seat on our governing body. 
 
The People’s Republic of China started to participate in activities at UNHCR Excom in 1979.277 
In the same year, it requested UNHCR to propose an aid programme at the UN General 
Assembly Meeting to assist the Indochinese refugees in China. The aid programme was 
approved by the UN GA and became one of the very first UN aid programmes in China.278  
In 1980, a UNHCR Task Office was established in Beijing to assist the Indochinese refugees in 
China. On December 1, 1995, the Task Office was upgraded to a Mission Office, which was 
further upgraded to a Regional Office in May 1997. Nowadays, the UNHCR Regional Office in 
Beijing covers China (including Hong Kong and Macau, not including Taiwan) and Mongolia. 
Additionally, UNHCR maintains a Sub-Office in Hong Kong.279 The relations between China 
and UNHCR will be further discussed in Chapter V. 
III Regional Developments  
A Africa, Latin America, and Europe 
In the mid-1960s, a number of developing countries voiced their dissatisfaction with the 
Convention’s inadequacy to reflect the reality in the Third World.280 While the Protocol may be 
seen as the response to these situations at the international level, the regional response was the 
OAU Convention in 1969 in Africa and the Cartagena Declaration in 1984 in Central and Latin 
America.  
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The OAU Convention developed a broader refugee definition which was based on the 
experience of the wars of liberation and decolonisation in Africa during the late 1950s and early 
1960s.281 Article I of the OAU Convention incorporates the Convention definition and further 
provides that:  
 
the term “refugee” shall also apply to every person who, owing to external aggression, 
occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the 
whole of his country of origin or nationality, is compelled to leave his place of habitual residence 
in order to seek refuge in another place outside his country of origin or nationality.  
 
The Cartagena Declaration was adopted to cope with the mass displacement caused by civil 
strife in Central and Latin America.282 It also introduced a broader definition. Part III of the 
Cartagena Declaration recommends that a refugee definition:  
 
in addition to containing the elements of the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol, 
includes among refugee persons who have fled their country because their lives, safety or 
freedom have been threatened by generalised violence, foreign aggression, internal conflicts, 
massive violation of human rights or other circumstances which have seriously disturbed public 
order. 
  
Although the Cartagena Declaration is not a binding treaty, the wider refugee definition outlined 
in the Cartagena Declaration has been incorporated into national laws by many countries in the 
region.283  
The OAU Convention and Cartagena Declaration were adopted in response to frequent large-
scale forced migration movements in the Africa and Central and Latin Amercia respectively. As 
Arboleda has noted, both documents “conform with the tenets of humanitarianism, as well as the 
dictates of pragmatism”.284  
A more recent effort to develop the refugee concept at the regional level is the EU Qualification 
Directive. Instead of adopting a broader refugee definition, the EU Qualification Directive 
incorporates the Convention Definition in art 2(d) and provides “subsidiary protection” to any 
third country nationals or stateless persons under art 2(f): 285 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
281 UNHCR, above n 268, sec 1.2.2.1. 
282 Zimmermann and Mahler, above n 105, at 318. 
283 Tristan Harley “Regional Cooperation and Refugee Protection in Latin America: A ‘South-South’ Approach” 
(2014) 26(1) International Journal of Refugee Law 22 at 24. 
284 Eduardo Arboleda “Refugee Definition in Africa and Latin America: The Lessons of Pragmatism” (1991) 3(2) 
International Journal of Refugee Law 185, at 186. 
285 Serious harm is defined under art 15 of the EU Qualification Directive as (a) death penalty or execution; or (b) 
torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment of an applicant in the country of origin; or (c) serious and 
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who does not qualify as a refugee but in respect of whom substantial grounds have been shown 
for believing that the person concerned, if returned to his or her country of origin, or in the case 
of a stateless person, to his or her country of former habitual residence, would face a real risk of 
suffering serious harm as defined in Article 15, and to whom Article 17(1) and (2) does not apply, 
and is unable, or, owing to such risk, unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that 
country 
 
Goodwin-Gill and McAdam have noted that the EU Qualification Directive merely distils State 
practice rather than creates a new protection system,286 and have pointed out that, with few 
exceptions, western countries typically “eschewed the incorporation of additional categories into 
the Convention refugee concept”.287 
B Asia 
Asia hosts a significant portion of the world’s refugee population. However, the majority of 
Asian countries have not acceded to the Convention and Protocol,288 showing constant resistance 
to these instruments.289 As pointed out by UNHRC, a lack of understanding of refugee issues 
generally hinders the promotion of a favourable refugee protection environment in Asia.290 
Refugee flows are dealt with primarily as issues of State security and political process in Asia.291 
Kneebone has rightly noted that in Asia “refugees have long been associate with threats to 
national sovereignty and identity, … rather than as victims of human rights abuse”.292 As a result, 
although the overall Asian region is looking for solutions for large-scale refugee movements in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
individual threat to a civilian’s life or person by reason of indiscriminate violence in situations of international or 
internal armed conflict.  
286 Goodwin-Gill and McAdam, above n 103, at 329. 
287 Goodwin-Gill and McAdam, above n 103, at 289. 
288 According to UNHCR, as at March 2014, 20 countries from the Asian Pacific region are parties to the 
Convention and Protocol. Among these countries, 12 are Asian. Asian State parties to the Convention and/or its 
1967 Protocol and their date of accession are: Afghanistan (30 August 2005), Cambodia (15 October 1992), China 
(24 September 1982), Iran (28 July 1976), Japan (3 October 1982/1 January 1982), Kazakhstan (15 January 1999), 
Kyrgyzstan (8 October 1996), Korea (3 December 1992), Philippines (22 July 1981), Tajikistan (7 December 1993), 
Timor-Leste (7 May 2003), and Turkmenstan (2 March 1998). UNHCR, above n 254, at 5.  
289 See generally Sara Davies Legitimising Rejection: International Refugee Law in Southeast Asia (Martinus 
Nijhoff, Leiden, 2008); Sam Blay “Regional Development: Asia” in Andreas Zimmermann (ed) The 1951 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol: A Commentary (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2011) 145, at 148; Taya Hunt and Nikola Errington “The Search for Protection in Southeast Asia” in Angus 
Francis and Rowena Maguire (ed) Protection of Refugees and Displaced Persons in the Asia Pacific Region 
(Ashgate, Farnham(UK), 2013) 53. 
290 UNHCR “2013 Regional Operations Profile – East Asia and the Pacific” UNHCR <http://www.unhcr.org/ 
pages/49e45b276.html> (accessed 14 July 2013).  
291 Pia Oberei “Regional Initiatives on Refugee Protection in South Asia” (1999) 11(1) International Journal of 
Refugee Law 193, at 197. 
292 Susan Kneebone “ASEAN and the Conceptualisation of Refugee protection” in Ademola Abass and Francesca 
Ippolito (ed) Regional Approaches to the Protection of Asylum Seekers: An International Legal Perspective 
(Ashgate,  Farnham(UK), 2014) 295, at 298. 
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the region,293 no regional arrangement specifically designed to tackle Asia’s refugee problems 
has been achieved. 
1 The Bangkok Principles by the Asian-African Legal Consultative Organization 
The Asian-African Legal Consultative Organization (the AALCO) adopted a set of Principles 
concerning the Status and Treatment of Refugees (the Bangkok Principles) in Bangkok in 1966. 
The Bangkok principles are the only codified and comprehensive standards of refugee protection 
in Asia.294  
The Bangkok Principles were revised in 2001. In the revised text of the Bangkok Principles 
adopted by the AALCO on 24 June 2001,295 a refugee is defined in a way similar to the refugee 
definition in the OAU Convention. According to art 1(1) of the Bangkok Principles, a refugee is: 
 
a person who, owing to persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, 
colour, religion, nationality, ethnic origin, gender, political opinion or membership of a particular 
social group: (a) leaves the State of which he is a national, or the Country of his nationality, or, if 
he has no nationality, the State or Country of which he is a habitual resident; or, (b) being outside 
of such a State or Country, is unable or unwilling to return to it or to avail himself of its 
protection. 
 
Article 1(2) further applies the term “refugee” to: 
 
every person, who, owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events 
seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his country of origin or nationality, 
is compelled to leave his place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge in another place 
outside his country of origin or nationality. 
 
The Bangkok principles are declaratory and not legally binding.296 Although the refugee 
definition contained in the Bangkok Principles has not had a real impact on national refugee law 
in Asian countries,297 they form guiding principles for State practice and serve as a term of 
reference and an expression of the Asian-African region’s concern for refugees.298 For example, 
the government of Pakistan referred to the refugee definition contained in the Bangkok 
Principles when explaining its policy towards refugees from Afghanistan in 1981.299  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
293 Zimmermann and Mahler, above n 105, at 320. 
294 Oberei, above n 291, at 197. 
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June 2001 at the AALCO’s 40th Session, New Delhi”, available at Refworld 
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296 At Introductory Remarks 2, Notes, Comments and Reservations Made by the Member States of AALCO. 
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2  The Asia-Pacific Consultations and the Bali Process 
There are two regional inter-governmental processes in the Asia-Pacific region relevant to 
refugees. One is the Inter-governmental Asia-Pacific Consultations on Refugees, Displaced 
Persons and Migrants (APC). The other is the Bali Ministerial Conference on People Smuggling, 
Trafficking in Persons and Related Transnational Crime (Bali Process). 
The APC was originally convened in 1996 by the Australian government to provide a forum for 
Asian-Pacific governments, who seek regional cooperation on matters relating to population 
movements, including movements of refugees, displaced persons and migrants. With regard to 
refugee matters, the APC focuses on comprehensive and durable solutions for refugee 
situations.300 The APC has 34 members, including China and Myanmar.301 UNHCR and the 
International Organization for Migration (IOM) are both observers of the APC. The APC is 
inactive at present; the last APC plenary was held in 2006 in China.302  
Established in 2002, the Bali Process is a voluntary forum with 45 members, including China, 
Myanmar, Pakistan, Afghanistan, UNHCR, and IOM.303 A core objective of the Bali Process is 
to assist States to adopt best practices in asylum management, in line with the Refugee 
Convention. 304  In March 2011, Bali Process Ministers endorsed a Regional Cooperation 
Framework to enable interested members to develop practical bilateral or sub-regional 
arrangements aimed at enhancing responses to irregular migration through consistent processing 
of asylum claims, durable solutions for refugees and sustainable return of persons ineligible for 
protection.305 A Regional Support Office has been opened in Bangkok in September 2012 to 
facilitate implementation of the framework.306  
The APC and the Bali Process are informal and non-binding in character and discussions under 
these processes are confidential. 307 However, as Oberio has observed, the very fact that 
governments feel compelled to participate (or be seen participating) is itself recognition on their 
part of the value of the processes addressing refugee issues.308 
C China’s Involvement at Regional Level 
China joined the AALCO in 1983 and has maintained a friendly and cooperative relation with 
the AALCO.309 Prior to joining the organisation, it was invited to participate in the AALCO’s 
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304 “About the Bali Process”, above n 303.  
305 “About the Bali Process”, above n 303. 
306 “Regional Support Office” Bali Process <http://www.baliprocess.net/regional-support-office> (accessed 23 April 
2014). 
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13 Melbourne Journal of International Law 838, at 854. 
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21st annual conference in Jakarta, Indonesia, as an observer and sent a delegation to the 
conference in 1980; it did the same twice in the following years.310 On 14 November 1983, 
China became a member of the AALCO.311 Since then, China has been actively involved in the 
AALCO’s activities. It hosted the AALCO 29th annual conference in Beijing in 1990 and several 
Chinese nationals have been the Secretary or Deputy Secretary of the AALCO.312  
China contributed to the revised text of the Bangkok Principles. For example, following the 
adoption of the revised text of the Bangkok Principles in 2001, the AALCO adopted a resolution 
(RES/41/3) in 2002 which directed the AALCO Secretary-General to explore the possibility of 
convening a workshop in cooperation with UNHCR and led to a seminar on strengthening 
refugee protection during migratory movements in 2003. 313  At this seminar, “interesting 
accounts of the refugee situation and preoccupations in several countries, in particular China, 
Egypt, India, Kenya, Syria and Tanzania”, were listened to.314  
The Chinese government has rarely, if ever, referred to or mentioned the Bangkok Principles 
domestically. The Bangkok Principles has not had obvious influence on Beijing’s national 
refugee policy. However, China’s willingness to participate in the discussion relating to the 
Bangkok Principles indicates China’s recognition of the value of these Principles. As a member 
of the AALCO, China should give good consideration to the Bangkok Principles when framing 
its national refugee law and policy. 
China has actively participated in the APC and Bali Process. It hosted the 2005 and 2006 APC 
plenaries. China has also sent delegates to a number of Bali Process Ministerial conferences. 
Given the informal and confidential nature of the APC and the Bali Process, it is difficult to 
assess the impact of these processes on China’s refugee law and policy. 
Besides participating in multilateral processes, China has shown emerging interest in involving 
refugee matters in bilateral dialogues with key players in the region. In February 2014, China’s 
Vice Foreign Minister, Mr Li Baodong, criticised Australia’s treatment of refugees during the 
15th bilateral human rights dialogue between China and Australia.315 It probably was the first 
time China initiated conversations on refugee issues with another countries. It may not be 
coincidence that the Chinese government invited the Melbourne-based International Detention 
Coalition to present about alternatives immigration detention in May 2013.316  
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IV Conclusion 
The Convention and Protocol allow significant freedom for State parties to interpret the 
Convention Refugee Definition. This mechanism of the Convention and Protocol is a double-
edge sword. On the one hand, it leads to varying treatment of refugees; on the other hand, it 
gives the continuing relevance to the Convention and Protocol. 
Many of the issues relating to the interpretation and application of the Convention Refugee 
Definition remain open. Like any other State parties to the Convention and Protocol, China is 
entitled to interpret and apply the Convention Refugee Definition based on its own 
understanding of these documents and to establish a RSD mechanism tailored to the situation in 
China. However, China also has the obligation to apply the Convention Refugee Definition in 
good faith and in line with the purposes of the Convention and Definition.  
China has demonstrated a growing interest in engaging in the international refugee protection 
regime, especially at the regional level. As China increasingly pursues conversations and 
cooperation with the international community, it is inevitable that China’s conception of the 
Convention Refugee Definition will evolve; on the other hand, China’s potential to influence the 
international refugee protection regime can be realised through frank conversations and 
constructive cooperation with the international community. 
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Chapter III Legal Context of Refugee Status in China 
 
The traditional mistrust of law, lawyers, and courts among the Chinese, not only in China but 
elsewhere in Asia, should not be underestimated.  
– Vitit Muntarbhorn317 
 
I China’s Legal System  
China does not have a Western-style separation of powers,318 where the legislative, executive, 
and judicial branches stand independently to restrain each other. In China, the legislative power 
is shared by more than one power organ.319 The National People's Congress (NPC) is the highest 
legislative organ in China. It is vested with the authority to amend the Constitution and to 
establish and amend basic laws governing criminal offences, civil affairs, the State organs and 
other matters in China.320 The NPC is also empowered to elect the President and the Vice-
President of China, decide on the choice of the Premier of the State Council upon nomination by 
the President of China, and elect the President of the Supreme People’s Court.321 The People’s 
Congress at local levels are authorised to enact local legislation. The State Council is the Central 
Government of China. It is empowered to formulate administrative regulations, which are 
considered as part of the legislation in China. Governments at local levels are authorised to make 
local regulations. 
According to the 2000 Chinese Law on Legislation, Chinese legislation can be divided into three 
tiers (art 79).322 Top tier legislation consists of laws (falü) made by the NPC or its Standing 
Committee (art 7); second tier legislation consists of administrative regulations (xingzheng fagui) 
made by the State Council (art 56); third tier legislation includes local regulations (difangxing 
fagui),323 autonomous regulations (zizhi tiaoli), separate regulations (danxing tiaoli),324 and rules 
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(guizhang).325 In this thesis, unless otherwise indicated or implied by the context, the term 
Chinese law refers to Chinese legislation in general rather than just the laws made by the State 
Council. 
China's legal system is similar to a civil law model. In theory, a decision of a Chinese court will 
not bind another Chinese court, but in practice, judges of lower courts usually try to follow the 
interpretations of the laws decided by the Supreme People’s Court.326 From time to time, the 
Supreme People’s Court issues so-called judicial interpretations, which contain the Supreme 
People’s Court’s opinion on legal matters. These judicial explanations are generally considered 
practically to serve as a source of law,327 and hence binding on lower courts. 
China is in the transition to rule of law. Prior to China’s reform and opening up in 1979, law had 
often been neglected or abused for decades in China, and the governance of the country had 
heavily relied on the policy of the Chinese Communist Party, especially during the Cultural 
Revolution (1966-1976). For example, prior to 1976 China lacked even the most basic laws, 
such as a comprehensive criminal code or a contract law,328 and the Ministry of Justice, which 
was dismantled in 1959, was re-established only in 1979.329 In the past three decades, China has 
made remarkable progress in building up a body of legislation and legal institutions. However, 
Peerenboom has rightly noted that there is evidence that the legal system in China remains a type 
of rule by law rather than a form of rule of law, indicating that in China law remains merely a 
tool to be used as the government sees fit rather than imposing meaningful restraints on the 
government and individual members of the ruling elite.330 Nowadays, in some cases, law is still 
ignored by authorities or trumped by party policy. 
It should be pointed out that Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan each has a different legal system 
from China mainland. Hong Kong, a British colony until 1997, maintains a common law system. 
Macau, a Portuguese colony until 1999, has a civil law system which is based on the Portuguese 
legal system. Hong Kong and Macau enjoy highly autonomous legislative powers and 
independent judicial powers according to the Basic Law of Hong Kong Special Administration 
Region (art 2) and the Basic Law of Macau Special Administration Region (art 2) respectively. 
Taiwan has a civil law system. China claims that Taiwan is a province of China, but has not 
exercised sovereign power on Taiwan since 1949.  
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It has been made clear in the Introduction above that this thesis focuses on China mainland only. 
However, given that relevant law or administrative procedures in Hong Kong and Macau are 
likely to serve as references when China contemplates its own refugee law because of close 
political, economic and cultural links and geographic proximity between China and Hong Kong 
and Macau, relevant Hong Kong and Macau laws and procedures are discussed in this chapter. 
II Immigration Control  
A Underdevelopment of Chinese Immigration Law 
Generally speaking, a State’s immigration law is of particular relevance to refugee protection in 
that State. China does not have a codified immigration law. Chinese immigration rules are 
scattered among a number of laws and regulations.331  
Traditionally, China has offered few channels for foreigners to migrate to China. Prior to 2004, 
there were no legal provisions regarding permanent immigration to China and foreigners could 
not apply for permanent residence.332 The Administrative Measures for the Examination and 
Approval of Foreigners’ Permanent Residence in China promulgated in 2004 was the first of its 
type in China, however, the criteria for permanent residence of foreigners in China set out in the 
Measures have been described as “harsh” and “strict”.333 Unsurprisingly, immigration law has 
not had a prominent position in China’s legal system. 
B General Provisions of the 2012 Exit and Entry Administration Law 
Prior to 1 July 2013, China regulated the exit and entry of aliens and Chinese citizens 
respectively in the 1985 Law on Administration of the Entry and Exit of Aliens (the Aliens Exit-
Entry Law),334 and the 1986 Law on Administration of Entry and Exit of Chinese Citizens. 
These two laws were superseded by the 2012 Exit and Entry Administration Law (the Exit-Entry 
Law) which entered into force on 1 July 2013.  
Both the Alien Entry-Exit Law and the Exit-Entry Law contain articles specifically addressing 
asylum or the treatment of refugees and asylum seekers, which will be discussed in section III B 
of this Chapter. The discussion here deals with relevant general immigration control measures 
provided under the Exit-Entry Law, which are likely to be applicable to refugees in the absence 
of a sufficient refugee protection mechanism as is the status quo in China. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
331 For further reading on Chinese immigration law, see generally Liu, above n 15. 
332 They can obtain a long-term residence permit which allows them to legally stay in China for as long as five years.  
333 From 2004 to 2011, it was estimated that only about 2,000 foreigners successfully applied for permanent 
residence in China. Many people also believe that given China’s large population, there is no need to encourage 
immigration of foreigners. Grace Ng “Red Tape Foils Green Card Dreams in China” (4 April 2012) The Jakarta 
Globe <http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/archive/red-tape-foils-green-card-dreams-in-china/> (accessed 28 April 
2014); “zhuanjia cheng zhongguo weilai chengwei xin yiminguojia kenengxing da [Expert Says it is Highly Possible 
that China Would Become a New Immigration Country in the Future]” (30 June 2010) Sina 
<http://news.sina.com.cn/c/sd/2010-06-30/115120579697.shtml> (accessed 28 April 2014). 
334  English version of the law is available at Chinese Government website <http://english.gov.cn/2005-
08/21/content_25035.htm> (accessed 1 April 2014). 
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According to the Exit-Entry Law, foreigners are normally required to apply for a visa at Chinese 
visa-issuing authorities outside China (art 15).335 Chinese border authorities have the right to 
inspect the passport, visa and other relevant documents of a foreigner entering China and to 
refuse the entry of certain types of foreigners under art 25 and art 21 of the Exit-Entry Law.336 
Chinese border authorities are not required to give reasons for denying entry (art 25), and are 
empowered to “force the return of those who refuse to do so” (art 26). These provisions, in the 
absence of relevant safeguards, may lead to refoulement prohibited by art 33 of the Convention 
or return to torture prohibited by art 3 of the Convention against Torture. 
Public security bureaus (county level or above) and border authorities are authorised to detain 
foreigners who are suspected of illegal entry or overstay, for up to 30 days and under certain 
circumstances, up to 60 days (arts 58, 60). Foreigners who illegally enter, stay in, and work in 
China may be subject to a variety of punishments varying from oral warning to fines, detention 
and deportation (arts 72, 76, 78, 80, 81).  
The Exit-Entry Law, like other Chinese laws, generally does not distinguish refugees and asylum 
seekers from other migrants. Therefore, in the absence of a national refugee protection 
mechanism, refugees and asylum seekers entering or staying in China without valid documents 
are not likely be exempted from these measures. As a result, the provisions of the Exit-Entry 
Law fall short of providing sufficient protection against penalisation in line with art 31 of the 
Convention. 
C Criminalisation of Unauthorised Departure and Entry under the 1997 Criminal Law 
In accordance with art 322 of the 1997 Criminal Law, unauthorised border crossing, including 
authorised departure and entry of the territory of China, is a crime if the circumstances are 
considered serious:337 
Whoever violates the laws and regulations controlling secret crossing of the national boundary 
(border), and when the circumstances are serious,338 shall be sentenced to not more than one year 
of fixed-term imprisonment and criminal detention or control. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
335 There are a few exceptions, which will be discussed in sec III B of this chapter. 
336 Article 25: “Under any of the following circumstances, foreigners shall not be allowed to enter China: (1) Hold 
no valid exit/entry documents, or refuse or evade border inspection; (2) Are involved in any of the circumstances 
specified in Subparagraph (1) through (4) of the first paragraph of Article 21 of this Law; (3) May engage in 
activities not conform to the types of visa after entering China; or (4) Other circumstances in which entry is not 
allowed in accordance with laws or administrative regulations.” Article 21(1)-(4): “Under any of the following 
circumstances, visas shall not be issued to foreigners: (1) Was deported, or was repatriated upon decision, and the 
No-Entry-into-China period has not expired; (2) Is suffering from serious mental disorders, infectious tuberculosis 
or other infectious diseases that may severely jeopardize the public health; (3) May endanger China’s national 
security or interests, or disrupt social and public order, or engage in other illegal or criminal activities; (4) Resort to 
fraudulent acts in visa application or cannot guarantee expected expenditures during their stay in China”. 
337 Official English translation, available at the official website of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
<http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/cgvienna/eng/dbtyw/jdwt/crimelaw/t209043.htm> (accessed 17 July 2014).  
338 According to the Supreme Court of China Judicial Explanation of Several Issue of Application of Law relating to  
the Hearing of Criminal Case of Organising or Transporting People Illegally Crossing National Boundary (Border), 
the following circumstances are considered “serious”: (1) commit actions abroad which damage the interest of the 
China; (2) Illegally cross national boundary (border) for more than three times; (3) persuade or entice other people 
to illegally cross national boundary (border) together; (4) in the case of persons who receive administrative 
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Article 322 penalises illegal departure and entry on an equal foot, and, as Muntarbhorn has 
noted,339 penalisation of unauthorised border crossing under Chinese criminal law is applicable 
to both Chinese nationals and foreigners. 
However, Yu has noted that the interpretation and application of this provision has clearly 
focused on penalising unauthorised departure instead of unauthorised entry. 340 He pointed out 
that from 1949 to the 1980s, illegal entry into China was very rare whereas China faced huge 
pressure of unauthorised exit of Chinese nationals, the exodus of residents in Guangdong 
Province to Hong Kong from the 1960s to the 1980s being a pertinent example.341 Interestingly, 
he has argued that Chinese nationals, who illegally exit China and apply for asylum in other 
countries based on fabricated evidence of having been persecuted in China, commit an offence 
under art 322.342  
III Existing Legal Provisions relating to Refugees and Asylum 
China does not have a separate refugee law or any domestic legal provisions pertaining to 
refugee definition or RSD. Though it acceded to the Convention and Protocol in 1982, it has not 
enacted any domestic legislation to codify its obligations under these instruments.  
Existing provisions relevant to refugees and asylum are rare and scattered in the Chinese 
domestic law system. The legal basis for refugee protection in China is commonly considered to 
be art 32(2) of the 1982 Constitution and art 46 of the 2012 Exit and Entry Administration Law. 
Emergency Response Plans at national and local levels, though not specifically addressing the 
case of refugees or asylum seekers, have been followed by Chinese authorities to handle large 
scale influxes of displaced foreigners. 
Before I start to explore the refugee definition in a legal context in China, it might be useful to 
look at the ordinary meaning of the term in Chinese language. The Chinese term for “refugee” is 
nanmin, which is the same as the Korean and Japanese term for “refugee”, indicating that this 
term was probably introduced from another language. The term “nanmin” is defined in the 
authoritative Contemporary Chinese Language Dictionary as persons who are displaced and live 
in difficulty due to the impact of warfare and natural disasters.343   
A Article 32(2) of the 1982 Constitution 
The concept of asylum has been included in all constitutional documents of the People’s 
Republic of China. The first constitutional document of the People’s Republic of China, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
punishment because of illegal crossing of national boundary (border), repeat illegal crossing in less than a year’s 
time after their punishment; (5) other serious circumstances. 
339 Muntarbhorn, above n 51, at 62. 
340 Zhigang Yu “chengshi guojia de guojihua yu toudufanzui de xingshi zhengce [The Internationalisation of States 
and Cities and the Criminal Policy regarding Illegal Border Crossing” (2014) 2 Qinghua University Journal 101, at 
112. 
341 Yu, above n 340, at 115. 
342 However, he has noted that in practice, such people are not prosecuted and that it would be difficult to obtain 
evidence. Yu, above n 340, at 115. 
343 Chinese Academy of Social Science Institute of Linguistics Dictionary Department xiandai hanyu cidian 
[Contemporary Chinese Language Dictionary] (The Commercial Press, Beijing, 1996) at 367. 
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1949 Common Program of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (1949 
Common Program),344 provided in article 60 that “The People’s Republic of China should grant 
the right of residence to foreigners who are persecuted by the government of their home country 
because of their participation in peace and democracy movements for the interest of the people 
and seek asylum in China”. Article 99 of the 1954 Constitution stipulates that “The People’s 
Republic of China grants the right of residence to any foreigner who is persecuted because of her 
support for justice, participation in peace movements or conduct of scientific work”, whilst art 
29 of the 1975 Constitution and art 59 of the 1978 Constitution both provide that “[t]he People’s 
Republic of China grants the right of residence to any foreigner who is persecuted because of her 
support for justice, participation in revolutionary movements or conduct of scientific work”.  
The Constitution in force, which was promulgated on 4 December 1982 and last amended in 
2004, is the first Chinese Constitution to employ the term “bihu [asylum]”. Article 32(2) of the 
1982 Constitution provides that “The People’s Republic of China may grant asylum to 
foreigners who request it for political reasons.” Comparing to provisions of its counterparts in 
previous Chinese constitutional documents, art 32(2) of the 1982 Constitution is less strongly 
worded and abstract.  
First, the requirement of being persecuted, which was mentioned in corresponding articles in all 
previous Chinese constitutional documents, is absent in art 32(2) of the 1982 Constitution. 
Second, contrary to all previous Chinese constitutional documents, which gave relatively 
specific descriptions of the acts which would entitle the foreigner to asylum, the 1982 
Constitution mentioned “political reasons” (zhengzhi yuanyin) as the only ground for a 
foreigner’s request for asylum. Third, while the 1949 Common Program stated that China 
“should grant” the right of residence to persecuted foreigners and the 1954, 1975 and 1978 
Constitutions provided that China “grants” to persecuted foreigners, the 1982 Constitution only 
stipulated that China “may grant” asylum. In light of how the verb “grant” is used, there seems 
to be a trend of decreasing commitment of the Chinese government to provide asylum to aliens 
in its constitutional documents from 1949 to 1982 (the year China acceded to the Convention 
and Protocol). 
Article 32(2) of the 1982 Constitution is the only existing provision that Chinese domestic law 
contains in relation to the criteria for granting asylum in China.345 It has frequently been referred 
to as the legal ground for China’s admission of refugees.346 It is clear that there is a gap between 
art 32(2) of the 1982 Constitution and the refugee definition under the Convention and Protocol.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
344 The 1949 Common Program of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference served as an interim 
constitution. After 1949, four Constitutions have been promulgated by the PRC successively on 20 September 1954, 
17 January 975, 5 March 1978 and 4 December 1982.  
345 There was a similar provision in the 1985 Law on Administration of Entry and Exit of Aliens (Alien Entry-Exit 
Law). The Alien Entry-Exit Law expired on 1 July 2013. See section III B of this chapter. 
346 See eg Liang, above n 32, at 259; Liu, above n 15, at 89; Muntarbhorn, above n 51, at 61; Yuanjun Wang 
“guanyu jianli woguo nanmin baohu falv zhidu de jidian sikao [Several Thoughts on Establishment of Refugee 
Protection Mechanism in China]”(2005) 12 Public Security Research 46 at 46; Chengdu Liu “dui gongan churujing 
guanli bumen jiaqiang nanmin guanli de jidian sikao [Several Thoughts on Improving Refugee Administration by 
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On the one hand, art 32(2) of the 1982 Constitution mentions nothing of a person’s fear of 
persecution, which is essential to the Convention Refugee Definition. This means a person does 
not need to be persecuted or at risk of persecution to be eligible for asylum in China. Existing 
literature provides little clue as to why the requirement of persecution was removed from art 
32(2) of the 1982 Constitution. The requirement was included in the asylum article in all 
previous Chinese constitutional documents.  
There is a possibility that this change was induced by China’s experience in protecting persons 
who were not persecuted, but there is no evidence that China had provided asylum to such 
persons prior to the 1982 Constitution. Another possible explanation is that art 32(2) represents a 
much weaker commitment to provide asylum than any of its precedents in Chinese constitutional 
documents and hence the requirement of persecution was removed as a balancing effort. If one 
looks at art 32(2)’s precedents, one may find that China seemed to adopt a very welcoming 
attitude towards asylum seekers in its constitutional documents, which of course had something 
to do with the fact that few people requested for asylum in China at that time. For example, the 
1949 Common Program created a constitutional obligation for China to provide asylum, 
stipulating that China should grant the right of residence to foreigners persecuted for certain 
reasons.  The 1954, 1975 and 1978 Constitutions provided that China grants the right of 
residence to certain types of persecuted foreigners. In art 32(2) of the 1982 Constitution, 
granting asylum is clearly nothing more than a right that Chinese authorities can exercise at their 
discretion. Maybe that made the drafters of the 1982 Constitution feel that the requirement of 
persecution was not as necessary as before. Coincidentally or not, in a 1989 official reply from 
China’s Ministry of Public Security (MPS) to a provincial ID card office, a refugee was defined 
in a way very similar to that of the Convention and Protocol, but the requirement of persecution 
was not mentioned (see sec IV of this chapter).347 
On the other hand, while the Convention Refugee Definition recognises race, nationality, 
religion, political opinion and membership of social groups as grounds for a refugee’s fear of 
persecution, art 32(2) of the 1982 Constitution limits the ground for requesting asylum in China 
to “political reasons”. The phrase “political reasons” is not a legal term in China and is not 
defined in the Chinese legal context. It has only appeared in a very small number of Chinese 
laws and judicial explanations,348 most of which use the term without explanation or examples. 
Only a few examples of “political reasons” have been given in Chinese legal and judicial 
documents. According to the 2007 Interim Implementation Rules for Management of State-
owned Assets by Institutes Functioning Abroad (2007 Rules for Asset Management), political 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Border Exit and Entry Administration Department of Public Security System]” (2000) 4 Journal of Beijing People’s 
Police College 46 at 46; People’s republic of China Combined seventh and eighth periodic reports on the 
Implementation of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, 
CEDAW/C/CHN/7-8 (17 January 2013), at [224]. 
347 MPS Security Management Bureau Reply to Jiangxi Province Resident ID Issuance Office’s Enquiry about 
Whether to Issue ID Card to Refugees Returning to China 1989, GONGSAN[1989]NO350. 
348 According to searches in databases run by Peking University, the Supreme Court of China, and the Ministry of 
Commerce of China in April 2014.  
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reasons included armed conflicts and riots in the host country and bilateral relations between 
China and the host country.349 In a 1985 judicial explanation on a real property dispute case, a 
person was considered to have not been able to claim her property right due to political reasons 
because her father in law was supressed during the land reform and her husband was imprisoned 
in a reform-through-labour jail.350  
Another useful reference is provisions relating to asylum in previous Chinese constitutional 
documents, which limited provision of asylum to persons persecuted for reason of “participation 
in peace and democracy movements for the interest of people”, “support for justice, participation 
in peace movements or conduct of scientific work” or “support for justice, participation in 
revolutionary movements or conduct of scientific work”. There seems to be some degree of 
consistency in these provisions which means that the Chinese government might have had a 
consistent view of who are eligible for asylum in China. The drafters of the 1982 Constitution 
are likely to have considered and consulted these provisions. Therefore, it is possible that 
reasons for persecution enumerated in these provisions were an inspiration for the term “political 
reasons” in art 32(2) of the 1982 Constitution. Of course, these provisions should be understood 
in a historical context. For example, “conduct of scientific work” does not seem obviously 
political today, but at the height of the Cold War when atomic knowhow and military 
technologies were rapidly developing and commonly linked to a government’s political leverage, 
conducting relevant scientific work could be highly political.  
It may also be useful to look at the meaning of the term “political reasons” in a non-legal context. 
The term “political reason” is not defined in an authoritative Chinese language dictionary, the 
Contemporary Chinese Dictionary. Generally, “political reason” can be understood as any 
reason relating to politics. The term “politics” is defined in the Contemporary Chinese 
Dictionary as relations between classes, political parties, ethnic groups and states and their 
interrelations between each other.351 Therefore, in the Chinese language context, political 
reasons may refer to reasons relating to between classes, political parties, ethnic groups and 
states and their interrelations between each other.  
Taken into consideration of the examples of “political reasons” given in the 2007 Rules for 
Asset Management, art 32(2) may, through interpretation, cover persons who are displaced by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
349 Article 26, the People’s Republic of China Ministry of Finance (MOF) Interim Implementation Rules for 
Management of State-owned Assets by Institutes Functioning Abroad CAIXING[2007]NO559. Chinese version of 
the Rules is available at MOF 
<http://www.mof.gov.cn/zhengwuxinxi/caizhengwengao/caizhengbuwengao2008/caizhengbuwengao20082/200805
/t20080519_29058.html> (accessed 30 March 2014). 
350 The Supreme People’s Court of China, Reply regarding the Real Estate Dispute between Fang Yishun, Fang 
Shengeng and the Central Production Team of Hengfeng Village, Wufeng Region, Qimen County, FAMINZI[85] 
NO 4, available at MOF 
<http://policy.mofcom.gov.cn/blank/claw!fetch.action?id=g100002673&industrycode=L07429;S09431&secondcod
e=711001;552022> (accessed 6 April 2014). 
351 Contemporary Chinese Language Dictionary, above n 343, at 1609. The Chinese term for “politics” is zhengzhi. 
When used in conjunction with another noun, the Chinese term zhengzhi can also mean “political”, functioning as 
an adjective. In art 32(2) of the 1982 Constitution, the term “political reasons” is zhengzhi yuanyin in Chinese, 
yuanyin meaning reason(s).   
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armed conflict and riots. In this sense, art 32(2) may provide protection to certain types of 
persons who are not protected by the Convention and Protocol. As will be discussed in sec C of 
this chapter, several emergency response plans made by county level governments in China 
actually highlight warfare or unrest as a cause of potential refugee influxes into China. 
The coverage of art 32(2) of the 1982 Constitution would need to depend on Chinese authorities’ 
interpretation of the article. Since art 32(2) of the 1982 Constitution has, however, never been 
invoked, at least not publicly,352 it is hard to tell how Chinese authorities interpret art 32(2) of 
the 1982 Constitution in relation to refugee definition. The refugee status of the Indochinese had 
been recognised by the Chinese government in August 1979; as will be discussed in Chapter IV, 
there is no evidence that the Chinese government referred to art 59 of the 1978 Constitution, 
which was in force at that time, as a ground for its recognition of the Indochinese’s refugee 
status. Indeed, the Indochinese who came to China had been persecuted for being ethnic Chinese, 
and hence hardly fell within the spectrum of art 59 of the 1978 Constitution which protected 
those persecuted “because of her support for justice, participation in revolutionary movements or 
conduct of scientific work.” A portion of Indochinese refugees arrived in China after 1982. 
While their forcible departure from Vietnam could be argued as to have been a result of political 
frictions between Vietnam and China,353 as Muntarbhorn pointed out, art 32(2) of the 1982 
Constitution generally was not invoked in the large scale influx of Indochinese cases.354  
After the Indochinese refugees, the Chinese government did not identify any refugees or publicly 
grant asylum to any person.355 There is no published record that Chinese authorities have 
screened any asylum seeker according to Chinese domestic law.356 Whereas its emphasis on the 
economic motivation of the North Korean escapees as the ground for denying them of refugee 
status seems to relate to art 32(2) of the 1982 Constitution, the Chinese government has never 
explicitly referred to art 32(2) of the 1982 Constitution to justify its position to the North Korean 
escapees. It has always merely stated generally that it has treated the North Korean escapees in 
China according to relevant international law, national law and the principle of humanitarianism 
(see chapter IV). It has not mentioned art 32(2) of the 1982 Constitution to justify its decisions 
on the status of the displaced ethnic minorities from Myanmar or any other displaced foreigners.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
352 Since granting asylum is regarded as a highly sensitive issue in China, it is not impossible that Chinese 
authorities granted asylum but have kept relevant information secret. It is impossible to verify whether article 32(2) 
was invoked in those unpublished asylum cases.  
353 See generally Paomin Chang Beijing, Hanoi, and the Overseas Chinese (University of California Institute of East 
Asian Studies, Berkeley, 1982); Michael Godley “A Summer Cruise to Nowhere: China and the Vietnamese 
Chinese in Perspective” (1980) 4 The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs 35. 
354 Muntarbhorn, above n 51, at 61. 
355 “China has not promulgated laws or regulations relating to refugees and has no published precedents of screening 
asylum seekers or granting refugee status in accordance with domestic law.” Guofu Liu “zhongguo weilai raobuguo 
nanmin yiti [China Cannot Avoid Refugee Issues in the Future]” (23 February 2012) Xinhua Net 
<http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2012-02/23/c_122744895.htm> (accessed 28 April 2014); “waiguoren ruhe 
dedao zhongguo ‘bihu’ [How Can Foreigners Receive Asylum in China]” (18 December 2013) Sohu News 
<http://news.sohu.com/s2013/dianji-1291/> (accessed 11 April 2014). 
356 Liu, above n 355. 
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By the time the 1982 Constitution was promulgated, China had acceded to the Convention and 
Protocol more than two months earlier. The majority of the Indochinese refugees had arrived and 
been settled.357 However, art 32(2) does not seem to take into consideration the Convention 
Refugee Definition or the Indochinese influx. A likely explanation is that asylum issues were not 
China’s priorities in 1982. The country was still recovering from the ten year long chaotic 
Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) during which law was subordinated to policies. Intellectuals, 
including many law scholars, were persecuted; and foreigners were commonly viewed as spies 
and anti-revolutionary. It was also at the beginning of the “reform and open-up” process which 
begun in December 1978. Asylum and refugee issues were not China’s priorities.  
Another possible explanation is that the legislators were not ready to introduce those changes. 
As mentioned in chapter I, China’s early experience in granting asylum mainly involved high 
profile politicians and was closely linked to political and diplomatic rivalry with the foreigner’s 
country of origin. Even the acceptance of the Indochinese refugees was initially used to 
denounce Vietnam.358 Granting asylum might still be viewed as merely a means to serve 
political and diplomatic purposes by the Chinese legislators in 1982. Actually, as recently as 
2000, an author from the Beijing Public Security Bureau’s Border Exit and Entry Sector 
suggested in the Journal of Beijing People’s Police College that political asylum may be given 
to the following types of persons: (1) high level state officials, (2) high officials of the UN, other 
internal organisations and foreign NGOs, (3) employees of foreign embassies, (4) influential 
leaders of opposite parties, politicians, well-known figures, (5) science and technology expert, 
famous scholars, militaries, social activists, (6) persons who have made outstanding contribution 
to China’s scientific research, economic development or cultural exchange, (7) the family and 
relatives of the above and other foreigners.359 Given that the MPS and its local branches are 
among the major players in handling refugees and asylum seekers,360 the extent of media control 
in China and the sensitivity of the topic, the view of this author may, to a certain extent, 
represent the attitude of the Chinese government in 2000. 
Whereas art 32(2) of the 1982 Constitution may be seen as a legal ground for the Chinese 
government to provide asylum, it is questionable whether asylum seekers may rely on it for their 
right to apply for asylum in China. After all, art 32 essentially only provides for the power of 
Chinese authorities to grant asylum, not the right of aliens to request asylum in China. No 
mechanisms have been established for the enforcement of an individual’s constitutional rights in 
China. The Chinese Constitution primarily concerns itself with state organisational structure 
rather than the protection of fundamental rights of individuals.361 The right of citizens or 
organisations to challenge the constitutionality of government actions is not mentioned in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
357 China received about 280,000 Indochinese, about 250,000 of who arrived between April 1978 and June 1979. 
Liang, above n 32, at 272. 
358 See ch IV. 
359 Liu, above n 346, at 48.    
360 The Chinese institutional framework for refugee and asylum matters is to be further discussed in chapter V. 
361 Jianfu Chen “Constitutional Judicialisation and Popular Constitutionalism in China: Are We There Yet?” in 
Guanghua Yu (ed) The Development of the Chinese Legal System (Routledge, Oxon, 2011) 3 at 4. 
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Constitution. These factors make it difficult for individuals to exercise their constitutional rights. 
In addition, refugees and asylum seekers are not citizens of China. Whether they are entitled to 
constitutional rights under the Chinese Constitution and, if so, how they are going to exercise the 
constitutional rights remain in question. 
B Law on Exit and Entry Administration 
On 1 July 2013, the Exit-Entry Law,362 which was promulgated by the Standing Committee of 
the NPC on 30 June 2012, entered into force, superseding the Law of the People's Republic of 
China on Control of the Entry and Exit of Aliens (Aliens Entry-Exit and Law),363 and the Law 
on Administration of Exit and Entry of Chinese Citizens. The Alien Entry-Exit Law, which was 
promulgated on 22 November 1985 by the Standing Committee of NPC and entered into force 
on 1 February 1986, contained an article allowing asylum seekers to reside in China which stated 
“Aliens who seek asylum for political reasons shall be permitted to reside in China upon 
approval by the competent authorities of the Chinese Government.”364 Prior to the Exit-Entry 
Law, this article, together with art 32(2) of the 1982 Constitution, was often referred to as the 
legal ground for refugee protection in China.365 
The Exit-Entry Law is regarded as a combination of the two superseded laws as well as a 
reflection of the practice in the field. According to art 46 of the Exit-Entry Law, foreigners 
applying for refugee status may stay temporarily in China with temporary identity certificates 
issued by public security organs during the RSD process and foreigners recognised as refugees 
may stay or reside in China refugee identity certificates issued by public security organs. This is 
the first time China included provisions regarding the treatment of refugees in its domestic 
law.366  
Article 46 of the Exit-Entry Law represents a step forward from art 15 of the Alien Entry-Exit 
Law in two senses. First, it explicitly recognises refugees’ right to stay and live legally in China. 
Before the Exit-Entry Law, refugees’ right to remain in China was not clearly stated under 
Chinese law. Article 32(2) of the 1982 Constitution and art 15 of the Alien Entry-Exit Law may 
be considered the legal ground for the right to stay of those who requested asylum from the 
Chinese government for political reasons, but they do not necessarily afford the same protection 
for those who are recognised as refugees or whose status is under consideration by UNHCR. In 
particular, UNHCR’s definition of a refugee obviously is not limited to persons who request 
asylum for political reason and covers any person who is at risk of “serious and indiscriminate 
threats to life, physical integrity or freedom resulting from generalized violence or events 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
362 English version of the law is available at Bureau of Exit and Entry Administration of the Ministry of Public 
Security <http://www.mps.gov.cn/n16/n84147/n84196/3837042.html> (accessed 1 April 2014). 
363  English version of the law is available at Chinese Government website <http://english.gov.cn/2005-
08/21/content_25035.htm> (accessed 1 April 2014). 
364 Article 15. 
365 See Combined seventh and eighth periodic reports of China to UNCEDW, above n 346, at [224]; Liang, above n 
32, at 259; Liu, above n 15, at 89. 
366 UNHCR “Submission by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees For the Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights’ Compilation Report - Universal Periodic Review: People’s Republic of China” 
(March 2013), Refworld <http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/5135b0cb2.pdf> (accessed 28 April 2014), at 1. 
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seriously disturbing public order”.367 As mentioned in chapter I, the Chinese government does 
not issue identity documents to UNHCR refugees. The legal status of UNHCR travel documents 
issued to refugees is unclear in China.368 Although in practice China allows UNHCR refugees to 
stay in China temporarily until a durable solution, usually resettlement, is found by UNHCR for 
them,369 UNHCR refugees’ right to stay in China lacked sufficient legal protection under 
domestic Chinese law. Compared to Indochinese refugees who have been issued Chinese 
identity documents,370 UNHCR refugees are in a precarious situation. For example, in the early 
1990s, more than 30 UNHCR refugees were repatriated along with illegal migrants by the 
Chinese government.371 Under art 46 of the Exit-Entry Law, refugees’ rights to stay in China are 
explicitly recognised, which provides a legal ground for all refugees in China to stay or live in 
the country and lays a foundation for further improvement of the treatment of refugees in China. 
Second, art 46 of the Exit-Entry Law identifies the authority in charge of issuing identity 
certificates to refugees and asylum seekers. Neither art 32(2) of the 1982 Constitution nor art 15 
of the Alien Entry-Exit Law specifies which authorities are responsible for dealing with refugee 
matters. Liu has suggested the need for more detailed rules for enforcing art 15 of the Alien 
Entry-Exit Law, including the need to specify government organs in charge of refugee 
matters.372 Similarly, Wang pointed out that the lack of clear designation and distribution of 
responsibilities to authorities to handle refugee matters had hindered refugee protection and 
management in China.373 By stipulating that Chinese public security authorities are responsible 
for issuing identity certificates to refugees, art 46 of the Exit-Entry Law is the first Chinese legal 
provision relating to the national constitutional framework for refugee protection in China. 
Certainly art 46 is a positive move to improve legal protection for refugees. The Exit-Entry Law, 
however, is silent on who qualifies as a refugee, which authorities are responsible for handling 
applications for refugee status or conducting RSD, or what the RSD procedures are. It will be 
sometime before we can tell whether and how refugees and asylum seekers can exercise their 
right under art 46. According to UNHCR, which has been advocating for national refugee 
protection legislation in China, a national asylum regulation should in principle shortly follow as 
an implementation tool.374 Given that art 46 covers only persons who are in the process of RSD 
and who have been granted refugee status, a prerequisite of exercising the right under this article 
is to have access to RSD procedures. If a person is not able to lodge an application for refugee 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
367 UNHCR, above n 268, sec 3.1.4. 
368 Jerry Z Li and Sanzhuan Guo “China” in Dinah Shelton (ed) International Law and Domestic Legal Systems: 
Incorporation, Transformation, and Persuasion (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011)158, at 160; Wang, above 
n 346, at 47. 
369 UNHCR, above n 41. 
370 The Indochinese refugees were initially accepted as returning overseas Chinese nationals and to certain extent 
are still viewed as such by the Chinese government. That is the main reason they obtained Chinese identity 
documents and enjoy many civil rights that non-Indochinese refugees do not have. See Chapter IV. 
371 Liu, “Several Thoughts”, above n 359, at 47. 
372 Liu, above n 359, at 47. 
373 Wang, above n 346, at 47. 
374  UNHCR Regional Presentation for China and Mongolia “Fact Sheet” (September 2013) UNHCR < 
http://www.unhcr.org/500018e59.pdf> (accessed 28 April 2014). 
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status, they will by no means be able to exercise the rights under art 46. The new law is silent on 
who qualifies as a refugee and the procedures for refugee status application and determination. 
China has not established a mechanism for RSD and, as mentioned in chapter I, the Chinese 
authorities do not substantially involve themselves in RSD at present. UNHCR Beijing is the 
only organisation that currently conducts RSD in China (see chapter V). However, a significant 
proportion of de facto refugees and asylum seekers do not have access to UNHCR. For example, 
as mentioned above, China has repeatedly declined UNHCR’s request to access the North 
Korean escapees and the displaced Kokangs and Kachins. The lack of a national RSD 
mechanism and restricted access to UNHCR hinders de facto refugees and asylum seekers from 
enjoying the rights under art 46 of the Law on Exit and Entry Administration. As said by a 
UNHCR refugee in Beijing, “it remains to be seen how China will implement these new 
provisions and whether refugees will receive the protection they are entitled to”.375  
Additionally, the Exit-Entry Law seems to leave room for the possibility of temporary and 
humanitarian protection. Normally, all aliens who wish to enter China need to apply for a visa at 
China’s visa authorities overseas unless provided otherwise by the law (art 15). As an exception, 
art 20 allows foreigners to obtain a visa at certain ports for humanitarian reasons, and art 23 
exempts foreigners from a visa under certain circumstances. According to art 20, aliens who 
need to enter China urgently for humanitarian reasons can apply for a so-called port visa (kou’an 
qianzheng) at certain Chinese ports. A port visa is valid for single entry and a stay for no longer 
than 30 days. According to art 23, aliens who enter China temporarily due to force majeure or 
other urgent reasons do not need a visa. Instead, they should go through the temporary entry 
formalities with the border defence and checking authorities at the border.376 Once admitted, 
they are allowed to stay in China up to 15 days. The law further provides that, subject to the 
approval of the border control department of the Public Security Bureau, aliens who need to 
change a temporary stay to a long-term stay in China for humanitarian reasons can obtain a 
residence permit (art 31). 
These provisions, if constructively interpreted, may well serve as the legal basis for temporary 
and humanitarian protection for displaced foreigners who do not qualify for refugee status but 
are in need of international protection.  
C Emergency Response Plans on Sudden Incidents Involving Foreign Factors 
In the aftermath of the SARS public health crisis in 2003, the Chinese government established a 
national emergency response system. The system consists of a National Overall Emergency 
Response Plan, 21 national category emergency response plans, 57 State Council departmental 
emergency response plans and emergency response plans at provincial, municipal, county, town 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
375 Olivier Rukundo “China’s New Exit-Entry Law” (1 October 2012) Fahamu Refugee Legal Aid Newsletter 
<http://frlan.tumblr.com/post/32664470835/chinas-new-exit-entry-law> (accessed 19 April 2014). 
376 Border Control authorities can require the alien requesting temporary entry, the person in charge of the transport 
vehicle carrying the alien requesting entry across the border or the agent representing the transport vehicle in border 
crossing matters to provide necessary guarantee. 
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and village levels.377 The 2005 National Emergency Response Plan on Sudden Incidents 
Involving Foreign Factors (National Plan) is one of the national category emergency response 
plans. In accordance with the National Plan, local plans on sudden incidents involving foreign 
factors (Local Plans, collectively the Plans) have been made at provincial, municipal, and county 
levels.  
Though the Plans are not specific to the refugee situation, they are commonly regarded as the 
documents relied on by the Chinese government in response of refugee influxes.378 In practice, 
they have been followed by the Chinese government to deal with displaced minorities from 
Myanmar. For example, the Yunnan provincial authorities followed these plans to deal with the 
massive influx of ethnic Kokangs from Myanmar in 2009 in a timely and orderly manner.379 In 
April 2012, the government of Tengchong county Yunnan Province, a town bordering 
Myanmar’s Kachin State, triggered its Local Plan to handle the influx of displaced Kachins.380 
The full text of the National Plan has not yet been published, though it was launched in 2005, 
indicating the sensitive nature of the plan.381 Only the title of each chapter of the National Plan 
has been published. According to published chapter titles, the Nation Plan comprises seven 
chapters, namely General Principles, Organisation and Instructional Structures and 
Responsibilities, Whistle-blowing Mechanism, Classified Responses, Handling Procedures, 
Emergency Response Support and Supplementary Provisions. 
Many of the Local Plans are available in full text. The structure of these plans and their 
provisions relating to refugees are generally similar. This indicates that these Local Plans might 
have been drafted following a certain model, most likely the National Plan. Several county level 
Local Plans, such as the plans of Yunnan Province’s Lancang Country, Lushui County, Mengla 
County, Nujiang Prefecture and Wenshan Prefection list “large scale refugee influxes due to 
reasons like zhanshi [warfare] in neighbouring countries” as incidents that will trigger the plan 
(see Chart 6). 382  Similarly, Tibet Autonomous Region’s Shigatse Prefecture’s Overall 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
377 As of 5 March 2013. Source: the Central People’s Government of China <www.gov.cn>. 
378 See eg Drew Thompson “Border Burdens: China’s Response to the Myanmar Refugee Crisis” (2009) 5 China 
Security 11; Duanfang Tao “nanmin: zenyang bangzhu guojia de lingju? [Refugees: How to Help Our Country’s 
Neighbours?]” NetEase <http://news.163.com/special/reviews/refugees.html> (accessed 20 April 2014); Bi Hu 
“ruhe jie ‘nanmin’ zhedao ti [How to Solve the Problem of ‘Refugees’]” Southern Weekly (online ed, Guangzhou, 3 
September 2009). 
379 Thompson, above n 378, at 15. 
380 Emergency Response Management Office of the People’s Government of Yunnan Province “jiceng yingji guanli 
shifan danwei Tengchong xian yingji guanli gongzuo shijian [Emergency Response Practice of Tengchong, A 
Model Basic-Level Unit in Emergency Response]” (26 October 2012) Environment Protection Department of 
Hunan Province <http://www.hbj.hunan.gov.cn/hjjc/hjyj/content_32894.html > (accessed 2 April 2014). 
381 It is not uncommon for Chinese authorities to not publish legal or policy documents as there is no effective 
system in China to ensure freedom of information. For example, according to a Chinese immigration law scholar, 
the majority of Chinese immigration laws, regulations and policies are “internal and not open for public scrutiny” 
because Chinese authorities usually treat immigration laws, regulations and policies as confidential. Liu, above n 15, 
at 12. 
382 Article 1.1.3, Office of Lushui County People’s Government Notice on Circulation of Lushui County Emergency 
Response Plan on Sudden Incidents Involving Foreign Factors (2007) luzhengbanfa[2007]No.114, available at 
Lushui County Government Information Gateway 
<http://xxgk.yn.gov.cn/canton_model19/newsview.aspx?id=362418> ; article 1.3(4), Mengla County Emergency 
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Emergency Response Plan for Sudden Public Incident also lists “large scale refugee influx into 
border region due to reasons like dongluan [unrest] in neighbouring countries” as incidents 
which will trigger the plan.  
These Local Plan Incidents are classified into four levels: extremely major (level 1), major (level 
2), relatively major (level 3) and ordinary (level 4) in these five country-level plans. Level 1 
emergencies are the most urgent and serious while level 4 emergencies are of the lowest urgency 
and severity. Refugee numbers triggering each level of emergency responses differ across 
counties and are as follows: 
 
Chart 6 Trigger Level of Refugee Numbers in Local Emergency Response Plans 
Places applicable  Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 
Lushui, Yunnan  Not mentioned Not mentioned  Not mentioned 20-50 
Mengla, Yunnan  300  100-300  50-100 20-50 
Nujiang, Yunnan  Not mentioned Not mentioned 50-100 20-50 
Wenshan, Yunnan 300 100-300 50-100 20-50 
Shigatse, Tibet Not mentioned Not mentioned Not mentioned Not mentioned 
 
It is worth noting that warfare or unrest in neighbouring countries are the only highlighted 
causes of refugee influxes in all plans which mention refugee influxes. While these plans are not 
intended to define a refugee, they seem to suggest that the Chinese government does not rule out 
the possibility of considering persons displaced by warfare and unrest from neighbouring 
countries as refugees. Of course, these Local Plans are made by county level governments in 
remote border provinces and do not necessarily represent the Central Government’s view. The 
Chinese Central Government had clearly claimed that the displaced Kokangs or Kachins, who 
seem to fit the description of refugees in these Local Plans, were not refugees.383  
IV Applicable Multilateral and Bilateral Treaties  
A The Convention and Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees  
China acceded to the Convention and Protocol in 1982. In theory, by acceding to the Convention 
and Protocol, China has made a commitment to be bound by the provisions of these instruments; 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Response Plan on Sudden Incidents Involving Foreign Factors (2008), available at MengLa County Legal Office 
<http://xsbnml.xxgk.yn.gov.cn/canton_model3/newsview.aspx?id=1441287>; article 1.1.3 Nujiang Prefecture 
Emergency Response Plan on Sudden Incidents Involving Foreign Factors (2007) nuzhengbanfa[2007]No.10, 
available at Nujiang Prefecture Office of Foreign Affairs and Oversea Chinese Affairs 
<http://xxgk.yn.gov.cn/canton_model19/newsview.aspx?id=139359>;  art I1(5), Wenshan Prefecture Emergency 
Response Plan on Sudden Incidents Involving Foreign Factors (2006) wenzhengbanfa[2006]No.108, available at 
People’s Government of Wenshan Zhuang and Miao Autonomous Prefecture 
<http://www.ynws.gov.cn/Detail.aspx?ID=13472>; Appendix article IV-3(2), Shigatse Prefecture Emergency 
Response Plan on Sudden Incidents (2008). All links were accessed on 2 April 2014. 
383 Due to the large size of China, it is not unusual that local level legislation and policy documents do not strictly 
comply with those at the national level. It has a longstanding problem through China’s history.  
 
	  
82 
it also has the obligation to perform the Convention and Protocol in good faith according to the 
principle of pacta sunt servanda and the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,384 to 
which China is a party.  
In reality, China has not enacted any national law to implement the Convention and Protocol, 
except for art 46 of the exit-Entry Law. China’s Constitution is silent on the legal status of 
treaties and their hierarchy in the domestic legal system. There has been no consensus among 
scholars on the legal status of treaties in China.385 According to Judge Xue Hanqin, of the 
International Court of Justice, strictly speaking, treaties ratified or acceded to by China do not 
automatically become part of Chinese domestic law and therefore do not automatically become 
enforceable in China.386 Judge Xue further pointed out that, generally speaking, except for those 
administrative agreements that can be directly executed,387 treaties can be applied domestically 
in China only after the adoption of legislation transforming a treaty into domestic law or 
authorizing direct application of the treaty.388 I agree with Judge Xue. Since China has not 
enacted any legislation to incorporate the provisions of the Convention and Protocol into 
Chinese law, the Convention and Protocol do not apply domestically in China. This means that 
refugees will not be able to bring a case to a Chinese court to enforce the provisions of the 
Convention and Protocol. In the event that Chinese authorities violate the provisions of the 
Convention and Protocol, there would be very limited remedies in the Chinese legal system 
available for refugees for violations of their rights under the Convention, such as of the right of 
not being returned to any place where their life or freedom would be threatened.  
In addition, as mentioned in chapter II, the Convention and Protocol lack a strong monitoring 
mechanism. The institution charged with the task to supervise the implementation of the 
Convention and Protocol, UNHCR, unlike treaty supervisory bodies formed under a few human 
rights treaties, does not have the function of reviewing state reports or determining individual or 
inter-state complaints. It is “very much within a state party’s sovereign discretion as to whether 
to take steps and, if so, which steps, to protect refugees within its jurisdiction”.389  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
384 Article 26, “pacta sunt servanda”, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (concluded on 23 May 1969, 
entered into force on 27 January 1980). 
385 For discussions on domestic implementation of treaties in China, see eg Sanzhuan Guo “Implementation of 
Human Rights Treaties by Chinese Courts: Problems and Prospects” (2009) 8(1) Chinese Journal of International 
Law 161; Xiaoqing Zhu “guoji tiaoyue zai zhongguo guonei de shiyong yanjiu [Study on Application of 
International Treaties in China]” (20 June 2001) Bureau of International Cooperation of China Academy of Social 
Science 
<http://bic.cass.cn/info/Arcitle_Show_Study_Show.asp?ID=2257&Title=%B9%FA%BC%CA%CC%F5%D4%BC
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September 2011); Yongwei Liu “guoji tiaoyue zai zhongguo shiyong xinlun [New Thoughts on Application of 
International Treaties in China]” (2007) 2 Faxuejia [Jurists Review] 143. 
386 Hanqin Xue and Qian Jin “International Treaties in the Chinese Domestic Legal System” (2009) 8(2) Chinese 
Journal of International Law 299, at 300.  
387 This refers to bilateral cooperation agreements and memoranda of understanding between governments, which 
qualify as international treaties under Chinese law. Xue and Jin, above n 386, at 306. 
388 Xue and Jin, above n 386, at 322. 
389 Goodwin-Gill and McAdam, above n 103, at 528. 
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Despite the lack of relevant national legislation, the Chinese government has repeatedly argued 
that it has duly implemented the Convention and Protocol. For example, it claimed in a 2008 
State report on the implementation of the International Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination (Convention on Elimination of Racial Discrimination) that 
“China has been implementing the convention [relating to the Status of Refugees] in real 
earnest.”390 In a 2010 report on the implementation of the Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, it stated that: 391 
 
China is a state party to the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 
Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, … [It] has provided international protection to 
refugees within its capacity, guaranteed their legitimate rights and interests to the greatest 
extent, … . 
  
As argued in chapter II, China might not have had a good understanding of its obligations under 
the Convention and Protocol or given a careful thought of its capacity and willingness to commit 
to these instruments. In fact, it seems that, after China acceded to the Convention, the lack of 
understanding of the Convention Refugee Definition, as well as of China’s rights and obligations 
under these instruments, remained with Chinese authorities for a long time.  
In 1989, seven years after China’s accession to the Convention, the Jiangxi Province Resident ID 
Issuance Office submitted an enquiry to the MPS regarding the Indochinese refugees’ eligibility 
for Chinese ID cards. In the enquiry, the Jiangxi office referred to the Indochinese refugees as 
“guiguo nanmin [refugees who returned to China]”, obviously confusing the concept of refugees 
and returning huaqiao [overseas Chinese].392 MPS in its reply pointed out that:393  
 
Regarding people who reside in China as a “refugee”, their nationality should be identified first. 
Refugees should refer to persons who, due to reasons of race, politics and religion, etc, stay 
outside of their country of origin, and are unable or unwilling to receive protection from that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
390 People’s Republic of China 10th to 13th Periodic Reports on the Implementation of the International Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, CERD/C/CHN/13 (24 June 2008), at [142]. 
391 People’s Republic of China Second Periodic Report on the Implementation of the Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights, E/C.12/CHN/2 (6 July 2012), [23]. 
392Between the 1950s and 1970s, due to anti-Chinese movements in Indonesia and India, several waves of overseas 
Chinese nationals returned from those countries on ships sent by the Chinese government to collect them. Most 
Indochinese refugees are ethnic Chinese and they received treatment on a par with those Chinese nationals returning 
from Indonesia and India. This is probably the cause of the Jiangxi office’s confusion. Glen Peterson argues that 
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UNHCR’s refugee definition quite closely. However, apart from the complex problems surrounding their nationality 
status, China seems to have regarded those for who it sent ships in the 1960s as Chinese nationals. See Peterson, 
above n 17; Lin Wen “xinzhongguo shouci daguimo cheqiao shimo [New China’s First Large-scale Evacuation of 
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393 MPS Security Management Bureau Reply to Jiangxi Province Resident ID Card Issuance Office’s Enquiry about 
Whether to Issue ID Card to Refugees Returning to China 1989, GONGSAN[1989]NO350. 
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country, including stateless persons who, due to such reasons, are unable to stay in their country 
of habitual residence, and unable or unwilling to return to that country.  
 
The refugee defined in the reply looks similar to the Convention Refugee Definition. However, 
the requirement of well-founded fear for persecution, which is central to the Convention Refugee 
Definition, is not mentioned in the MPS reply. This seems to show the influence of art 32(2) of 
the 1982 Constitution, but it is difficult to tell whether the MPS merely neglected the 
requirement of persecution or intentionally omitted it. In addition, the reply did not mention 
membership of a particular social group, which is a ground for fear of persecution in the 
Convention Refugee Definition, and used the term “politics (zhengzhi)” rather than “political 
opinion (zhengzhi jianjie)”, which is the phrase used in art 1A(2) of the official Chinese version 
of the Convention. Though there are no sources to verify the reasons for such omission and 
changes, poor understanding of the Convention Refugee Definition is a possible explanation. 
In 1992, the MPS issued a notice to provincial public security authorities on handling aliens 
illegally entering or staying in China (the 1992 Notice).394 The 1992 Notice mentioned that the 
number of Pakistanis, Iranians and Afghans illegally staying in China was increasing year by 
year and the most of these people, “using the excuse of escaping wars, applied for refugee status 
with UNHCR’s office in China, and after registered with UNHCR, lived on charity provided by 
UNHCR.” The notice required local level public security authorities to repatriate every and all 
aliens illegally entering or staying in China “regardless of whether they have registered with 
UNHCR”, emphasising that “UNHCR shall not intervene in China’s sovereign matters”. 
According to Liu, in 1992, China repatriated 172 aliens illegally entering or staying in China, 
among whom were more than 30 UNHCR refugees. The 1992 Notice is obviously not in line 
with the Convention and Protocol and China clearly violated art 33 of the Convention by 
repatriating UNHCR refugees.  
As mentioned in chapter I, since the mid-1990s, China has dealt with at least three massive 
inflows of displaced foreigners, namely the North Korean escapees, the displace Kokangs and 
the displaced Kachins. Generally, China has denied them refugee status and declined UNHCR’s 
requests to access them.395 China’s repatriation of the North Korean escapees and the displaced 
Kachins has been criticised by human rights groups as violations of the Convention and Protocol.  
There is no doubt that China, if it is to implement the Convention and Protocol in real earnest as 
it claimed, must make sure that it will not repeat the mistake of repatriating refugees as it did in 
1992. However, due to the limitations of the Convention and Protocol, it is practically difficult 
for any third party to intervene in China’s decisions on the treatment of refugees and other 
displace foreigners within its territory. 
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B Human Rights and Humanitarian Treaties 
China is a party to most of the major international human rights treaties, including the 
Convention against Torture, Convention on Elimination of Racial Discrimination (adopted 21 
December 1965, entered into force on 4 January 1969), Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (opened for signature 19 December 1966, entered into force 3 January 1976), 
Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (opened 
for signature 12 August 1949, entered into force on 21 October 1950), Convention on the Rights 
of the Child (adopted 20 November 1989, entered into force 2 September 1990) and Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (adopted on 18 December 
1979, entered into force on 3 September 1981). 
Treaty supervisory bodies established under a number of these human rights treaties have raised 
refugee protection issues with China.396 For example, in its 2005 Concluding Observations, the 
Committee on the Rights of the Child urged China to amend relevant laws to allow children who 
were born to Indochinese refugees in China to obtain Chinese citizenship and to ensure that no 
unaccompanied children, including those from North Korea, are returned to a place where there 
are substantial grounds for believing that the children face a real risk of irreparable harm.397 The 
Committee again expressed concerns about the North Korean and Kachin children in China in its 
2013 Concluding Observation:398 
 
(a) Children entering mainland China from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea are still 
categorically considered as economic migrants and returned to the Democratic People’s Republic 
of Korea without consideration of whether there are risks of irreparable harm to the children upon 
return; 
(b) Children whose mothers are from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea lack legal 
identity and access to basic rights, particularly education, as they are not registered under the 
hukou system out of fear that their mothers would be identified and forcibly returned to the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea; 
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 (c) The State party failed to recognize the Kachin asylum seekers, including children, as refugees 
despite their circumstances and forcibly returned them to Myanmar in August 2012; 
(d) There is an absence of special reception procedures or facilities for unaccompanied and 
separated refugee and asylum-seeking children and that they lack access to health care, special 
care and protection. 
 
The Committee on the Rights of the Child recommended China to respect the non-refoulement 
principle, cease arrest and repatriation of North Koreans, especially North Korean children, 
provide temporary protection to Kachin refugee children and their family, and allow UNHCR to 
access them.399 
The Committee against Torture noted that many North Koreans in China were referred as 
“illegal immigrants” or “snakeheads” and had been forcibly returned “without any examination 
of the merits of each individual case”. The Committee commented that, when determining the 
applicability of art 3 of the Convention against Torture, China:400 
 
should establish an adequate screening process for status determination in order to determine 
whether persons subject to return may face a substantial risk of torture, particularly in view of the 
fact that it is reportedly a criminal offence to depart unofficially from the DPRK, and should 
provide UNHCR with access to the border region and persons of concern. 
  
The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination also expressed its concerns about 
the treatment of North Korean asylum seekers in China and recommended China adopt 
appropriate national legislation to ensure protection for refugees and asylum seekers: 401 
 
the Committee reiterates its concern (A/56/18, para. 246) that asylum-seekers from the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea continue to be systematically refused asylum and 
forcibly returned. (art. 5(b)). 
The Committee recommends that the State party adopt legislation relating to refugee status as 
soon as possible. Bearing in mind its general recommendation No. 30, the Committee calls upon 
the State party to take all necessary legal and policy measures to ensure that all asylum-seekers 
have the merits of their individual cases considered by an independent and impartial authority. 
 
In response to the comments of these human rights treaty bodies, China has politely but 
resolutely insisted that North Korean escapees in China are not refugees, and emphasised that 
China has provided refugee protection to the Indochinese refugees and has been working on 
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national refugee legislation. For example, it stated in a State report on the implementation of the 
Convention of the Rights of the Child that:402  
 
The “children from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea”, referred to in the Committee’s 
concluding remarks, have illegally entered China’s borders for economic reasons, and are not 
refugees. The Chinese Government has always dealt properly with cases concerning illegal 
entrants from the DPRK, in accordance with domestic law, international law and a humanitarian 
spirit, and giving full consideration to the actual circumstances of the persons involved. 
 
It also stated in a State report on the implementation of the Implementation of the Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women that:403 
 
Illegal immigrants from North Korea who come to China for economic reasons are not refugees. 
China has been handling individual cases in this regard in accordance with its domestic law, 
international law and in the spirit of humanitarianism, fully taking into account the actual 
situation of the persons involved. The dignity and rights of North Koreans who enter China by 
illegal means and for economic reasons are respected and they are treated in the spirit of 
humanitarianism, by providing them with necessities of life. 
 
Generally, in these reports China simply claimed that the North Koreans illegally entered China 
for economic reasons and that they have been treated in accordance with relevant international 
law, national law and humanitarianism. It has not elaborated on the legal grounds for its decision 
on the status of the North Korean escapee nor has it indicated whether it investigated individual 
situations to determine their status. 
C Protocol on Cooperation in the Work of Maintaining National Security and Social 
Orders at Border Areas between China and North Korea  
The Chinese government has reportedly relied on China-North Korean bilateral treaties to justify 
its repatriation of North Koreans.404A number of articles on North Korean escapees mentioned 
bilateral agreements between China and North Korea, which require China to repatriate North 
Korean. However, there are several versions of the name and the time of conclusion of the 
agreements. For example, Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement in 2010 mentioned 
a Mutual Cooperation Protocol for the Work of Maintaining National Security and Social Order 
in the Border Areas signed in 1986 between China and North Korea, and that art 4 of this 
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protocol “allows for deportations by providing cooperation between China and North Korea in 
‘preventing the illegal border crossing of residents’.” 405   
A Human Rights Watch (HRW) report entitled “The Invisible Exodus: North Koreans in the 
People’s Republic of China” and published in November 2002 mentioned “a secret 
agreement … on the repatriation of illegal migrants and criminals” between China and North 
Korea signed in the early 1960s and “a protocol on security in the border area” concluded in 
August 1986, under which China claimed to be obliged to repatriate North Koreans to North 
Korea.406 The HRW report said that contents of neither the secret agreement nor the 1986 
protocol had not been published.  
Seymour in his UNHCR-commissioned article “China: Background Paper on the Situation of 
North Koreans in China” in 2005 said that in “the context of China’s famine of the early 1960s, 
the two countries in 1961 drew up a still-secret treaty” which created obligations for China to 
return North Koreans who have entered China illegally.407 He further mentioned “an alleged 
1986 protocol between the two countries’ security ministries”, which is entitled Mutual 
Cooperation Protocol for the Work of Maintaining National Security and Social Order in the 
Border Areas and provides that both sides were to “co-operate on the on the work of preventing 
the illegal border crossing of residents” and that any criminal should “necessarily be handed over 
to the other side”. Seymour noted that the text of the 1986 protocol, which was obtained in 
December 2002 by Rescue the North Korean People Urgent Action Network (a Japanese NGO) 
and published on a Japanese website in English, could not be authenticated but “does not seem 
implausible”. 408  According to the published English translation, art 4 of this protocol 
stipulates:409 
 
(1) Both sides shall mutually cooperate on the work of preventing the illegal border crossing of 
residents. 
In the case of crossing the border without possession of a legal certificate or without passing 
through screening agencies or the passage places stated on the possessed certificate, [the 
individual] shall be treated as an illegal border crosser … . 
(2) Regarding individuals who illegally cross the border, depending on the situation a name-list 
or relevant materials should be turned over to the other side … . 
 
A report prepared by the United States Congressional Research Service dated 26 September 
2007 also mentioned “a bilateral 1986 repatriation agreement” between China and North Korea, 
which gives China the obligation “to return all border crossers”.410 Jendrzejczyk said in an 
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article published in November 2002 that Chinese authorities repatriated North Koreans “under 
the terms of a secret 1986 agreement between Beijing and Pyongyang.”411 Cutler mentioned a 
treaty between China and North Korea which permitted North Koreans to legally enter China 
temporarily.412 According to Cutler, the agreement became effective in late 2001 but the text of 
the agreement was unavailable. 
Among the Chinese-North Korean bilateral treaties I found in major Chinese legal databases, 
there is a “The Ministry of Public Security of the People’s Republic China and The Ministry of 
National Security of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea Protocol on Cooperation in the 
Work of Maintaining National Security and Social Orders at Border Areas” signed on 8 July 
1998.413 The bilateral protocol entered into force on 28 August in the same year. Article 4 of this 
protocol provides for the cooperation in prevention of illegal border crossing as follows: 
 
The two Parties cooperate with each other in the work of preventing illegal exit and entry. 
(1) Persons, who do not have valid documents or do not exit or enter through the designated 
passage and inspection authorities in accordance with the documents they are holding, are 
regarded as illegal border crossers. 
However, persons (including people suffering from mental disorder) from one Party of this 
Protocol, who enter the territory of the other party of this protocol for reasons of different kinds 
of disasters and force majeure, are not be regarded as illegal border crossers. 
Persons holding border area exit-entry pass (for Chinese, it is “PRC Chinese-North Korea border 
area exit-entry pass” type B, for North Koreans, it is “DPRK border area residents border 
crossing pass”), who enter the non-border area upon approval by public security authorities and 
exit-entry control authorities, are not regarded as illegal border crossers. 
(2) Regarding illegal border crossers, depending on the situation, a name-list and relevant 
materials should be handed over to the other Party. However, regarding any person who commits 
a criminal offence after crossing the border, one Party may handle the person according to its law 
and inform the other Party of the situation. 
 
This protocol resembles the agreement on border area affairs that mentioned in several articles 
except that it was concluded in 1998 instead of 1986. According to art 4(2) this protocol, 
depending on the situation, China is required to hand over the name list of illegal border crossers 
and relevant materials to North Korea, however, the protocol does not explicitly require China to 
repatriate illegal border crossers. Instead, China is required to hand over criminal suspects who 
enter China after committing criminal offences in North Korea (art 5(1)).  
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It is worth noting that art 4(1) of the protocol stipulates that persons crossing the border without 
valid documents for reason of disasters and force majeure are not considered illegal border 
crossers. The 1999 USCRI World Refugee Survey has noted that China had “generally tolerat[ed] 
the presence of thousands of North Korean ‘illegal immigrants’” for years prior to 1999.414 As 
mentioned above, the crisis of North Korean escapees in China is generally believed to have 
started in the mid-1990s due to famine in North Korea. This means that many of the early 
arrivals were tolerated by Chinese authorities, despite the 1992 Notice which emphasised 
repatriation of illegal immigrants, including North Koreans, in the early 1990s. In light of this, it 
is not impossible that the Chinese government considered the famine in North Korea as a kind of 
disaster, and hence tolerated their stay in China.415 In the late 1990s, the famine in North Korea 
was no longer as severe as in the mid-1990s; more importantly, the North Korean escapees in 
China began to attract international attention. These factors probably prompted China’s 
crackdown on North Korean escapees in 1999. 
Additionally, art 3(3) allows residents of the Chinese-North Korean border area to cross the 
border without a passport or visa. Border residents are eligible for a special border area exit-
entry pass, which would enable them to visit their relatives living in border areas in the other 
country and is valid for one month. However, the protocol stipulates that applications to visit 
relatives across the border should be strictly assessed; approval will be granted to those who 
have immediate relatives on the other side of the border; those visiting non-immediate relatives 
are required to provide an invitation letter (art 3(3)). 
The Chinese government, however, has never identified the title or time of conclusion of the 
bilateral treaty or treaties. Nor has it mentioned a treaty allowing temporary entry by North 
Koreans. When asked to verify the existence a bilateral repatriation treaty between China and 
North Korea at MFA press conferences on 7 January 2003 and 23 January 2007, MFA 
spokesmen essentially ignored the question, neither confirming nor denying.416 
It should be emphasised that even if China does have obligations to repatriate North Korean 
illegal border crossers under any bilateral agreement with North Korea, those obligations by no 
means override China’s obligations under the 1951 Refugee Convention and the Protocol. 
D Protocol on Chinese-Myanmar Border Management and Cooperation  
China and Myanmar concluded a Protocol on Chinese-Myanmar Border Management and 
Cooperation on 25 March 1997. The Protocol entered into force on 29 September 1997. Similar 
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to the Chinese-North Korean bilateral protocol, the Chinese-Myanmar bilateral protocol contains 
an article on turning over illegal border crossers:417 
 
regarding persons who cross the border illegally and persons who violate the public order at the 
border, both parties should investigate and take appropriate measures, and hand them over to 
their country of nationality. One party must provide the other party the name, photo, and detailed 
address of such persons before handing over. After the other party verifies and agrees, the 
handover time and place may be negotiated and decided; relevant evidence shall also be handed 
to the other party. 
   
The Chinese-Myanmar allows border residents from one party to enter designated border areas 
of the other party with a border exit-entry pass (churujing tongxingzheng), exempting them from 
a normal visa (art 20(2)).418 The bilateral protocol defines border residents as “permanent 
residents in the border area of one party” (art 1) and border areas as “Chinese county (city) or 
Myanmar township listed in appendix I of the protocol” (art 1). The designated border areas are 
as in Chart 7. 
Compared to the arrangement for border passes under the Chinese-North Korean bilateral 
protocol, the arrangement under the Chinese-Myanmar protocol not only allows border residents 
to apply for a border pass regardless of whether they have relatives in the other country, but also 
encourages border residents to get involved in many activities in addition to visiting relatives (art 
20(1)). This suggests that Chinese authorities are more comfortable with people movements 
between China and Myanmar than those between China and North Korea. 
As mentioned in chapter I, Chinese authorities referred to the displaced Kokangs and displaced 
Kachins as border residents and refused to recognise them as refugees. In the Kokang Incident, 
the majority of the displaced Kokangs came from Laukkai (number 11 in Chart 7), the capital of 
Kokang Region. Most of them were likely to have a border pass which enablesd them to cross 
into China. During the Kachin influx, many of the displaced Kachins fled to China’s Yingjiang 
County (number 7 in Chart 7) and Longchuan County (number 8 in Chart 7), which are open to 
border residents from Myanmar. As will be discussed in chapter VI, a proportion of the 
displaced Kachins were from highland villages and did not hold a border pass; that probably 
explained why not all displaced Kachins were let in by Chinese border authorities initially. In 
light of the above, it is highly likely that the Chinese-Myanmar bilateral protocol is the legal 
ground for China’s tolerance of the entry and stay of the displaced Kokangs and Kachins.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
417 Article 22(2). 
418 Normally, Myanmar nationals need a visa to enter China. Myanmar nationals holding a border pass, which 
functions as a travel document for border residents, do not need a Chinese visa or a formal Myanmar passport to 
enter China, but will need to have their border pass stamped by the Chinese authorities. Interview conducted by the 
author (12 April 2013). 
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Chart 7 Designated Border Towns on Chinese-Myanmar Border under Appendix I of the 
Chinese-Myanmar Bilateral Protocol 
 China Myanmar 
1 Chayu Nagmung 
2 Gongshan Khawbude 
3 Fugong Sawlaw 
4 Lushui Chipwi 
5 Tengchong Waingmaw  
6 Longling Momauk  
7 Yingjiang Mansi  
8 Longchuan Namhkam  
9 Wanding Muse  
10 Ruili Konkyan  
11 Luxi Laukkai  
12 Zhenkang Kunlong  
13 Gengma  Hopang  
14 Cangyuan Mongmao  
15 Lancang Pangwaum  
16 Ximeng Mampan  
17 Menglian  Pangyang  
18 Menghai  Mongyang  
19 Jinghong  Kengtung  
20 Mengla  Mongyaung  
 
The Chinese-Myanmar bilateral protocol does not state how long a border pass holder can stay 
after crossing the border. It should be mentioned that the arrangement of border passes for 
residents in border areas is a practice established between China and Myanmar long before the 
1997 bilateral protocol between China and Myanmar. The Yunnan provincial government issued 
the Yunnan Province Administrative Rules for Entry-Exit of Foreign Border Residents in 
Chinese-Myanmar Border Areas (Yunnan Entry-Exit Rules) in 1990, which allows border 
residents from Myanmar to stay in border areas in Yunnan for up to two years, subject to the 
approval of the border exit-entry administration department of local public security authorities at 
county or city level.419 China and Myanmar also hold frequent meetings to update and discuss 
the implementation of this agreement.420 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
419 Border residents staying in Yunnan for employment, study, business or medical treatment can apply for 
temporary residence permit at the border exit-entry department of the local public security authorities at county or 
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E Protocol on the Repatriation of Lao Refugees between China and Laos  
During the Indochinese refugee influx in the late 1970s and early 1980s, Lao refugees escaped to 
China. In addition, China offered resettlement to about 2,500 Lao refugees from refugee camps 
in Thailand.421 At the end of 1990, the Lao government informed the Chinese government of its 
desire for the repatriation of the Lao refugees in China.422 By that time, the Chinese-Lao 
relations and situations in Laos had improved. Persecution of ethnic Chinese no longer existed in 
Laos. About 3,700 Lao refugees in China also expressed their willingness to return to Laos.423 
On 10 April 1991, China signed a bilateral agreement on the repatriation of the Lao refugees 
with the Lao government. According to this agreement, China agrees to repatriate Lao refugees 
who are willing to return to Laos; Laos agrees to receive these refugees and be responsible for 
settling them.424 In July 1991, China, Laos and UNHCR signed a memorandum on the same 
matter. The memorandum further specifies the respective responsibilities of the Chinese and the 
Lao governments and states that UNHCR will provide technical support and will sponsor part of 
the repatriation. The text of neither the bilateral agreement nor the memorandum has been 
published. 
The task of repatriating Lao refugees was carried out by the provincial government of Yunnan 
province, which hosted the largest number of Lao refugees in China. The Yunnan provincial 
government set up a team headed by a deputy governor of the province to oversee the 
repatriation.425 By October 1994, 2,919 refugees had been repatriated, 46 percent more than the 
originally planned 2,000, and the Chinese government spent more than two million Chinese 
Yuan on the project. 426  By 1997, about 3,550 Lao refugees had returned to Laos.427 
V Refugee Law and Procedures in Macau and Hong Kong  
As stated above, Macau and Hong Kong have autonomous legislative and executive system and 
independent judicial power. Given the close political, economic and cultural links between Hong 
Kong and Macau and China, refugee law and practice in Hong Kong and Macau may be taken 
into consideration by Chinese authorities when establishing China’s refugee law. China has 
extended the application of the Convention and Protocol to Macau, but has not extended the 
application of these instruments to Hong Kong.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
city level (art 15). Valid period of temporary residence permits is between three months to one year, and can be 
extended twice, six months per each extension (art 18).  
420 “<zhongmian bainjing guanli hezuo xieding> di shierlun sijuji huiwu zaimian juxing [The 12th Department and 
Bureau Level Meeting on the Implementation of the China-Myanmar Protocol on Border Management and 
Cooperation Held in Myanmar]” (25 February 2014) MFA 
<http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_chn/wjb_602314/zzjg_602420/t1131797.shtml> (accessed 7 April 2014). 
421 Feith, above n 38. 
422 Liang, above n 32, at 303. 
423 UNHCR, above n 41.   
424 Liang, above n 32, at 303. 
425 Defu Li (Deputy Director of Yunnan Civil Affair Department) “kaizhan qianfan nanmin gongzuo de chubu tihui 
[Preliminary Reflection on Works of Repatriating Refugees]” (1994) 10 zhongguo minzheng (Chinese Civil Affairs) 
26 at 27. 
426 Li, above n 425, at 26. 
427 Liang, above n 32, at 306. 
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Macau adopted Law No.1/2004, establishing a Legal Framework on the Recognition and Loss of 
Refugee Status. Under art 3, the Legal Framework defines a refugee as a person who qualifies as 
a refugee according to the Convention and Protocol and a person who falls under the 
competence of the Office of UNHCR according to art 6 and art 7 of the UNHCR Statute.428 A 
commission was set up by the Legal Framework to conduct RSD (arts 5 & 6).  
Macau’s refugee definition is practically as generous as UNHCR’s definition of a refugee. 
Despite Macau’s generous refugee definition, the number of applications for refugee status and 
refugee recognition rate has been low in Macau. As of mid-2013, there were no refugees and 
only 6 asylum seekers residing in Macau.429 From 2002 to early September 2011, only 15 
requests for refugee status were submitted, of which 10 were denied and one was cancelled.430 
Macau is a case that illustrates the point that adoption of a refugee definition, even if a generous 
one, does not necessarily attract more asylum seekers. 
Hong Kong, which is about three times the size of Macau, had 94 refugees and 1,332 asylum 
seekers as at mid-2013.431 Although, the Convention and Protocol have not been extended to 
Hong Kong, UNHCR maintains a Sub-Office in Hong Kong. Prior to 3 March 2014, a parallel 
screening mechanism existed in Hong Kong. On the one hand, the UNHCR Sub-Office in Hong 
Kong was allowed to process individual application for refugee status; on the other hand, Hong 
Kong authorities considered non-refoulement claims based on art 3 of the Convention against 
Torture.432 On 3 March 2014, the Government of Hong Kong commenced operation of a unified 
screening mechanism to determine claims for non-refoulement protection on applicable grounds 
including risk of “persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under art 33 of the 
Convention”;433 at the same time, UNHCR ceased to process asylum claims.434  
Time will tell how Hong Kong authorities define the risk of persecution under the unified 
screening mechanism. It is worth mentioning that Hong Kong authorities have stressed their firm 
policy of not determining the refugee status of, or granting asylum to, anyone.435 If a person’s 
non-refoulement claim on grounds of persecution risk is substantiated under the unified 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
428  Official Chinese and Portuguese version of the Legal Framework is available at 
<http://images.io.gov.mo/bo/i/2004/08/lei-1-2004.pdf> (accessed 7 April 2014). 
429  “Macau (Special Administrative Region of China) Statistical Snapshot” (2014) UNHCR 
<www.unhcr.org/pages/49e488436.html> (accessed 7 April 2014). 
430  “No Refugee Status Ever Granted” (29 September 2014) Macau Daily Times 
<http://www.macaudailytimes.com.mo/macau/30055-no-refugee-status-ever-granted.html> (accessed 7 April 2014). 
431  UNHCR “Hong Kong (Special Administrative Region of China) Statistical Snapshot” (2014) 
<http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/page?page=49e488026#> (accessed 7 April 2014). 
432 Kelley Loper “Human Rights, Non-Refoulement and the Protection of Refugees in Hong Kong” (2010) 22(3) 
International Journal of Refugee Law 404 at 412. 
433 Hong Kong Government “Commencement of Unified Screening Mechanism for Claims for Non-Refoulement 
Protection” (7 February 2014), available at Hong Kong Government Information Web 
<http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201402/07/P201402070307.htm> (accessed 16 April 2014). 
434  UNHCR “Unified Screening Mechanism” (26 March 2014) UNHCR 
<http://www.unhcr.org.hk/unhcr/en/news_and_updates/news_list/news_details.html?id=1115> (accessed 16 April 
2014). 
435 Government of Hong Kong, above n 433. 
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screening mechanism, the person would be referred to UNHCR for recognition of refugee 
status.436  
VI A National Refugee Law at the Horizon? 
The absence of any legal framework dealing with refugee matters may be attributed to several 
factors. First, except for the Indochinese refugees, China had little experience of receiving 
refugees or asylum seekers before the mid-1990s. Motivation to develop relevant legal 
framework was probably lacking.  
Second, like many former Soviet Bloc countries, China makes little legal distinction between 
refugees, tourists, and immigrants. Former Soviet Bloc nations had typically resisted the concept 
of refugees throughout the Cold War; it was common practice among these countries not to 
classify refugees as a category of population movement.437  
Third, having strictly restricted the entry of and the residence in China of all aliens, China had 
few provisions encouraging or favouring inflows of foreigners in general, let alone provisions 
pertaining to refugees. China’s restrictive immigration policy was initially motivated by the 
Chinese Communist Party’s anti-foreigner policies. According to the 1948 Instruction of the 
Central Committee of Chinese Communist Party on the Policy Regarding the Treatment of 
Aliens in China: 438 
 
The Chinese government and army will have a friendly policy towards aliens in China. However, 
more watchfulness and measures are needed to prevent certain aliens from spying on, destroying 
and interfering with Chinese internal affairs. 
 
Hostility towards Communist China by many countries further consolidated China’s restrictive 
immigration policy. The Regulations on the Administration of Entry, Exit, Transit, Residence 
and Travel of Aliens in China (1964) which codified previously practised control policies on 
aliens, provided in art 8 that: 439 
 
Aliens must enter into, exit from and transit in China by means of appointed exit ports, 
transportation vehicles and routes. Aliens entering into China shall go only to the destination 
noted in the visa. Aliens must directly enter into, exit from and transit in China and must not stop 
off unless permitted. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
436 Government of Hong Kong, above n 433. 
437 Maria Redei “Hungary” in Solon Ardittis (ed) The Politics of East-West Migration (St Martin’s Press, New York, 
1994) 89. 
438 Liu, above n 15, at 5. 
439 At 7. 
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China’s reluctance to grant legal status to asylum seekers could also be understood in light of the 
general resistance to international refugee law by Asian countries. As mentioned above in 
chapter II, the majority of Asian countries are not parties to the Convention and Protocol; of 
those that have acceded to the Convention and/or the Protocol, most have not enacted domestic 
legislation to implement these instruments; there have been no regional refugee arrangements 
specifically tailored for Asia. As noted by UNHCR, a lack of understanding of refugee issues 
generally hinders the promotion of a favourable refugee protection environment in East Asia.440 
This is probably true of China. Thirty years after China’s accession to the Convention and 
Protocol, the term “refugee” still sounds unfamiliar and remote to most Chinese people. For the 
government, the refugee issue remains a sensitive one.  
Since the 1990s, the Chinese government (specifically the MFA, the MPS and the Ministry of 
Civil Affairs (MCA)) have been working on drafting a national refugee law with assistance of 
UNHCR.441 Several symposiums were held jointly by the Chinese government and UNHCR 
between 2004 and 2007 to discuss issues such as state sovereignty and refugee protection, 
refugee status determination mechanism and procedure, treatment of refugees, cooperation 
between the Chinese government and the UNHCR and relevant experience of other Asian-
Pacific countries. In a symposium in September 2012 jointly organised by UNHCR and the 
MFA, an international refugee law expert from New Zealand was invited to present the national 
refugee legislation of New Zealand as a case study.442 
According to UNHCR, a draft refugee regulation with inputs from all relevant ministries was 
submitted to the State Council for deliberation in 2008, but the draft was not adopted.443 In a 
report submitted to the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against 
Women (UNCEDW) in early 2012, China stated that Rules for Identification and Administration 
of Refugees, which provide for refugee definition, authorities in charge of refugee affairs, 
refugee status determination, temporary settlement and repatriation of refugees and loss and 
removal of refugee status, had been drafted.444 It also claimed to be making efforts to finalise the 
legislation work as soon as possible, but no time line was provided.445  
If China started work on drafting national refugee legislation in the 1990s, about 20 years have 
been spent on the draft, yet China still has few legal provisions relating to refugees, let alone a 
refugee law. Why is the progress slow? Liu, a Chinese immigration law expert, has pointed out 
three reasons for the delay of China’s refugee law. First, China has not developed a culturally 
diverse and tolerant society. Second, there are political considerations involving neighbouring 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
440 UNHCR, above n 290.   
441 CEDAW/C/CHN/7-8, above n 346, at [225]. 
442 UNHCR Regional Representation for China and Mongolia, above n 48, at 2. 
443 UNHCR, above n 366, at 2.  
444 CEDAW/C/CHN/7-8, above n 346, at [225], 
445 CEDAW/C/CHN/7-8, above n 346, at [225]. 
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countries. Third, there are concerns of attracting more refugees.446 These factors make China 
reluctant to promptly enact national refugee legislation or establish a national RSD mechanism. 
VII Conclusion 
The Chinese constitutions since 1949 have a consistent history of recognising the basic human 
right to seek asylum. Article 32 of the 1982 Constitution and art 46 of the Exit-Entry Law are the 
legal basis for China’s recognition of refugees and their protection at the national law level.  
However, Chinese law in general contains very few provisions which distinguish refugees from 
other migrants, and there is a gap between the criteria for asylum contained in art 32 of the 1982 
Chinese Constitution and the criteria for refugee status contained in the Convention Refugee 
Definition. As the provisions of the Convention and Protocol have not been incorporated into 
Chinese law, the Chinese legal system cannot provide effective implementation of the provisions 
of the Convention and Protocol. As a consequence, China has relied mainly on bilateral 
agreements to handle repatriation as well as admission of refugees and other displaced foreigners 
who arrived as part of large-scale inflows.  
China has clearly demonstrated a growing interest in handling RSD in a more formalised 
framework. Once the national refugee regulation being drafted is passed, it will have profound 
and positive impact on refugee status determination and refugee protection in China.  
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Chapter IV China’s Refugee Policy and Practice 
 
Governments have the power, whatever their legal obligations, to turn a blind eye to violations 
of the rights of refugees.  
– Gil Loescher447 
 
In the absence of a legal refugee definition in domestic Chinese law, it may be useful to look at 
China’s refugee policy and practice. Officially the Chinese government has published few, if any, 
policy documents regarding refugee definition, RSD or the treatment of refugees or other 
displaced foreigners in China. Information about China’s refugee policy can be found mainly in 
Chinese delegates’ statements at UN meetings, records of MFA press conferences, China’s State 
reports to international organisations, high ranking Chinese officials’ speeches at international 
conferences, and articles written by government officials in academic journals. China’s refugee 
policy is also reflected in China’s practice in dealing with refugees and other displaced 
foreigners. In particular, its differing treatment of the Indochinese refugees, the North Korean 
escapees, the displaced Kachins, and the displaced Kokangs illustrates how China defines a 
refugee. In turn, China’s experience with these groups also feeds the development of its refugee 
policy in time. This chapter focuses on exploring why China treated them this or that way.  
I The Beginning of China’s Refugee Policy: the Indochinese Refugee Crisis 
and Its Impact 
A The Crisis and China’s Response 
China probably began to pay attention to refugee issues and the international refugee protection 
regime after the influx of Indochinese refugees in 1978. Prior to that time, the Chinese 
government probably knew very little about the international refugee protection regime. An 
article in a periodical with links to the MCA revealed China’s ignorance of the international 
refugee protection regime upon the arrival of the Indochinese refugees:448  
 
China was caught completely unprepared by the Indochinese refugees, everything had to be 
learned from scratch, what is a refugee, why establish refugee camps, what obligations do we 
have, what rights do we enjoy, how to apply for international assistance, refugee affairs officials 
gathered relevant information little by little … . 
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448 Jing Zhang “Zhongguo weishenme bushe nanminying [Why China Did Not Establish Refugee Camps]” 
Zhongguo shehui daokan [China Society] (China, May 2002) at 58, emphasis added. 
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On 4 August 1979, a working meeting on reception and resettlement of Indochinese refugees 
(the 1979 Meeting) was convened in Beijing; it was presided by then Chairman of China, Li 
Xiannian, and Vice Minister of the State Council, Chen Muhua, and attended by officials from 
Ministries and government departments involved in receiving and resettling the Indochinese 
refugees. 449 The 1979 Meeting laid down four principles for the Indochinese refugee reception 
and settlement: (1) from the standpoint of political implication and humanity, the reception and 
resettlement work should be handled with care and responsibility; (2) political education for the 
refugees should be strengthened; (3) the refugees’ living conditions should be improved 
gradually; and (4) publicity and reporting of relevant reception and resettlement work should be 
enhanced.450 Under principle 4, the 1979 Meeting required that all Vietnamese, Laos and 
Cambodian who were expelled by Vietnamese authorities and escaped to China should be 
referred to as refugees without exception. 
The first principle laid down by the 1979 Meeting suggests that China had both political and 
humanitarian reasons for accepting and settling the Indochinese refugees. That China intended to 
educate them politically and to improve their living conditions gradually demonstrates its 
intention to assimilate the refugees and host them on a long-term basis, if not permanently.  
Most importantly, the 1979 Meeting officially announced China’s recognition of the Indochinese 
as refugees in China. This recognition was, and has remained a policy decision. Chinese 
authorities have never published any official document regarding the recognition of the refugee 
status of the Indochinese in China. No individual screening of the Indochinese was conducted 
before or after the 1979 Meeting.451  
It is notable that the recognition of the Indochinese as refugees came under the last principle laid 
down by the 1979 Meeting, which emphasised enhancing publicity and reporting of relevant 
reception and settlement work. This probably suggests that recognition of the Indochinese as 
refugees was not considered as very important compared to other matters relating to the 
Indochinese.  It is also notable that the favourable treatment of the Indochinese refugees started 
long before the 1979 Meeting. As mentioned in chapter I, the Indochinese had been generously 
assisted since April 1978 when the exodus from Vietnam into China first started, and the 
settlement process had begun shortly after April 1978. By June 1979, about 235,000 Indochinese 
refugees had arrived; hundreds of thousands of them had been transferred from the border area 
to settle on OCFs by the time of the 1979 meeting. 452 
In hindsight, China was exceptionally generous with the Indochinese. First, China was among 
the very few Asian countries to allow local settlement of the Indochinese refugees.453 Second, 
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the Indochinese refugees remain the only group that the Chinese government has officially 
recognised as refugees since its establishment in 1949. As mentioned in chapter I, China has not 
identified any person or group as refugees after the Indochinese refugees.454 Additionally, China 
was not a party to the Convention until 1982 and the country was still poor at that time. 
Nevertheless, it provided timely protection and local settlement to the Indochinese refugees.  
An important and well recognised reason for China’s receptivity to the Indochinese refugees is 
that the majority of the refugees were ethnic Chinese.455 Ethnic, linguistic and cultural links 
between incoming refugees and the native population are known as strong causes for the 
receptivity of the receiving country to incoming refugees, particularly in the Third World.456 
Because of geographic proximity, racial affinities between the Chinese and the Vietnamese, and 
the pervasive influence of Chinese culture in Vietnam, many of the Chinese in Vietnam were 
born in China and maintained close ties with China.457 Most refugees speak one or more Chinese 
languages, such as Cantonese, Mandarin Chinese, and Hakka.458 Their living habits, moral 
outlook and religious practices were similar to that of the native Chinese. Many had relatives in 
China. These ethnic, linguistic and cultural links between the Indochinese refugees in China and 
the native Chinese no doubt contributed significantly to China’s willingness to accept and settle 
the Indochinese refugees.  
However, the legal grounds for China’s acceptance of the Indochinese refugees have rarely been 
examined. As mentioned above, art 32(2) of the 1982 Constitution and art 15 of the 1985 Alien 
Entry-Exit Law have been frequently referred to as the legal ground for China’s protection of 
refugees. We shall bear in mind that most of the Indochinese arrived and settled before the 1982 
Constitution and the 1985 Alien Entry-Exit Law existed. On the one hand, China was not a party 
to the Convention and Protocol, and the Chinese government had little knowledge of the 
international law and practice of refugee protection when the majority of the Indochinese 
refugees were accepted. On the other hand, the Indochinese refugees in China were generally 
persecuted for being ethnic Chinese,459 and hence hardly fit into art 29 of the 1975 Constitution 
or art 59 of the 1978 Constitution, both of which provided that “The People’s Republic of China 
grants the right of residence to any foreigner who is persecuted because of her support for justice, 
participation in revolutionary movements or conduct of scientific work.” On what legal ground 
did China accept and settle the Indochinese?  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
454 China generally allows UNHCR Beijing Office to process individual applications for refugee status, but has not 
been substantially involved in RSD procedures administrated by UNHCR. It acknowledges the status of UNHCR 
refugees. See Sec III.A of chs I and V. 
455 Ninety eight per cent of the Indochinese refugees who fled to China between 1979 and 1982 were ethnic Chinese. 
Song, above n 34. Recognition of ethnic link as China’s main motivation for taking the Indochinese, eg 
Muntarbhorn, above n 51, at 65; Lam, above n 36, at 386. 
456 Loescher, above n 120, at 25. 
457 Chang, above n 353, at 2. 
458 Xiaorong Han “Exiled to the Ancestral Land: the Resettlement, Stratification and Assimilation of the Refugees 
from Vietnam in China” (2013) 10 International Journal of Asian Studies 25 at 27. 
459 Liang, above n 32, at 270. 
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To answer this question, it may be useful to look at China’s initial response to the exodus of 
refugees from Vietnam. This has rarely been examined in the small volume of the existing 
literature that looks at the Indochinese refugees in China after the early 1980s.460  
As mentioned in Chapter I, the majority of the Indochinese refugees in China were ethnic 
Chinese fleeing from Vietnam. The exodus of the ethnic Chinese from Vietnam, as perceived by 
Godley, was related to the nationality question.461 The same probably can be said of China’s 
readiness to accept and settle the refugees from Vietnam. When the exodus from Vietnam to 
China began to gain momentum in April 1978, China promptly charged Vietnam with 
persecuting Chinese nationals. It contended that the crisis all started with the forced 
naturalization Vietnam had imposed upon the Chinese and that in doing so Vietnam had 
departed from the principle of voluntary naturalization jointly agreed upon by the two countries 
in 1955 to reduce dual nationality. 462 Vietnam, nevertheless, claimed that there were no 
“persecuted Chinese” or “Chinese nationals”, only “Hoa people” or “Vietnamese of Chinese 
origin”, and counter-charged China with manipulating the Hoa people to flee.463 In the months to 
come, China and Vietnam argued whether the displaced ethnic Chinese were victimised Chinese 
nationals as China claimed or Hoa people of Vietnamese citizenship as Vietnam claimed, 
exchanging charges and counter charges. 
The problem of dual nationality of and competing claims over the ethnic Chinese in Southeast 
Asia had been a long-standing phenomenon. Since the late 19th century, the Chinese 
communities abroad have been seen as a valuable source of financial and political support by the 
Chinese government. Accompanying the Chinese government’s financial and political interest in 
the Chinese abroad was the pursuing of jus sanguinis by the Chinese government and the 
resulting issue of dual nationality. Both the Qing Imperial government and the Nationalist 
government of China had passed laws to claim jurisdiction over overseas Chinese and prohibited 
naturalisation without government consent; this was contrary to the doctrine of jus soli adopted 
by a number of Southeast Asian countries.464 Following the post-war decolonisation of Southeast 
Asia and the communist victory in China in 1949, nationalism rose alongside with fear for 
communist pervasion in Southeast Asia, and the large number of Chinese dual nationals in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
460 Refugees who came from Vietnam counted for more than 98 per cent of the Indochinese refugees who fled to 
China. Chaozhi Peng “laowo nanmin daqianfan (Repatriation of the Laotian Refugees)” shidai fengcai [Modern 
Elegance] (China, October 1994) at 40.  
461 Godley, above n 448, at 35. For background of the exodus, see ch I of this thesis. See also Chang, above n 353, 
chs II and III.  
462 Spokesman of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of the State Council “Statement on Viet Nam’s Expulsion of 
Chinese Residents” (2 June 1978) 22 Beijing Review 14, at 16. 
463 Godley, above n 448, at 50; Chang, above n 353, at 39. 
464 For discussions on dual nationality of the Chinese in Southeast Asia, see eg Tung-Pi Chen “The Nationality Law 
of the People’s Republic of China and the Overseas Chinese in Hong Kong, Macao and Southeast Asia” (1984) 5 
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region had become a source of constant tension and controversy between China and Southeast 
Asian countries.465 
A consequence of these controversies and tension was the repatriation of the ethnic Chinese in 
Southeast Asian countries. In the early 1950s, Malaya deported about 19,000 Malayan Chinese 
who were deemed communists; they were well received and settled by China. 466  China 
established ad hoc committees at national and local level to oversee and facilitate the reception 
and settlement of these Malayan Chinese; OCFs were established for the first time to settle them. 
In 1959 as well as in 1966 and 1967, China sent multiple ships to Indonesia to bring home about 
136,000 Chinese expelled by Indonesia;467 more OCFs were opened to absorb these returners. 
Ships were also sent to India in 1963 to pick up the Chinese marginalised by the Indian 
government; ad hoc offices for reception and resettlement of Indian Chinese were established; 
most returners were again settled on OCFs.468 China regarded all of these ethnic Chinese 
returning from overseas as Chinese nationals.469 
Prior to the refugee influx, the assimilation of the Chinese in Vietnam was still in process. China 
and North Vietnam agreed in 1955 that Chinese nationals residing in North Vietnam would be 
administered by Vietnam,470 and that on the condition that they enjoy the same rights with the 
Vietnamese, they might step by step adopt Vietnamese nationality after being given sustained 
and patient persuasion and ideological education.471 The 1955 agreement did not spell out the 
time needed for the process of naturalisation or whether the Chinese administered by Vietnam 
should be considered as Chinese nationals or fully-fledged Vietnamese citizens during the 
interim period. Neither did the 1955 agreement specify whether the Chinese in South Vietnam 
should be subject to the same principle of integration after the unification of North and South 
Vietnam. In 1961, China and Vietnam signed another agreement which allowed Vietnam to 
issue travel documents to the Chinese returning to China for short visits, but Vietnam was still 
not authorised to issue regular passports to them.472 
As early as in June 1977, in his talks with Vietnamese Premier Pham Van Dong, Chinese Vice 
Premier Li Xiannian expressed China’s concern of Vietnam’s policy of forced naturalisation of 
and discrimination against the Chinese in Vietnam for the first time.473 The reasons for China’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
465 Chen, above n 464, at 289. 
466 Shichao Deng and Lichang Huang “zhongguo yuenan guiguo nanqiao de anzhi yu shengchan shenghuo 
xianzhuang tanxi: yi Guangdong yangcun huaqiao ganjuchang weili [Analysis on Reception of Overseas Chinese in 
Difficulty Returning from Vietnam and Their Present Work and Life Conditions: a Case Study of Guangdong Yang 
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467 Deng and Huang, above n 466, at 88. 
468 Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region Local Chronicle Commission “guangxi tongzhi: qiaowuzhi [Guangxi 
Chronicle: Overseas Chinese Affairs Chronicle]” (online ed, Guangxi People’s Press, 1996), section 5 chapter 1 part 
2, available at Guangxi Local Information Net 
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expressly raising the issue were multiple. Firstly, there had been small but continuous flows of 
ethnic Chinese returning from Vietnam since April 1977 due to discrimination against the 
Chinese in Vietnam.474 Secondly, the Sino-Vietnamese relation was rapidly deteriorating due to 
territorial disputes and Kampuchea. Thirdly, China’s interest in ethnic Chinese abroad was 
reviving. Just months before the exodus, in February 1978, then Chairman of China, Hua 
Guofeng, emphasised that China opposed any attempt to compel the overseas Chinese to change 
their citizenship and was duty-bound to protect those who decided to keep their Chinese 
citizenship.475 
It should also be mentioned that from the 1940s through the 1970s, the ethnic Chinese living in 
Vietnam had frequently crossed into Guangxi, China from Vietnam due to wars in Vietnam.476 
These people were all treated as returning Chinese nationals by the Chinese government and 
were locally settled. 
In light of the above, it is, perhaps, not surprising that when the ethnic Chinese from Vietnam 
poured into China in April 1978, China immediately accused Vietnam of persecuting Chinese 
nationals, and took exactly the same measures to receive them as it did to receive the ethnic 
Chinese from Malaya, Indonesia and India in the 1950s and 1960s. At the national level, China 
established a Committee for the Reception and Settlement of Returned Overseas Chinese (jiedai 
anzhi guiqiao weiyuanhui).477 At the provincial level, Guangxi formed a Leading Group for 
Reception and Settlement of Overseas Chinese in Distress (jiedai anzhi nanqiao lingdao xiaozu) 
in May 1978;478 Guangdong also established the Guangdong Province Committee for Reception 
and Settlement of Returning Overseas Chinese (Guangdong sheng jiedai anzhi guiguo huaqiao 
weiyuanhui) in May 1978.479 On 15 June 1978, China sent two ships to Ho Chi Minh City and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
474 Beijing Review, 18 August, 1977, as cited in Chang, above n 470, at 203. 
475 Chang, above n 353, at 26. 
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In 1947, upon the return of the French to Vietnam, more than 2,000 Chinese crossed into Guangxi, and the 
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Haiphong to bring home “victimised Chinese nationals persecuted by the Vietnamese 
authorities”, 480 exactly as it did for the expelled ethnic Chinese in Indonesia and India in the 
1950s and 1960s. Alas, this time the ships returned to China empty at the end of July in 1978 
after Vietnam refused to let them dock.481 By the time the empty ships returned to China, more 
than 160,000 persons had fled to China from Vietnam, and tens of thousands had been promptly 
transported from temporary border shelters to settle on OCFs.  
As a 2002 article published in a periodical under the auspices of the MCA pointed out, China 
had little idea of the concept of a refugee and international refugee protection regime at the 
beginning of the exodus, and thus treated them as huaqiao (Chinese nationals who had settled 
overseas) based on the fact that most of them were ethnic Chinese.482 Since they were considered 
Chinese nationals, the ethnic Chinese arriving from Vietnam had the right to stay in China, and it 
is only natural that they were settled on the OCFs, known as huaqiao nongchang in Chinese, 
which had been established for the exclusive purpose of accommodating returning overseas 
Chinese nationals, such as the expelled Chinese from Malaya, Indonesian and India. 
This leads to another question: why did China later decide to recognise the ethnic Chinese from 
Vietnam as refugees? Despite China’s desire to keep its promise to take care of huaqiao, a 
practical matter was that its absorptive capacity could by no means match the scale and the pace 
of the influx. Since May 1978, China had repeatedly demanded, in vain, that Vietnam act to stop 
the exodus in many rounds of bilateral negotiations with Vietnam. On 12 July 1978, China 
announced the closure of the Chinese-Vietnamese land border, probably hoping to slow the 
flow.483 But the influx continued. China then withdrew its technical aid to Vietnam and ordered 
the closure of three Vietnamese consulates in Nanning, Guangzhou, and Kunming.484  In 
February 1979, the month-long Sino-Vietnam war broke out. By then, Beijing probably had 
exhausted its diplomatic and economic measures to make Vietnam act on stopping the exodus. 
Perhaps it was not a coincidence that in Guangxi the Leading Group for Reception and 
Settlement of Overseas Chinese in Distress was renamed as the Leading Group for Reception 
and Settlement of Indochinese Refugees in February 1979,485 and that in Yunnan Province, the 
ethnic Chinese from Vietnam who came during after the war were called refugees (nanmin), 
while those who arrived before the Sino-Vietnam war were called overseas Chinese in distress 
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(nanqiao). 486 China probably began to realise that Vietnam could not care less about the fate of 
the ethnic Chinese and was determined to get rid of them anyway. By recognising the ethnic 
Chinese from Vietnam as refugees, China, who had suffered public humiliation as the professed 
protector of the overseas Chinese and had borne, and would continue to bear, social and 
economic burdens resulting from the influx, could at least seize the moral high ground in her 
bitter battle with Vietnam, because China was no longer just taking in its own citizens who were 
unwanted by Vietnam, but was generously offering asylum and humanitarian assistance to the 
homeless refugees. This perhaps explains why the recognition of the refugee status of the 
Indochinese at the 1979 Meeting came under a principle emphasising the promotion of publicity 
and reporting of the reception and settlement of the Indochinese refugees in China. 
Additionally, having been unable to bring Vietnam to face the issue of ethnic Chinese at the 
negotiation table, China decided to promote international pressure on Vietnam from late June 
1979.487 In July 1979, a Chinese delegation led by China’s then Deputy Foreign Minister was 
sent to the Meeting on Refugees and Displaced Persons in South-East Asia convened by the 
Secretary-General of the UN at Geneva on 21 and 22 July. Less than three weeks later, China 
held the 1979 meeting in Beijing and officially announced its recognition of the status of the 
Indochinese as refugees. 
Apart from the ethnic and historical connections between the Indochinese refugees and China, 
other factors probably have also contributed to China’s receptivity towards the refugees.488 First, 
Sino-Vietnamese relations had been rapidly deteriorating since 1975. The Indochinese refugee 
crisis was only one of the multiple conflicts between China and Vietnam that eventually led to 
the Sino-Vietnamese war in February 1979.489 The ideological rift between China and Vietnam 
and the worsening Sino-Vietnamese relation, in combination with the pro-China sentiment 
openly demonstrated by the Chinese communities in Vietnam,490 were important reasons for 
Vietnam’s hostility and maltreatment of the Chinese in Vietnam. China, which was not unaware 
of the pro-China sentiment of the ethnic Chinese in Vietnam given her close ties with them, 
might have felt somewhat obliged to come to the help of the refugees.491  
Second, having just finally gained its seat at the UN in 1971 after many years of diplomatic 
battle with Taiwan, ended the extreme leftist Cultural Revolution in 1976, and began its open-
door policy and economic and political reform in late 1978, China was eager to improve its 
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international image and be accepted in international society. By extending humanitarian 
assistance to the refugees expelled by Vietnam, and, as instructed in the fourth principle laid 
down by the 1979 Meeting, publicising and promoting its humanitarian work for the Indochinese 
refugees, China did enhance its international image and win praise from the outside world for 
what it had done for the Indochinese refugees.  
China’s good faith and humanitarian considerations in the course of receiving the Indochinese 
refugees should not be denied or underestimated. Precisely as China reminded the international 
community at a UN meeting in 1986, “despite its stringent economy and heavy population 
burden”, it had taken 280,000 Indochinese refugees for local integration.492  
B The Impact of the Crisis 
The Indochinese refugee crisis was a milestone for China in terms of its legal, policy and 
institutional development relating to incoming refugees and asylum seekers. The crisis leaves 
rich and mixed legacies to China. First, the acceptance of more than a quarter million 
Indochinese refugees provided China the first hands-on experience of handling a massive influx 
of refugees. Unlike the return of the ethnic Chinese from Malaya, Indonesia and India, who were 
brought home by Chinese vessels, the arrival of the Indochinese refugees (except those brought 
back from Thai camps) was unplanned. China drew on its past experience with the ethnic 
Chinese expelled by other Asian countries and mobilised the local communities to provide 
relatively smooth reception and local settlement for the Indochinese refugees. It also gained 
experience in repatriation operations from the repatriation of Lao and Cambodian refugees in the 
1990s. China won well-deserved recognition and applause for its assistance to the Indochinese 
refugees from the international community. In 2006, António Guterres, then United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees, praised the local integration of Indochinese refugees in China 
as “one of the most successful integration programs (of refugees) in the world”.493  
In retrospect, although China’s treatment of the Indochinese refugees was in line with the 
standards set by the Convention and Protocol, the majority of the Indochinese refugees were 
accepted and settled as returning overseas Chinese nationals. As mentioned above, China had 
little, if any, knowledge of the international refugee protection regime when it accepted and 
settled the majority of the Indochinese refugees. Rather than intentionally following the 
Convention and Protocol, China probably happened to provide the majority of the Indochinese, 
who were considered as returning overseas nationals at the time of their acceptance and 
settlement, the same protection afforded by the Convention and Protocol for refugees.  
Second, the Indochinese refugee crisis introduced China to the contemporary international 
refugee regime, led to the establishment of a UNHCR office in Beijing in 1979 and paved the 
way for China’s accession to the Convention and Protocol in 1982. China soon actively 
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participated in international discussions on the Indochinese refugees, and its refugee policy 
gradually took its initial shape during this time. For example, in 1979, China, along with the 
United States, Australia and Japan, defended Southeast Asian countries’ demand for significant 
financial and resettlement assistance, arguing that the international community’s assistance was 
essential.494 In 1984, China argued that the main problem with the lengthy Indochinese refugee 
crisis was that “none of the root causes of outflows had been eliminated”.495 Since UNHCR did 
not address pre-refugee issues, China’s proposal was considered quite radical at that time. 
However, this proposal quickly gained support from other countries. China still repeatedly 
emphasises burden sharing and addressing the root causes when it addresses the international 
refugee problem today.  
Third, an institutional network, ie the ORSIRs at national and provincial levels, for handling 
refugee matters was established. The ORSIRs, like the ad hoc committees established for the 
reception and settlement of returning overseas Chinese from Southeast Asia in the 1950s and 
1960s, were established on an ad hoc basis. However, China later decided to keep them as 
permanent offices. These offices are still functioning nowadays, coordinating both domestic and 
international aid projects for the Indochinese refugee community. Though the ORSIRs have not 
been involved in non-Indochinese refugee matters, they would be a useful institutional resource, 
which China could make use of when China forms its national refugee status determination 
procedures. 
Not all of the Indochinese refugee crisis’ impacts on China are positive. The international 
responses to the Indochinese refugee crisis provided China a practical lesson on the art of 
handling refugee problems. China’s Southeast Asian neighbours were a particularly negative 
example in treating refugees. Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore all systematically 
pushed refugees away from their borders at various points in the history of the exodus.496 All 
Southeast Asian countries, including the Philippines, which was the only Southeast Asian State 
party to the Convention and Protocol during the time of the Indochinese refugee crisis, 
consistently refused to allow Indochinese refugees to settle locally.497 By breaching international 
law and delivering ultimatums to the international community, Southeast Asian states 
successfully negotiated higher offers of resettlement places, received higher financial 
contribution, and were expected to do no more than offer temporary asylum.498 Though the 
international society condemned Southeast Asian countries’ refugee policy and practice, more 
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often than not they could do little but to provide financial assistance and resettlement quotas 
requested by Southeast Asian countries. Southeast Asian States learned that “hard hearts could 
drive hard bargains”.499 It is likely that China has noticed and learned this from its Southeast 
Asian neighbours.  
Somehow the puzzle of the nationality of the Indochinese refugees remains today. The deputy 
director of Guangxi provincial ORSIR, who also held the position of the head of the Settlement 
Department of Guangxi Overseas Chinese Affairs, mentioned in his 2006 article that:500 
 
In the international context, we refer to this group [the Indochinese] as refugees, because this 
group fits in the UN definition of refugees. … In the domestic context, we refer to them as 
nanqiao, they are huaqiao who returned to the motherland because of persecution. 
  
More often than not, the Indochinese are known by the local communities as overseas Chinese 
who returned to China instead of as refugees, and it is not uncommon that they are referred to as 
nanqiao or guiqiao by government officials and State media as well as in academic articles.501 
The Indochinese refugee whom I interviewed also referred to herself as huaqiao most of the time 
during the interview (see chapter VI). In Guangxi, a number of Indochinese refugees were even 
allowed to hold government positions.502 In Yunnan, officially the local authorities refer to the 
Indochinese as a whole as refugees, but in reality those who arrived before the Sino-Vietnam 
War are still known as nanqiao and those who arrived during or after the war are known as 
refugees. 503 The equivocality of the status of the Indochinese refugees suggests that the 
Indochinese refugee crisis may have never been dealt with by China as a “pure” refugee matter. 
Notably, in Yunnan Province those categorized as nanqiao are mainly settled on OCFs and have 
been given household registration and Chinese ID cards in a timely manner; those categorised as 
refugees are mainly accommodated in border villages and ordinary farms, and 10,700 of them, 
which is about 28 per cent of total Indochinese population in Yunnan, had not been able to 
obtain Chinese ID cards or have household registration as recently as 2009 despite their repeated 
requests.504 This perhaps helps explain why China’s generosity towards the Indochinese Chinese 
has not been shown again in its treatment of all other refugees and displaced foreigners in China. 
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II Developments: From North Korean Influx to Kokang Incident to Kachin 
Influx 
A Wang’s Four Point Proposal in 2001 
After the Indochinese refugee crisis and before the arrival of the North Koreans in the mid-1990s, 
China received few refugees and asylum seekers. During this period, China’s attention to 
refugee matters was directed mainly toward the repatriation of the Lao and Cambodian refugees. 
Though China often prides itself on its outstanding work in settling the Indochinese refugees 
locally, it has never concealed its desire to repatriate them. Through cooperation with the Lao 
and Cambodian governments and coordination by UNHCR, China repatriated about 3,550 Lao 
refugees and 30 Cambodian refugees between 1991 and 1997.505 It has also sought to repatriate 
the Vietnamese refugees. A Chinese representative stated in 1996 at an UNHCR meeting that:506  
 
China regarded voluntary repatriation as the most appropriate solution to the refugee problem, … 
With the conclusion of the Comprehensive Plan of Action in South-East Asia and the resulting 
solution to the problem of Vietnamese refugees in Southeast Asia, the repatriation of the 
Vietnamese refugees in China had become a matter of urgency.  
 
Negotiations were held between China and Vietnam regarding the repatriation, but according to 
Chinese media, Vietnam was unwilling to involve UNHCR.507 Hence the repatriation of the 
Vietnamese refugees has never started. 
In the post-Indochinese refugee crisis era, a notable change of the situation in China in the 
broader background is the increasing mobility of people across the border. In the 1980s, as 
China relaxed the restriction on foreigners’ entry to China and its economic conditions began to 
improve, the number of aliens entering China increased greatly. China obviously had realised the 
need to curb illegal immigration as early as in 1992, when the MPS issued the 1992 Notice to 
require provincial public security authorities to take action against illegal entry and illegal stay 
of aliens.508 The notice highlighted the increasing problem of illegal Vietnamese and North 
Korean immigrants, who entered and stayed in China, and of Pakistanis, Iranians and Afghans 
overstaying in China after their Chinese visa expired. It also noted illegal immigrants from 
Myanmar.  
China probably did not expect that the illegal North Korean border crossers would turn into a 
humanitarian crisis in less than 10 years’ time and that displaced ethnic minorities from 
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Myanmar would also challenge its asylum policy two decades later. From another angle, perhaps 
because China had noticed the flow of unauthorised border crossers from North Korea and 
Myanmar over the years and had perceived and had treated them as illegal economic migrants 
for years, China is less likely to be convinced that they are refugees.   
In December 2001, China’s then Vice Foreign Minister Wang Guangya proposed the following 
four points to address the refugee problem at a ministerial meeting of State parties to the 
Convention: (1) “to safeguard world peace, [and] promote common development” in order to 
prevent the emergence of refugees at the root; (2) “to effectively uphold the authority of the 
Convention and the existing regime for international protection and actively explore new ways 
and means for resolving the refugee problem”; (3) “to adhere to the principles of ‘international 
solidarity’ and ‘burden sharing’ and carry out international cooperation effectively”; (4) “to draw 
a clear line between the refugee issue and others, preventing the abuse of the protection regime 
and asylum policies as prescribed in the Convention”.509  
The first and the third points proposed by Wang were basically reiterating the principles of 
eliminating the root causes and burden sharing which China had adopted since the Indochinese 
refugee crisis. The second point may be seen as a general expression of China’s support for the 
existing protection regime, but it also suggested China’s preference of exploring new solutions 
within the existing protection regime rather than changing the regime.  
The fourth point reflected China’s conservative position toward the definition of a refugee in 
2001. Under this point, Wang warned of negative impacts of “unrestrained expansion of the 
asylum procedures of the Convention” on the international refugee protection regime and urged 
UNHCR to “work strictly within its mandate”. Though this statement was originally made to 
address the refugee problem in a global context, it is most likely that China’s call for drawing a 
clear line between refugee issues and others was related to the North Korean escapees in China. 
On 26 June 2001, seven North Koreans sought asylum in UNHCR Beijing Office; it was the first 
time North Korean escapees reached UNHCR Beijing Office. 510   Chinese authorities 
subsequently agreed in an arrangement with UNHCR and South Korea to allow these seven 
North Koreans to go to South Korea “on humanitarian grounds”.511  
B Controversial Repatriation of the North Korean Escapees  
1 China’s Policy on the North Korean Escapees 
As mentioned in previous chapters, while scholars and human rights groups have argued North 
Korean escapees are refugees, China has argued that they are illegal economic migrants, not 
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refugees, describing criticisms on its repatriation of the North Koreans as “not acceptable”.512 
China’s argument is straight-forward and simple: the North Korean escapees enter China mainly 
for economic reasons and there are no sufficient grounds to establish their status as refugees; 
therefore they are illegal border crossers, not refugees.513 However, Chinese officials routinely 
declined to comment or offer any explanation of China’s treatment of the North Korean escapees 
or whether China determined their status on group or individual basis, merely claiming that 
China has handled them in accordance with domestic law, international law, and the spirit of 
humanity.514 
On 3 June 2013, MFA spokesman Hong Lei said at a news briefing that China “always opposes 
making it an international and political issue or an issue of refugees.”515 Hong’s comment 
summarised well China’s policy towards the North Korean escapees.  
First, China desires to avoid international attention and criticism regarding its treatment of North 
Korean escapees. Sceats and Breslin noted that China’s approach to human rights matters had 
been “low-key, watchful and above all defensive”. 516 China’s handling of North Korean 
escapees and relevant international criticism reflects that approach. An example is China’s 
response to high-profile cases of North Korean escapees seeking asylum in foreign 
establishments in China and the immediate impact of these cases on North Korean escapees in 
China. The on-going North Korean escapee crisis is generally traced back to the mid-1990s, 
when large numbers of North Koreans entered China due to the famine in North Korea. China 
had tightened security on the Sino-North Korean border since then. However, up to 1999 it had 
not launched systematic crackdowns.517 In the early 2000s, humanitarian workers and NGOs 
assisted North Korean escapees in breaking into the UNHCR Beijing Office and a series of 
foreign embassies and international schools in China, bringing the North Korean escapees in 
China under the international spotlight.518  
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Although North Koreans who made their way into the UNHCR Beijing Office, diplomatic 
compounds or even foreign schools were eventually allowed to leave China (mostly for South 
Korea via a third country),519 China emphasised repeatedly that those cases were dealt with on 
an ad hoc and case-by-case basis and that China never recognised them as refugees. As a result 
of these consulate asylum incidents, China quickly tightened the security around UNHCR and 
foreign embassies, making it more difficult for North Korean escapees to enter; a crackdown in 
border areas intensified.520 Few North Koreans even attempted to seek asylum in foreign 
establishments in China after 2006. On the contrary, it was noted in 2007 that China tolerated the 
inflows of North Korean escapees and the activities of foreign NGOs so long as such activities 
were carried out quietly.521 Humanitarian workers helping North Korean escapees also noticed 
that public attention could result in greater danger and intensified militarization in the border 
areas North Korean escapees frequented.522    
Second, China has insisted on the economic nature of the illegal flow cross the Sino-North 
Korean border, and possibly follows this conclusion to address the problem in its own way. For 
example, China was reported to have been issuing 20,000 work visas to North Koreans amid a 
crackdown of illegal North Korean migrants in 2012.523  Analysts believed that China’s 
motivation to issue work visas to North Koreans was to reduce illegal North Korean migrants 
and to introduce low-cost labour in Northeast China.524 Another source said that in 2013, China 
issued 93,000 work visas to North Korean citizens, 17 per cent up from the previous year.525  
2 Political and Security Consideration Underlying China’s Policy on the North Korean 
Escapees 
China’s resistance to recognising North Koreans as refugees may be primarily attributed to its 
fears of attracting more North Korean escapees and to North Korea’s strategic location.526 
Chinese officials and academics have expressed the view that if asylum is granted to one North 
Korean escapee today, thousands or millions could pour into China. At the very least, the influx 
per se could be a threat to the stability of China’s border region. Given the pervasive fear of 
political instability amongst the political elite and the general public in China,527 the influx is 
anything but desirable to China. The potential of the exodus of North Koreans could be more 
devastating to China. Large scale departure of North Koreans could seriously shake the ruling of 
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the North Korean regime and lead to the collapse of North Korea. The collapse of North Korea 
would not only add to the political instability in the East Asia region, but would also expose 
China directly to the large United States military force posted in South Korea.  
Additionally, China’s close relationship with North Korea is believed to affect China’s policy 
towards the North Korean escapees. China is a formal ally of North Korea according to the Sino-
North Korean Treaty on Friendship and Mutual Assistance.528 Particularly, as mentioned in 
chapter III, China is obliged to hand over North Korean criminals to North Korea according to a 
bilateral agreement between the two countries. Since leaving North Korea without permission is 
a criminal offence according to North Korea criminal law,529 granting asylum to North Korean 
escapees would strain Sino-North Korea relations and consequentially weaken China’s influence 
on North Korea’s behaviour. Given North Korea’s strategic location and its ability to destabilise 
the region through military provocation, China naturally would not want to antagonise North 
Korea.530 
3 The Contrast between the North Korean Escapees and the Indochinese Refugees 
There is obvious difference between the North Korean escapees and the Indochinese refugees in 
China in terms of the causes, the pace and the pattern of their exodus, their country of origin’s 
relation with China, China’s political and economic situations at the time of their arrival, and 
their ethnic, linguistic and cultural connection with the majority of China’s population.  
The situations of the North Korean escapees and the Indochinese refugees do resemble each 
other in one way. That is the movement of people is closely interlinked with and subordinated to 
the political and strategic interest, which somewhat pushed humanitarian issues to the 
background.531 For the Indochinese, it was China and Vietnam’s disputes over territory and 
Kampuchea; for the North Korean escapees, it is China and North Korea’s disagreement on 
North Korea’s nuclear weapon and missile programme. It appears that the North Koreans 
escapees had been used as political currencies by state governments. In 2009, Beijing was 
reported to have temporarily suspended the repatriation of North Korean escapees after North 
Korea’s launched a missile without prior notification to Beijing.532  
4 The Importance of Meaningful Protection  
As discussed in chapter II, the status of the North Korean escapees in China involves complex 
legal issues. It is clear, however, that the North Korean escapees in China are in need of 
international assistance and that it is a pressing issue for China and the international community.   
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Given the complex political and security implications of the issue, a viable solution for the North 
Korean escapees in China will not be realistic without political cooperation between and among 
countries concerned. This thesis calls for the Chinese government to start a constructive dialogue 
with UNHCR and other international stakeholders, including North Korea, on the issue of North 
Korean escapees in China as soon as possible. This thesis also calls for more scholarship and 
creative thinking on the situation of North Koreans crossing the Chinese-North Korean border 
and the means for creating meaningful protection space for the North Korean escapees in China.  
C An Ambiguous Welcome: The Kokang Incident 
1 China’s Response to the Kokang Incident 
The points proposed by Wang Guangya in 2001 have been repeatedly expressed in one way or 
another by high-ranking Chinese officials.533 However, the call for a clear line between the 
refugee issue and other issues and adherence to the existing refugee protection regime rarely, if 
ever, reappeared. In statements made by high ranking Chinese officials in 2010 and 2011, China 
expressed its support for UNHCR to update and improve refugee protection mechanism in light 
of changes of international circumstances; it still called for prevention of abuse of international 
asylum system, but emphasised the balance between expanding the protection and preventing 
abuse of international asylum system and explicitly expressed that protection should be given to 
refugees and other displaced people.534 These changes can be regarded as positive signals from 
China that it is interested in dealing with the refugee issue in a less restrictive way, especially 
considering the fact that China had set up temporary camps to accommodate and feed thousands 
of ethnic Kokangs fleeing from Myanmar to China in 2009. 
As mentioned in chapter I, during the so-called Kokang Incident in August 2009, approximately 
37,000 displaced civilians flooded into Nansan town, Yunnan Province from Laukkai town of 
the Kokang Region in Myanmar in a few weeks as a result of the military standoff and clashes 
between the Myanmar government troops and Kokang’s local army. The Chinese government 
quickly opened 7 camps to accommodate more than 10,000 displaced Kokangs and provided 
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them with food, blankets, drinking water, medicine and a small amount of daily allowance in 
cash. In addition to allowing civilians to take refuge in China, Chinese authorities also took in 
the remnants of the Kokang army, disarming them at the border and putting them in guarded 
camps.535 As the conflict in Kokang Region eased in early September 2009, the displaced 
Kokangs were voluntarily repatriated and the camps were removed. 
The Kokang Incident was the first of its kind to receive wide publicity in China after the 
Indochinese influx. The Yunnan provincial government held a press conference to inform the 
public of the situation of the displaced Kokangs in Yunnan.536 Many mainstream Chinese media 
covered the incident. Government and semi-government organisations were mobilised to 
channel humanitarian assistance to the displaced Kokangs.  
As to the status of the displaced Kokangs in China, the Chinese authorities acknowledged that 
the Kokangs came to China to escape military standoff and armed conflict in Kokang Region 
and consistently referred to them as “border residents”, or in Chinese “bian min”, from 
Myanmar.537 Despite actively and openly providing protection and assistance to the displaced 
Kokangs during the Kokang Incident, Chinese officials never publicly referred to the displaced 
Kokangs as “refugees”. Notably, the Chinese authorities did not bother separating the ethnic 
Kokangs from Chinese nationals who were doing business in the Kokang Region when they 
provided the number of people fleeing the Kokang Region during the influx. The Chinese 
authorities only released the gross number of the incoming population which included both 
ethnic Kokang civilians fleeing into China and the returning Chinese citizens who were doing 
business in Kokang Region; Chinese citizens returning from Kokang Region were also referred 
to as “border residents”.538 
2 Possible Legal Grounds and Political Motivations  
A possible explanation for China’s choice of word is that the Kokangs were admitted on the 
ground of 1997 China-Myanmar bilateral protocol on border management and cooperation.539 As 
mentioned in chapter III, art 20 of the protocol allows border residents of one Party to travel to 
designated border areas of the other Party through designated border towns with a border pass. 
Laukkai, the capital town of Kokang Region in Myanmar is a designated border town according 
to the protocol. As will be discussed in chapter VI, it is relatively easy for border residents from 
Myanmar to apply for a border pass at Myanmar immigration offices near the border and it is not 
uncommon for people living near the Chinese-Myanmar border to have a border pass. As will be 
discussed below, the Kokang Region is known for its close economic and cultural link to China. 
It is very likely that many ethnic Kokangs in the region had a border pass, which would enable 
them to enter China during the Kokang Incident. Even though the 1997 Sino-Myanmar protocol 
was not referred to by Chinese official in response to the influx, art 20 of the protocol probably 
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served as a main legal ground for the admission of the displaced Kokangs as China never 
challenged the legitimacy of the displaced Kokangs’ entry into China.  
The 1997 China-Myanmar protocol, as stated in its preamble, aims to provide convenience for 
cross-border human and goods movement, in contrast to the 1998 Sino-North Korean Protocol 
on Cooperation in the Work of Maintaining National Security and Social Orders at Border Areas, 
which focuses on safeguarding national security and social order and was based on the desire to 
“further develop the friendly relations between the public security department and security 
safeguarding department of the two countries” (preamble). The different focus of the two 
protocols perhaps suggests that China is more confident in handling people movements across 
the Chinese-Myanmar border than those on the Chinese-North Korean border. This confidence 
may have contributed to China’s willingness to accommodate, at least temporarily, the displaced 
Kokangs in the border area where the Kokangs had been allowed to enter with little restriction 
anyway. 
In fact, the Yunnan local authorities claimed that they provided humanitarian assistance to the 
displaced Kokangs from the standpoint of maintaining friendly relations between the two 
countries and stability in the border area.540 China has been a major supporter of the military-
controlled government of Myanmar for decades, and Myanmar is usually described as a brother 
of China in domestic Chinese media. However, precisely because of the good relations between 
China and Myanmar, China’s hospitality to the Kokangs seems unusual, especially considering 
that China not only took in displaced civilians but also soldiers of the Kokang army routed by 
the Myanmar government troops.541  
3 Common Characteristics between the Displaced Kokangs and the Indochinese Refugees  
Though it may not be obvious at first glance, the Kokangs have a lot in common with the 
Indochinese refugees. The ethnic Kokang in Myanmar, like most Indochinese refugees, is of the 
same ethnicity as the majority of Chinese population, who are known as Han people in China.542 
The historical and cultural links between the Kokang Region and China are remarkably strong. 
The Kokang Region, which is now part of Myanmar, was once ceded to China on 1 March 1894 
when frontiers were first demarcated in Southeast Asian history, but later returned to Myanmar 
according to an 1897 agreement between the British and the Chinese.543 The region, however, 
maintained high autonomy prior to the 2009 clash. The Kokangs were very conscious of and 
cherish their ethnic and cultural heritage and had strongly maintained the language and cultural 
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541 A possible reason for China’s acceptance of the military persons is that commander of the Kokang Army, Peng 
Jiasheng, who were also the administrative head of the Kokang Region prior to the clash, had maintained good 
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542 The Kokang regard themselves as the descent of the Ming Dynasty royal family and scholar-official who fled to 
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traditions of their Chinese ancestors.544 Chinese was the primary spoken and written language in 
the Kokang Region and many Kokangs did not speak Burmese.545 Television, publication, and 
school education in the Kokang Region were all in Chinese. The region also had very close 
economic ties with China. The Chinese Yuan instead of the Burmese Kyat was the trading 
currency in the Kokang Region.546 The local government favoured Chinese investments and 
many businessmen from China had been doing business in the Kokang Region for years.  
Interestingly, there was also ambiguity in the nationality status of the ethic Kokangs. Prior to the 
2009 clash, the Myanmar central government issued identity cards to the ethnic Kokangs, but a 
note on the back of their identity cards stated that the holder of the card was not a national of 
Myanmar and that the card was invalid for entry to areas administered by the Burmese military 
government.547 The ethnic Kokangs consider themselves as having no nationality.548  
In addition, one shall not forget that a proportion of the Indochinese refugees entered China via 
Yunnan Province, and the province is still hosting nearly 40 thousand of Indochinese refugees. 
The common characteristics shared by the ethnic Kokangs and the native Chinese probably 
mitigated China’s fear of the destabilising effect of the influx, and the similarity between the 
displaced Kokangs and successful integration of the Indochinese refugees might have also 
increased China’s confidence in handling the Kokang Incident. 
D Where is China’s Refugee Policy Going: the Kachin Influx  
1  China’s Response to the Kachin Influx 
On 9 June 2011, less than two years after the Kokang Incident, tens of thousands of ethnic 
Kachins uprooted by armed conflicts between the Myanmar government troops and the ethnic 
Kachin military group, the KIA, started to flee to areas near the Chinese-Myanmar border. 
Initially, China only let in a small number of women and children,549 but later generally 
permitted the entrance of displaced Kachins. By late June 2011, more than 5,000 displaced 
Kachins had entered China, many to temporary camps provided by the local community, others 
in relatives’ homes or rented rooms.550 The number was estimated to be between 7,000 and 
10,000 in August 2012. The Chinese government provided almost no assistance to the displaced 
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(online ed, China, 17 Jan 2013). 
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Kachins, though several local Chinese NGOs and religious groups as well as Myanmar-based 
relief groups to access and assist them.551 In August 2012, China requested more than 5,000 
Kachins in camps to leave China.552 Those staying with relatives seem to have been allowed to 
stay.553 
The MFA admitted that ethnic Kachins came to China for reasons of safety, but denied that they 
were “refugees”, referring to them as border residents.554 The MFA asserted that “Some of them 
return to Myanmar for work during the day and reside in China temporarily during the night,” 
and that “China has, in the spirit of humanitarianism, devoted a large amount of human 
resources, money and other materials to supplying humanitarian assistance to these Myanmar 
border inhabitants.”555 
2 Similarities and Differences between the Displaced Kokangs and Kachins 
On the surface, the Kachin influx resembles the Kokang Incident. The two influxes took place 
within two years of each other, from August 2009 to present. Both displaced groups were from 
ethnic minority dominated regions with a certain degree of autonomy in Myanmar. Both groups 
were displaced by military standoff or armed conflicts between the Burmese government troops 
and local ethnic military forces. Both fled to mid to small size towns close to the Chinese-
Myanmar border in China’s Yunnan Province. Both arrived in large numbers during a short 
period. Both were referred to by Chinese officials as “border residents”. Both were allowed to 
take refuge in China temporarily, though the length of the time they spent in China varied. In 
both cases, China declined UNHCR’s requests to access the displaced minorities from Myanmar. 
Yet the treatment they received in China was different in two significant ways. First, the Chinese 
government did not provide any assistance to the Kachins except for limited medical service.556 
Second, unlike the Kokangs, many Kachins encountered difficulties in entering China, and many 
of them were eventually requested to leave China against their will. Why did China treat them 
differently? 
Above all, it should be noted that the scale of military conflict in Kachin State is much larger 
than that in the Kokang Region. As of March 2013, more than 100,000 persons have been 
uprooted by the conflicts in Kachin State, which has a total population of more than 1,200,000, 
whereas the total population of Kokang Region is less than 150,000, of whom 37,000 took 
refuge in China in 2009. In terms of civil administration in Myanmar, the Kokang Region is 
equivalent to a prefecture within Shan State, while Kachin State is equivalent to a province. The 
Kachin State conflicts uprooted people from several different regions in Kachin State. Not all 
these regions are as well connected with China as the Kokang Region. Residents in Kachin State 
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are eligible to apply for border a pass under the 1997 China-Myanmar protocol. However, many 
people from remote areas did not apply for it because they did not need to go to China, could not 
afford the expenses related to the application, or could not provide relevant documents required 
by the Burmese authorities.557 Consequently, not only was the population displaced by the 
conflicts in Kachin State much larger than in the conflicts in the Kokang Region, but many of 
the displaced Kachins did not have a border pass. Interviews with ethnic Kachins who crossed 
into China confirmed that Chinese border security forces did not prevent border pass holders 
from cross the border, but persons without a border pass encountered difficulties when 
attempting to enter China.558 This suggests that China probably had also relied on the 1997 
China-Myanmar protocol to deal with the displaced Kachins. But the large scale of the 
displacement and the possibly high number of people without a border pass probably 
significantly reduced China’s willingness to open its door to the displaced Kachins. 
Notwithstanding the above, many Kachins without a border pass were allowed in later, and 
many others managed to enter China via the many unofficial pathways along the China-
Myanmar border.559 From June 2011 to August 2012, Chinese authorities generally tolerated 
their presence in Yunnan Province. According to the Yunnan Province Administrative Rules for 
Entry-Exit of Foreign Border Residents in Chinese-Myanmar Border Areas, border pass holders, 
except those who are employed, studying, maintaining a business or receiving medical treatment 
in Yunnan, are normally allowed to stay in China for 15 days and, subject to approval, to apply 
for an extension of up to 90 days.560 In practice, prior to the clashes in June 2011, border pass 
holders normally were allowed to stay in China for up to seven days.561 It is probably reasonable 
to say that China has provided temporary protection to the displaced Kachins based on the 1997 
China-Myanmar protocol and humanitarian considerations.  
Secondly, the cultural and ethnic links between the ethnic Kachins and the native Chinese are 
weaker than those between the ethnic Kokangs and the Chinese. The Kachin, known as ethnic 
Jingpo in China, is one of China’s 56 officially recognised ethic minority groups. In this sense, 
the Kachins are similar to the North Koreans, who have their Chinese Korean counterpart in 
China. The Kachins have a different language from the majority Chinese, the Han Chinese. The 
Kachins are mostly Christian. These differences could have been seen by China as destabilising 
elements.  
Thirdly, China’s strategic and economic interests in the conflicts are believed to have 
contributed to China’s different treatment of the two displaced ethnic groups.562  On the one 
hand, China has bigger investment in Kachin State. Both the Kokang Region and the KIA 
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controlled areas in Kachin State are on the route of the Chinese invested multi-million dollar 
project, the China-Myanmar oil and gas pipelines, but Kachin State hosts several large 
hydropower station projects invested in by Chinese state-owned companies, while the Kokang 
Region is known for the gambling industry. On the other hand, the good relations between the 
Kokang local army and China in the Kokang Incident is absent between the KIA and China in 
the Kachin influx. The KIA had expressed dissatisfaction about the biggest Chinese-invested 
hydropower station project in Kachin State and was reported to have threatened attacking the oil 
and gas pipelines. Given the close relations between China and the Burmese government, China 
has mainly relied on the Burmese government to protect its investment interests in Kachin State. 
In light of the above, China probably was reluctant to assist the displaced Kachins in the same 
way it assisted the displaced Kokangs.  
III Conclusion 
Generally speaking, China has been very cautious in recognising the refugee status of displaced 
foreigners in mass influx situations. In the situation of the North Korean escapees, the displaced 
Kokangs, and the displaced Kachins, China’s security, political, and strategic interests have 
overshadowed the commitment of China under relevant international treaties. The relations 
between the Chinese government and the ruling authorities in the country/region of origin of the 
displaced foreigners concerned have usually been an important consideration in this regard.  
Ethnic and cultural links between the displaced foreigners and the majority Chinese population 
probably have also been an important factor affecting China’s receptivity towards displaced 
foreigners. A likely explanation is that the Chinese government probably considers foreigners 
who have strong ethnic and cultural links with China as a lesser threat to social stability, which 
is a top priority of the Chinese government. 
China’s policy on recognition of refugee status lacks certainty and predictability. This has 
undermined refugee protection in China. China should develop a consistent policy in line with 
relevant legal framework.   
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Chapter V Procedures and Institutional Framework 
 
There is no reason to believe that a rigorous but fair refugee determination procedure geared to 
the present and not hostage to the past should not be in line with China's principles.  
– Alexander  Casella, former director for Asia at UNHCR 563 
 
As mentioned above, China has not established any national RSD mechanism. Asylum seekers 
applying for refugee status in China must make their claims to the UNHCR Office in Beijing. 
UNHCR is the only organisation that processes individual refugee status applications in China. 
On several occasions, the Chinese government declined UNHCR’s requests to access and 
conduct RSD for certain groups of displaced persons who were regarded as non-refugees by the 
Chinese government. In such cases, the Chinese government de facto determined the displaced 
persons’ status through policy decisions. Therefore, it can be said that there are two parallel RSD 
procedures in China, one implemented by UNHCR, the other one implemented by the Chinese 
government. Both are discussed below.  
I RSD Conducted by UNHCR  
A Relations between UNHCR and China 
At present, the operation of the UNHCR Beijing Office includes advocating for respect for the 
principle of non-refoulement, undertaking RSD under its mandate, identifying durable solutions 
for all persons of concern, and lobbying for the enactment of national refugee legislation and 
policies in accordance with international refugee law; the office is also responsible for providing 
life-sustaining assistance to refugees pending the implementation of appropriate durable 
solutions, including accommodation, living allowances and access to basic health care.564 It 
highlights the requirement of sustained advocacy efforts and technical advice to promote the 
enactment and implementation of national asylum legislation as the challenge it faces in 
China.565  
The Chinese government claims to have maintained a cooperative relation with UNHCR.566 
Since the 1980s, China and UNHCR have worked together to support the Indochinese refugees. 
UNHCR has been involved in the training of relevant government officials and has jointly held 
several symposiums with the Chinese government on enacting China’s national refugee 
regulation. China has made contributions to UNHCR every year since 1990 (see Chart 8). It 
contributed USD 250,000 in most years after 1996. There was in a slight increase in 2001 and 
2002 and then a sharp increase 2008. It is notable that China successfully entered the World 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
563 Alexander Casella “Time for China to make legal preparations for acceptance of refugees” (28 May 2013) 
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Trade Organisation in December 2001, and hosted the Summer Olympic Games in Beijing in 
2008. These two events are widely regarded as milestones of China’s integration into the 
international society and establishing itself as a emerging world power. It is possible that these 
two events motivated China to make higher contributions to UNHCR in 2001 and 2002 and 
2008.  
Ironically, China deported 15 UNHCR refugees during “security sweeps” before the 2008 
Olympic in Beijing.567 In response, UNHCR expressed its concerns, but did not directly criticise 
the deportations as a violation of the Convention.568 In 2008, the number of asylum seekers 
registered with UNHCR in China dropped for the first time since 2001 (see Chart 2). UNHCR 
refugee population also decreased sharply from 180 in 2007 to 70 in 2008. It was the first time 
the figure dropped below 100 since 2004 (see Chart 2). This again suggests that refugee 
protection has not been a priority for Chinese authorities and may be compromised for what 
Chinese authorities prioritise.  
 
Chart 8 Chinese Government Contributions to UNHCR (USD) 
 
Source: www.unhcr.org; Liang, above n 32, footnote 1 at 254. 
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Most notably, China’s contribution increased significantly in the past two years. As at 9 
December 2013, China’s contribution to UNHCR was nearly USD 1.5 million, representing a 
more than 210 per cent increase from 2012 and a nearly 500 per cent increase from 2011.569 The 
increase may be linked to the passage of the Exit-Entry Law, which includes the first provisions 
on refugee treatment in domestic Chinese law, and to the Kachin influx. Although refugee 
protection is not likely to become a priority for the Chinese leadership in the near future, the 
increase in China’s contribution to UNHCR in the past two years, together with China’s 
response to displaced minorities from Myanmar in recent years as mentioned in chapter IV, may 
be interpreted as indicating an increasing awareness of the refugee problem and an emerging 
interest in a more cooperative approach to refugee issues.  
The relations between China and UNHCR are not always free from tensions. For example, as 
mentioned above, more than 30 UNHCR refugees were repatriated in 1992,570 and 15 UNHCR 
refugees have been deported before the 2008 Summer Olympic Games in Beijing. In the 1992 
Notice, the MPS emphasised that UNHCR had no right to intervene in China internal affairs.571 
In 2013, China openly warned UNHCR not to make “irresponsible comments” on China’s 
treatment of North Korean escapees.572 According to a United States Congressional Research 
Service report, China was suspicious of UNHCR’s intentions and UNHCR could not provide 
assistance to the North Koreans in an open, transparent manner. 573  
The relations between China and UNHCR could be better understood in the context of China’s 
relations with international organisations. China had been excluded from the UN for 22 years 
from its establishment in 1949. Although it began to adopt a favourable view of multilateral 
institutions in the 1980s, concerns about the potential harm to Chinese sovereignty as a result of 
deeper engagement in the international regime remain.574 China was wary of the UN as a rubber 
stamp of the Western powers at first. It is slow in embracing the traditional human rights values 
and cautious about UN human rights agencies and other international human rights 
organisations.575 Given China’s general attitude towards international organisations, especially 
international human rights organisations, and the sensitivity of refugee issues in China, its 
suspicion of UNHCR is not surprising. As mentioned in chapter III, China has drafted a national 
asylum regulation. When China’s national refugee regulation is passed, China will inevitably 
deal with RSD and other matters relating to refugee protection itself, and hence the role of 
UNHCR in China is bound to change. Nevertheless, winning the trust and cooperation of 
Chinese authorities will remain a challenge for UNHCR in China. 
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B Refugee Status Determination Conducted by the UNHCR Beijing Office 
The Chinese government and UNHCR had mutually agreed that RSD should be jointly 
conducted by both parties.576 However, due to the lack of clear legal or administrative provision 
on responsibilities of each party, in practice the Chinese government has not been substantially 
involved in refugee status determinations conducted by UNHCR.577  
According to the UNHCR Procedural Standards for Refugee Status Determination Under 
UNHCR's Mandate (UNHCR Procedural Standards), each UNHCR office is responsible to 
develop and implement RSD procedures which should incorporate the UNHCR Procedural 
Standards and reflect the size of the particular RSD operation, the staffing and other resources 
available in the UNHCR office, as well as the conditions in the particular country.578 In principle, 
applicants applying for refugee status with UNHCR are required to register with UNHCR, lodge 
their application forms, and attend an interview with a qualified UNHCR Eligibility Officer in 
person. Generally, the UNHCR Beijing Office conducts RSD at its premises located in central 
Beijing for asylum seekers who approach it. Considering the vastness of Chinese territories and 
that UNHCR only has one office in China’s mainland, it can be a challenge for some refugees 
and asylum seekers to reach the UNHCR Beijing Office. Beijing is by no means close to China’s 
land or sea borders where most refugees and asylum seekers are likely to enter China. Since 
refugees and asylum seekers often arrive without proper entry documents and with limited 
financial resources, it would be difficult for them to make their way to Beijing, because they 
would be subject to identity document checks on the train, at the airport and at hotels. 
Alternatively, when it is necessary, UNHCR allows the registration and application form 
submission procedures to be conducted by approved implementing partners on the condition that 
it is possible for UNHCR to exercise effective monitoring and supervision and that the approval 
of relevant UNHCR RSD supervisors is obtained.579 Usually, NGOs serve as implementing 
partners in UNHCR RSD procedures. In China, there are very few, if any, locally-operated 
NGOs providing assistance to refugees and asylum-seekers in relation to refugee status 
application (see chapter VI). Therefore, it is difficult for refugees and asylum-seekers to reach 
UNHCR’s RSD service.  
In the UNHCR RSD process, interviews of the applicant, however, must be conducted by 
qualified UNHCR Eligibility Officers and must not be conducted by implementing partners.580 
Therefore, UNHCR is to “take all feasible steps” to conduct RSD outside UNHCR offices when 
conditions in the host country make it difficult for asylum-seekers to reach a UNHCR office.581 
Officials of the UNHCR Beijing Office have travelled to areas outside Beijing, such as Yunnan 
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and Guangzhou, to conduct RSD.582 Where the applicant is identified as a refugee by UNHCR, 
the person will obtain a permit from the Chinese government which allows him or her to travel 
within China; the applicant then travels to Beijing.583  
In reality, the UNHCR Beijing Office does not always have access to refugees and asylum 
seekers. In 1999, UNHCR sent a team to northeast China near the Chinese-North Korean border; 
the team assessed the situation of North Korean escapees and determined that some of them 
qualified as refugees.584 China reprimanded UNHCR for this action,585 and has not allowed 
UNHCR to access the Chinese-Korean border area since then. More notably, after North 
Koreans entered the UNHCR Beijing Office to seek asylum in the early 2000s, the Chinese 
authorities tightened security around the UNHCR Beijing Office, intentionally making it more 
difficult for North Koreans to approach UNHCR. The Chinese government also declined 
UNHCR’s repeated requests to access the displaced Kokangs and Kochins in Yunnan in 2009 
and 2011 respectively. 
UNHCR is sometimes criticised for not confronting the Chinese government about greater 
protection of the refugees in China. UNHCR officials said that they had worked behind the 
scenes with Chinese officials to assist with the challenges posed by refugees and asylum seekers 
and believed this was the most productive way forward.586  
II Refugee Status Determination Conducted by the Chinese Government 
A Procedures, or the lack Thereof 
China has not established any formal procedures for RSD. Where the Chinese government 
determined the status of certain displaced persons, the status of the displaced was determined 
through policy decisions. As mentioned in previous Chapters, Chinese authorities have 
determined, in effect, the status of at least four displaced groups, namely the Indochinese 
refugees, the North Korean escapees, the Kokangs, and the Kachins.  Except the Indochinese 
refugees, who were recognised as refugees before UNHCR established its office in Beijing, 
China did not recognise any of these displaced groups as refugees and generally declined 
UNHCR’s requests to access these groups. 
Opacity features in China’s decision-making process relating to RSD. The Chinese government 
never specified which government departments were responsible for processing applications for 
asylum or assessing the displaced persons’ eligibility for refugee status. It typically avoided 
elaborating the grounds for its decisions and usually did not provide data or detailed information 
of the displaced persons. For example, when a MFA spokesman was asked at a press conference 
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on 27 April 2004 whether Chinese authorities identified North Korean illegal border crossers as 
economic migrants on a prima facie basis or after investigating individual situations, he replied, 
“They entered China because of economic reasons. I think that, if their life was not difficult, 
they would not have left their home country”.587  
Whereas Chinese authorities routinely declined to comment on how they determined the status 
of the North Korean escapees and the displaced Kokangs and Kachins, it is highly likely that the 
decisions were made on a general basis. There is no evidence that Chinese authorities have 
conducted interviews with the North Koreans or ethnic minorities from Myanmar or investigated 
situations of displaced individuals in order to determine their status, although Chinese officials 
obtained basic information, such as name, age and the name of their home village, about the 
displace Kachins in Yunnan during the Kachin influx. Given the scale of these displacements, it 
is not unreasonable for China to determine their status prima facie as a group for initial 
emergency response. However, whenever circumstances permit, individuals should be given the 
opportunity to make claims for refugee status and to have their situation assessed by competent 
parties. This does not seem to have been the case in terms of China’s treatment of the North 
Korean escapees and the displaced Kokangs and Kachins (see chapter VI). For example, as 
mentioned above, UNHCR has generally been prevented from accessing the North Korean 
escapees and the Kokangs and Kachins, and North Korean escapees who attempted to apply for 
refugee status with the MFA was taken away arbitrarily by the Chinese authorities. 
There may be a few reasons for China’s adoption of the “group approach” in determination of 
these groups’ status. One possible explanation is that the displaced persons’ individual situation 
would make little difference to China’s decision on the status of a certain group when China’s 
political, strategic and security considerations outweighed its commitment to the Convention and 
Protocol and its humanitarian considerations. In other words, factors other than a displaced 
person’s specific situation were decisive in China’s decision-making process. Therefore, 
investigation into a displaced person’s individual situation would become unnecessary and even 
undesirable to Chinese authorities. The experience of North Korean escapees in China is a case 
in point. For example, on 26 August 2002, seven North Korean escapees (known as the MoFA 
Seven) attempted to apply for refugee status at MFA.588 They were immediately taken away and 
then investigated by Chinese public security authorities.589 A MFA spokesperson later referred 
to them as demonstrators with unknown identity and said that their behaviour severely violated 
Chinese law regarding assembly and demonstration.590 In February 1996, when a North Korean 
escapee identified himself to the Chinese security officials as a North Korean army captain 
although Chinese officials obtained basic information, such as name, age, and the name of the 
home village, of the displaced Kachins in Yunnan during the Kachin influx seeking political 
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asylum, he was only to be told by an official that “we do not recognize political asylum 
seekers”.591  
Another factor needs to be considered is that China is unlikely to be well equipped with RSD 
techniques to conduct individual screening at present, not to mention the lack of clarity as to 
which government body is responsible for RSD. Chinese officials probably have little 
experience, if any, in assessing individual application for asylum. As mentioned in previous 
Chapters, the Indochinese refugees were granted refugee status on a prima facie basis. Chinese 
authorities do not seem to show good understanding of the Convention and Protocol. 
Additionally, despite of the arrangement between the Chinese government and UNHCR on 
cooperation in RSD procedures, the Chinese government has essentially refrained from being 
involving in the RSD conducted by UNHCR. Of course, technical difficulties should by no 
means serve as an excuse for preventing the displaced persons from accessing UNHCR to use 
their RSD service.  
Several Chinese government bodies are involved in refugee administration in practice, including 
the MFA, the MCA (in particular ORSIRs), the MPS and certain provincial governments (see 
discussion below). It is clear that the ORSIRs only deal with the Indochinese refugees and have 
not been involved in handling non-Indochinese refugees. However, there are no established 
guidelines defining the other departments’ roles and responsibilities regarding refugee matters. 
Examination of China’s handling of the Indochinese refugees, the North Korean escapees and 
displaced ethnic minorities from Myanmar may cast light on who the decision makers actually 
are. In terms of the Indochinese refugees, the recognition of their status as refugee was officially 
announced at the 1979 Conference, which was presided by then Chairman of China, Li Xiannian 
and then Vice Premier of the State Council (the Central Government of China), Chen Muhua. 
Officials from 18 ministries and departments as well as provincial leaders from Guangxi, 
Guangdong (Hainan was part of Guangdong at the time), Yunnan, Jiangxi and Fujian were 
present at the conference.592 It showed that the matter was taken care of by the central 
government at a top level. In comparison, the repatriation of the Lao and Cambodian refugees 
was organised and implemented by the local authorities in Yunnan Province according to a joint 
decision by the MCA and the MFA.593 
In the case of North Korean escapees, the Chinese government primarily channels its policy on 
North Korean escapees to the public through the MFA’s regular press conferences. This does not 
necessarily mean the decision comes from or solely comes from the MFA. As exemplified by the 
case of MoFA Seven, it was usually public security authorities that directly dealt with North 
Korean escapees in China. North Korean escapees reported having been questioned, denied 
opportunity of being assessed for refugee status and repatriated by Chinese public security 
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bureaus (PSBs).594 According to art 31 of the Convention, refugees should be exempted from 
measures against general illegal border crossers. In other words, the MPS is given the task of 
handling the North Korean escapees assuming they are not exempted from these measures.  
During the Kokang Incident in 2009, then Minister of MPS, Meng Jianzhu was sent to Yunnan 
in response to the Incident. The Yunnan PSB held a special press conference on 31 August 2009 
to comprehensively explain the situation of the displaced Kokangs in China. The fact that the 
press conference was held by a local level authority rather than a national level authority 
suggests that the Incident was treated with relatively low importance by the China government. 
In comparison, no special conference press was held regarding the Kachin influx. The MFA 
mentioned that the Kachins were not refugee at its regular press conferences in reply to 
questions raised by journalists. The local authorities in Yunnan were quoted as sources of 
information in mainstream Chinese media. It is believed that the Kachin influx was dealt with by 
local authorities of border towns hosting the displaced Kachins, but higher level authorities took 
charge later.595  
B Institutional Framework 
The background for understanding the institutional framework for refugee management in China 
is that there is no unified immigration administrative authority in China. Immigration 
administrative functions are distributed between the MPS and the MFA (art 4, Exit-Entry Law). 
These ministries operate at various central and local government levels. Border Control Troops 
under the leadership of the MPS are responsible for preventing illegal border-crossing and 
human trafficking.596 
Three government bodies officially have the responsibility to deal with refugee matters: the 
MCA, the MFA, and the MPS, although their respective roles in handling refugee matters 
probably have not been clearly defined at present.  
1 Ministry of Civil Affairs and Offices of Reception and Settlement of Indochinese Refugees 
The MCA was established in 1978. The predecessor of the MCA is the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs established in 1949, which was mainly responsible for providing disaster relief and 
strengthening the institutional system of the newly founded People’s government. The Ministry 
of Internal Affairs was removed during the Cultural Revolution in 1969, and the MCA was given 
similar responsibilities when it was established in 1978.  
The MCA shouldered a leading role from a very early stage of China’s reception of the 
Indochinese refugees. The MCA continues to play a major role in supporting the Indochinese 
refugees nowadays. It is also responsible for drafting China’s national refugee regulation.  
According to the MCA website, two of the MCA’s main functions are to “participate in drafting 
administration rules on international refugees in China, and jointly take charge of temporary 
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settlement and repatriation of international refugees in China with other relevant 
departments”.597 As mentioned in Chapter III, the MCA is involved in drafting China’s national 
refugee regulation. Specifically, this function is performed by the International Cooperation 
Sector and the Policy and Regulation Sector of the MCA.598  
The refugee settlement and repatriation function of the MCA is performed through the State 
Council ORSIR and its branches at local level. The State Council ORSIR was established in 
1979. At the 1979 conference, the task of settling the Indochinese was transferred from the State 
Council Overseas Chinese Affairs Office to the then newly established State Council Leading 
Group for Reception and Settlement of Indochinese Refugees. The Group was headed by then 
Minister of Civil Affairs; persons in charge of the State Council Overseas Chinese Affairs Office, 
MFA, Ministry of Agriculture and China Red Cross served as deputy heads.599 The Group 
established an office under the MCA, which is known as the State Council ORSIR. Branches of 
the State Council ORSIR were soon established in autonomous regions and provinces where 
Indochinese refugees were hosted.  
Nowadays, ORSIRs operate at national, provincial and municipal levels. At the national level, 
the State Council ORSIR is placed under the MCA International Cooperation Sector. There are 
ORSIRs in Guangxi, Yunnan, Guangdong, Hainan, Fujian and Jiangxi at the provincial level. In 
cities and counties where there are large numbers of Indochinese refugees, such as Nanning, 
Beihai and Pingxiang in Guangxi, ORSIRs were also set up at municipal level; in cities and 
counties where no ORSIR is established, the local Overseas Chinese Affair Office (OCAO) 
takes charge of the reception and settlement of the Indochinese refugees.600 In Guangxi, 
Guangdong, Hainan, Fujian and Jiangxi, the provincial ORSIR either doubles with a department 
of the provincial OCAC or is under the leadership of the provincial OCAO. This probably 
suggests that, to some extent, the Indochinese refugees in China are still treated as returned 
overseas Chinese. 
As their name suggests, ORSIRs only deal with Indochinese refugees. They have not been 
involved in non-Indochinese refugee matters. ORSIRs are given a wide range of responsibilities 
relating to the Indochinese refugees in China, including protecting the rights and interest of the 
Indochinese refugees, researching and studying new circumstances and issues relating to refugee 
work, accepting assistance from UNHCR and other international organisations, implementing 
and managing assistance programs, accepting and accessing Indochinese refugees’ application 
for family reunion or resettlement in third countries, assisting in repatriation and naturalisation 
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of Indochinese refugees, taking charge of skill training and employment of the Indochinese 
refugees, and supervising the usage of refugee related funds.601  
ORSIRs are UNHCR’s implementing partners for local settlement and voluntary repatriation of 
the Indochinese refugees.602 UNHCR assistance to Indochinese refugees in China is channelled 
through the MCA, and ORSIRs are responsible for the overall implementation of relevant 
projects. 603 
Although the majority of the Indochinese refugees in China have become self-sufficient, 
ORSIRs provide continuous support to the Indochinese refugee community, such as 
occupational training and small loans to needy refugees. Officials of ORSIRs at national and 
provincial levels meet yearly, usually in one of the six provinces or autonomous regions hosting 
Indochinese refugees. ORSIR meetings consider matters relating to supporting the Indochinese 
refugee community in China and finding durable solutions for them. For example, the meeting in 
2013 was held in Hainan and focused on potential issues relating to permanent settlement of the 
Indochinese refugees in China and relevant possible plans.  
Besides ORSIRs’ work with the Indochinese refugees, the MCA provided assistance to the 
displaced Kokangs in 2009. The tents and blankets provided to the Kokangs by Chinese 
authorities were printed with characters “China Civil Affairs Disaster Relief”. Considering that 
the MCA is given the task of drafting China’s national refugee regulation, it is likely to become 
an important player in China’s national RSD mechanism in the future. In particular, ORSIRs’ 
operation network and their staff with experience of dealing with Indochinese refugees and 
implementing UNHCR assistance programmes would be valuable sources upon which the 
Chinese government can draw to build its national refugee protection system.  
2 Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
The MFA is responsible for foreign relations between China and other countries as well as 
international organisations. It is stated on the MFA’s website that one of the MFA’s main 
functions is to “handle global and regional security, political, economic, human rights, social, 
refugee and other diplomatic affairs in the United Nations and other multilateral fora”; it is also 
responsible for assisting “in examining foreign-related draft laws and regulations” and for 
organising and coordinating “the work of fulfilling international conventions and 
agreements”.604   
Generally speaking, all matters involving a foreign element may fall under the MFA’s authority 
in China. Due to the international nature of refugees, the MFA’s involvement is natural. Like the 
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MCA, the MFA assumed a major role during the Indochinese refugee crisis. The Foreign 
Minister at that time was appointed as one of the four deputy heads of the Leading Group for 
Reception and Settlement of Indochinese Refugees in 1979. It also made the decision, jointly 
with the MCA, to entrust the task of repatriating Lao and Cambodian refugees to the Yunnan 
provincial government.  
Nowadays, the MFA, through its regular press conferences, serves as the main source of China’s 
policy towards displaced foreigners in China and, perhaps because of that, is usually perceived 
as a major Chinese government body responsible for refugee protection in China. For instance, 
as mentioned above, seven North Korean escapees who hoped to acquire refugee status through 
official procedures attempted to lodge their applications at the MFA.  
Indeed, the MFA is a key player in handling refugees in China. This is perhaps because China 
has generally relied on non-public diplomatic negotiations to tackle the refugee problem on an 
ad hoc and case-by-case basis. For instance, the MFA was involved in negotiations with relevant 
foreign embassies and consulates with respect to the departure of North Korean escapees who 
entered these embassies and consulates for asylum. China also exercised influence via 
diplomatic channels on the government of Myanmar during the Kachin influx.605  
In addition, the MFA’s role involves liaising with the Office of UNHCR in China. For example, 
as mentioned above, the MFA has organised a number of symposia on asylum legislation jointly 
with UNHCR in China in the past few years. 
Since the Chinese government mainly interacts with the UNHCR Beijing Office through the 
MFA, the MFA probably is the Chinese government department best informed of the 
international refugee protection regime. Besides, it is in the position to provide the information 
of the country of origin of the refugees. Therefore, it is most likely that the MFA will also be an 
important player in China’s future national RSD mechanism.  
3 Ministry of Public Security 
The MPS is China’s principle police and security authority, responsible for a broad spectrum of 
matters ranging from public order administration, criminal investigation and counter-terrorism to 
border control, household registration and identity card administration. The MPS operates the 
nationwide system of PSBs, which serve as police stations in China and perform many of the 
MPS duties on a day-to-day basis at different local levels. There are a number of bureaus and 
departments under the MPS, such as the Bureau of Exit and Entry Administration (BEEA), the 
Border Control Department (BCD) and Fire Departments; many of these departments operate 
outside the PBS system at local levels. 
The legal ground of the MPS involvement in refugee matters is two-fold. First, public security 
authorities are responsible for issuing refugee identity cards to refugees and temporary identity 
cards to asylum seekers (art 46, Exit-Entry Law). PSBs are in charge of the issuance and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
605 Interview conducted by the author (April 2014). 
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administration of identity cards. Normally, a person’s identity card is issued by the district PSB 
with which the person’s household registration is maintained.606  
Second, public security authorities are in charge of border control. This function is performed 
through the BEEA, the BCD, their local branches and the PSBs. The BEEA primarily takes care 
of border control at nine major cities (Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Zhuhai, 
Shantou, Haikou and Xiamen),607 while the border control troops under the BCD’s leadership 
are responsible for guarding land and costal border elsewhere.608 The border control troops are 
part of the People’s Armed Police, and are stationed at border areas to, among other things, 
prevent illegal border crossing, human trafficking and smuggling of goods and drugs. BEEA, 
BCD and PSBs at county level or above are authorised to investigate, detain and repatriate 
illegal border crossers (art 58, Exit-Entry Law). 
III Conclusion  
Generally speaking, UNHCR processes individual applications for refugee status in China, 
whereas the Chinese government has de facto determined the status of displaced foreigners who 
arrived in China in large numbers through policy decisions. 
The Chinese government’s decision-making process relating to the status of relevant displaced 
foreigners lacks transparency and predictability. China should establish a national RSD 
mechanism as soon as possible. Before the Chinese national RSD mechanism is established, 
asylum seekers should have unrestricted access to UNHCR’s RSD service.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
606 Identity Card Administration Law 2003 (China), art 7. 
607 “churujing bianfang jiancha zongzhan ji xiashu churujing bianfang jianchazhan [Exit-Entry Inspection Head 
Station and Exit-Entry Stations under It” (3 July 2008) Bureau of Exit and Entry Administration of the MPS 
<http://www.mps.gov.cn/n16/n84147/n84165/1291480.html> (accessed 19 October 2013). 
608 Liu, above n 15, at 18.  
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Chapter VI Reality at the Border and Voices from Refugees and 
Humanitarian Workers 
 
We had little money, but we put our money together to buy gifts and went to the police station to 
apply for refugee status.  
– A Kachin interviewee 
  
I Methodology 
As refugees remain a highly sensitive topic in China, the Chinese government has disclosed little 
information of its decision making process regarding RSD or the treatment of refugees and other 
displaced foreigners. UNHCR is generally barred by the Chinese government from accessing the 
North Korean escapees, the displaced Kokangs, and the displaced Kachins, and hence is unable 
to provide first-hand information of the treatment of these groups. Journalists in China, both 
foreign and Chinese, either pay inadequate attention to or are restricted from covering refugees. 
Therefore, refugees and other displaced foreigners become a valuable and relatively accessible 
source – they are by no means easy to reach – of information regarding RSD procedures and 
methods employed by the Chinese authorities and how refugees and other displaced foreigners 
are treated during the process.  
Given the small volume of literature on refugees and other displaced foreigners in China, it is 
unsurprising that very little empirical research has been conducted with refugees and other 
displaced foreigners in China. In 2011 and 2012, HRW interviewed displaced Kachins in 
Yunnan, China and revealed in its report that the local authorities in Yunnan conducted “some 
sort of interview” with the displaced Kachins to gather basic information about them.609 A 
number of researchers and organisations have managed to interview North Korean escapees who 
were living or had lived in China.610 Interviews with Vietnamese refugees in China can be seen 
in Chinese media occasionally, but most of them, if not all, were not conducted or documented 
in a manner that facilitates academic analysis. Interviews conducted by Lam with Vietnamese 
refugees and people working with them in Guangdong and Guangxi were a rare effort of 
empirical investigation on the settlement of the Vietnamese refugees and China’s refugee 
settlement strategy, although he did not look at the decision making process relating to the 
refugees status of the Vietnamese.611  
The primary aims of my field research were, on the one hand, to obtain first-hand information of 
interactions between refugees and other displaced foreigners and the Chinese authorities with a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
609 HRW, above n 73. 
610 Eg Mikyoung Kim Securitization of Human Rights: North Korean Refugees in East Asia (Praeger, Santa Barbara 
(CA), 2012); Haggard and Marcus, above n 59; Han, above n 89; HRW, above n 59.  
611 Lam, above n 36. 
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focus on refugee status determination procedures and, on the other hand, to make the voice of 
the often silenced refugee community heard. From 26 March to 30 April 2013, I conducted 
interviews with two North Koreans, one Vietnamese, and seven Kachins (collectively Category I 
participants). Complementarily, six employees of international organisations and non-
governmental working with Category I participants (collectively Category II participants) were 
also interviewed for their observations of interaction between Category I participants and the 
Chinese authorities, including an employee of an NGO working with North Koreans, two 
employees of an aid group working with displaced Kachins, two persons helping displaced 
Kachins as independent humanitarian workers, and an employee of an international organisation 
working with displaced population.  
As acknowledged by Sawyer and Blitz:612  
 
[c]onducting research on refugees, asylum seekers … is notoriously difficult. Not only are such 
populations often out of reach, … but there is little official information recorded on the 
population of interest. 
  
This is particularly true with refugees and other displaced foreigners in the Chinese context 
given the sensitivity of the issue and the vulnerable condition of the refugees and other displaced 
foreigners in China. As mentioned in previous chapters, North Korean escapees in China are in 
an extremely vulnerable situation. They are considered to be illegal economic migrants in China 
and have to live in hiding. They face deportation if their identity is revealed to the Chinese 
authorities. In addition, humanitarian workers assisting North Korean escapees may also face 
penalty or expulsion from China if they attract attention from the Chinese authorities. Because of 
security considerations, North Korean escapees interviewed were those who no longer live in 
China at the time of the interview. Likewise, the interviewed humanitarian worker assisting 
North Korean escapees was not based in China. 
In terms of the displaced Kachins who remain in China,613 they do not have a legal status and 
therefore do not have a guaranteed right to stay in China. They are still at risk of removal. 
Considering that Chinese authorities have tried to avoid public attention on the displaced 
Kachins, the displaced Kachins remaining in China were not approached. Instead, interviews 
were conducted with those who had been pushed back to Myanmar. With only one exception, all 
humanitarian workers interviewed, who were helping the displaced Kachins, were not based in 
China.  
Regarding the ethnic Kokangs who were provided refuge in China in 2009, they voluntarily 
returned to the Kokang Region, Myanmar in September 2009. Entry to the Kokang Region from 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
612 Caroline Sawyer and Brad Blitz Statelessness in European Union (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
2011) at 141.  
613 After the Chinese authorities repatriated about 5,000 displaced Kachins who were living in camps in August and 
September 2012, there remain estimated 2,000 to 3,000 displaced Kachins in Yunnan. Most of them stay with 
relatives. See Ch IV. 
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both China and inside Burma was heavily restricted at the time of the interview.614 Due to 
security concerns as well as the time and budget limitations of the project, the Kokangs were not 
interviewed. 
Although the Indochinese refugees have been officially recognised as refugees by the Chinese 
government, they remain a community that the Chinese government much prefers to be invisible 
to the Chinese society, as demonstrated by my experience with the Guangxi Provincial ORSIR 
below. Since ORSIRs are responsible for taking enquiries regarding Indochinese refugees from 
the public, I contacted Guangxi provincial ORSIR twice by phone to enquire if they could assist 
in putting me in contact with Indochinese refugees residing in or around Nanning, the capital 
city of Guangxi or give information such as the name of Overseas Chinese farms where the 
Indochinese refugees reside.615 On both occassions, the officer who answered the phone declined 
to offer assistance or give any information of the Indochinese refugees locally integrated. One 
officer said that they were not authorised to release information of the Indochinese refugees and 
that, in order to acquire information of the Indochinese refugees from ORSIR in Guangxi, one 
needed to obtain approval from the State Council. Another officer said she had to ask her 
supervisor’s approval on the matter and came back with the advice for me to not write about the 
Indochinese refugees. 
Apart from the general difficulties in accessing refugees and other displaced foreigners, budget 
and time limitations resulting from the scale of this research further restricted options for 
selecting participants. For example, I did not have the budget to pursue interviews with North 
Korean escapees who may require monetary or material compensation for the interview.616 I did 
not have the time and budget to go through the procedures for applying a special permit for 
foreigners to visit Kokang Region which can be lengthy and nearly inevitably involves “tea 
money” (bribes) to the Burmese officials in Yangon.  
Sixteen participants were eventually recruited, mainly through personal contacts. Ten were 
Category I participants; six were Category II participants. I also spoke with a number of 
independent humanitarian workers and Kachin officials although did not formally interview 
them. Seven Kachin Category I participants and two Category II participants were recruited with 
the help of the IDPs & Refugees Relief Committee of the Kachin Independent Organisation 
(KIO) which I contacted through a Category II participant.617 Except the Vietnamese refugee and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
614 On the Chinese side, the Nansan (China)-Kokang (Myanmar) crossing does not open to foreigners except 
citizens of Myanmar with a border pass; Chinese citizens who do not reside in the border area are not allowed to 
exit from Nannan unless they are going to the Kokang Region for business and can provide an invitation letter from 
business partners in the Kokang Region. In Myanmar, the Kokang Region is located in the so-called “black area” 
where foreign visitors are generally forbidden. 
615 Unlike many Chinese government departments, ORSIRs do not have an official website. No contact emails could 
be found for Guangxi Provincial ORSIR. 
616 It is a common practice for North Korean escapees living in South Korea to request monetary or material 
compensation for interviews with them. 
617 The Kachin Independent Organisation (KIO) is the civilian wing of the Kachin Independent Army (KIA). The 
IDPs & Refugees Relief Committee was established by the KIO in 2009 with the responsibility of looking after 
displaced Kachins.  
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an independent humanitarian worker assisting displaced Kachins, none of the participants were 
residing in China.  
Generally, except the Vietnamese participant, all Category I participants entered China between 
2005 and 2012. The length of their stay in China varied from more than 30 years to five months, 
but 70 per cent of the participants spent between six years to ten months in China. 
Representativeness are not at issue in this fieldwork. The main object is to illustrate interactions 
between the Chinese authorities and displaced foreigners and how relevant law and policy is 
implemented on the ground. The benefit of this fieldwork, first and foremost, is to allow the 
freedom of articulating often silenced thoughts of the displaced persons who sought refuge in 
China. 
Most of the interviews were one-on-one face-to-face interviews which generally followed an 
interview schedule designed for each category. One group interview was conducted with five 
Kachin Category I participants due to lack of suitable venue for individual interviews. One 
interview with a Category II participant was conducted by email after attempted phone interview 
became difficult due to unstable mobile signals in the region of the participant. 
Interviews were conducted in a number of languages, including English, Mandarin Chinese, 
Cantonese, Korean and Kachin. Most of the Category I Participants were interviewed in their 
native language. The two North Korean participants both spoke Korean and Mandarin Chinese 
and were both offered the opportunity to choose the language they prefer to speak during the 
interview. One of them chose to speak Mandarin Chinese. The other preferred to speak Korean 
and a Korean-English interpreter was present during the interview. The Vietnamese participant 
was interviewed in Cantonese. All Category I Kachins participants were interviewed in Kachin 
with Kachin-Chinese or Kachin-English interpreters. In terms of the Category II Participants, all 
interviews were conducted in English, except one interview in Mandarin Chinese. 
Interviews with Category I participants were mostly conducted in a semi-formal atmosphere, set 
in school or hotel meeting rooms or hotel rooms; exceptionally, one Category I participant was 
interviewed at her home and at a garden within the private residence compound where she was 
living. Interviews with Category II participants (except an email interview) were set in meeting 
rooms as well as more casual places, such as quiet cafes and private dining rooms suggested by 
the participants. When interviews were not conducted in a private space, careful measures were 
taken to ensure the content of the interview remain confidential. No participants received any 
payment or reimbursement for the interview. 
The length of the interviews varied from 25 minutes to one hour and 35 minutes, mainly 
depending on the number of participants involved, whether an interpreter was used and whether 
the interview was conducted in a semi-formal or casual atmosphere.  
The interviews were semi-structured. An interview schedule was prepared for Category I and 
Category II participants respectively and was generally followed. Interviews normally started 
with a few preliminary questions relating to the general information of the participants, such as 
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how long he or she stayed in China (in terms of Category I participants) or had been working 
with refugees (in terms of Category II participants), followed by questions regarding the Chinese 
authorities’ treatment of displaced foreigners at the international border, during their stay in 
China and during their departure from China. Additionally, Category I participants were also 
asked if they tried to contact the office of UNHCR in China and their preference on repatriation, 
local settlement and third country resettlement, whereas Category II participants were asked if 
there was any particularly pressing issue that they would like to comment on. However, taken 
into consideration of participants’ varying background and reactions during the interview, not 
every Category I or Category II participant was necessarily asked the same questions. 
Section II of this chapter, based on my visit to Nabang (China)/Laiza (Myanmar) and Zhangfeng 
(China)/Mai Ja Yang (Myanmar) in mid April 2013, illustrates how cross-border movements 
were controlled along the Chinese-Myanmar border. This section provides background for 
understanding the response of the displaced Kachins in sec III. 
The response of the participants is presented below in sec III largely following the above 
mentioned sequence of clusters of interview questions. Where the interview was conducted in 
English or through an English interpreter, participants are quoted in their original words or as per 
the interpreter’s interpretation. Most of the participants interviewed in English as well as one 
Kachin-English interpreter are not native English speakers; when they are quoted, grammatical 
errors, if any, are retained. Where the interview was conducted in Mandarin or Cantonese, the 
translation is done by the author and rendered in a manner as faithful as possible to the original 
response of the participants, showing repeated words and unfinished sentences contained in the 
original conversation. The intention for presenting the quote in this way is to relay the voices of 
the participants as intact as possible. In several quotes, however, a few words are added in 
square brackets to include important information which was clear in the original context of the 
interview but is otherwise not shown in the quote. It should also be mentioned that sometimes 
interpreters used third person rather than first person when interpreting participants’ reply; in 
this case, the third person is replaced with first person when the participant is quoted.  
II Reality at the Chinese-Myanmar Border: Nabang/Laiza and Zhangfeng/Mai 
Ja Yang 
I visited four border towns on the Chinese-Myanmar border between 10 April and 14 April 2013, 
namely Nabang and Zhangfeng in the Yunnan Province, China and Laiza and Mai Ja Yang in 
Kachin State, Myanmar. Nabang lies within Yingjiang County, Dehong Dai and Jingpo 
Autonomous Prefecture in the west of Yunnan Province. It has a population of around 1,600. 
Across the Chinese-Myanmar border river from Nabang is Laiza, the headquarters of the KIA. 
Zhangfeng is located within Longchuan County, Dehong Dai and Jingpo Autonomous Prefecture. 
Its population is about 12,800. Zhangfeng connects with Mai Ja Yang, Kachin State, Myanmar.  
Both Nabang and Zhangfeng looked peaceful and orderly during my visit. There was, however, 
a check point guarded by armed soldiers near Nabang on the main road linking Nabang and 
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Yingjiang County’s administration centre. Local residents said that the check point was 
established after the conflict. The check point looked basic and temporary, merely a couple of 
military-looking dark green tents erected on the side of the road, equipped with a few desks and 
computers. Each vehicle entering or exiting Nabang via the main road had to stop at the check 
point. In my case, an armed young soldier came on the public mini bus I was taking and politely 
required all passengers on board to produce their identity cards. A few passengers who did not 
bring their identity card with them were requested to report the name of their tribe or village 
instead. The soldier collected and took away the identity cards to the tent. The soldier returned 
shortly to hand the ID cards back to the passengers and requested two passengers to leave the 
bus for “checking”. One of the passengers later returned in handcuffs. His belongings, contained 
in a small plastic bag, were taken away by the soldiers. According to the bus driver and the local 
passengers on the bus, that passenger was charged with drug trafficking which is not uncommon 
in the area. Our bus was allowed to pass shortly after.  
The check point near Nabang seemed to perform some drug control functions which were 
believed to be the main purposes of the check point by local residents. Drug trafficking and 
usage is one of China’s concerns which undermine its hospitality towards the displaced 
Kachins.618 In addition, the check point is probably used to control the movement of people; a 
Category II participant mentioned that displaced Kachins who attempted to leave the border 
town to go to cities were intercepted by the Chinese authorities. 
The Chinese-Myanmar borders at Nabang and Zhangfeng were not heavily guarded. At many 
places, the border is inhabited on both sides and residents on both sides form a close community, 
where many people cross the border on a daily basis to visit friends and relatives or to purchase 
groceries.619 For example, the busy business and residential area of Nabang town lies right next 
to the Chinese-Myanmar border river. When I visited Nabang in mid-April 2013, the water in 
the border river was ankle high. There is an official crossing near a bridge (known as guomen 
(national gate) by local residents) at Nabang, but people from both side frequently waded the 
river near their home for convenience instead of going through the official crossing. The river 
per se is also a popular playground of local children. A resident of Nabang said that border 
police rarely – only two or three days in a month – patrol along the river to prevent unofficial 
crossings.  
A local resident said that there had been no massive influx of displaced Kachins into Nabang. He 
was aware of the camps built by the Chinese government although he declined to take me to 
where they were. In comparison, camps built by the KIA were more visible and accessible. 
There are nine IDP camps at and around Laiza. Most of them were very close to the border, 
some visible from Nabang.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
618 HRW, above n 73. 
619 This is at least partly due to the historical reasons. This part of Myanmar historically has close links with China. 
There are about 132 thousand Kachins (known as ethnic Jingpo in China) people living in Yunnan Province. The 
border line was first survey by the British and China in the late 1800s. China and Burma exchanged lands under the 
1897 bilateral agreement and under the 1960 bilateral agreement. For more information, see Mong, above n 543. 
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One of these camps was built on the bank of the border river near a wooden bridge. Neither end 
of the bridge was guarded. Opposite to the overcrowded bamboo shelters on the Myanmar side 
of the river, the Chinese side of the river was quiet and wild, largely uninhabited. People living 
in the camp had no difficulty in crossing the bridge to go to the Chinese side of the river. I was 
near the bridge for about 10 minutes and saw a few people cross the bridge from Laiza to 
Nabang.  
It is said that, in the case of Nabang and Lazai, China achieved a mutual agreement with the KIO 
that the displaced Kachins should be kept on the Myanmar side. China had promised to the KIO 
that China would let displaced Kachins in when Laiza is seriously threatened by the Burmese 
army. Since Laiza is the headquarters of the KIO, it had been well defended and had not been 
severely attacked by the Burmese army. It is perhaps why the displaced Kachins were willing to 
stay in Laiza where they were taken care of by the KIO rather than going to China where they 
would receive no support from the Chinese authorities and the living cost is much higher.620 If 
China’s promise to the KIO was sincere, it probably echoes China’s strategy in the Kokang 
incident. China is said to have been receptive to the Kokangs because the Kokang army was 
completely defeated by the Burmese army. If Laiza falls, chances are the KIO is completely 
defeated; only in that situation would China open its door to the displaced Kachins. As long as 
Laiza is under the KIO’s control, there is no way to tell whether China will keep its promise or 
not. Yet, it shows again that it was not the refugee criteria but rather political considerations that 
were decisive in China’s receptivity towards the displaced Kachins.  
Zhangfeng is a much larger town than Nabang and used to be a prominent gateway between 
China and the British colony of Burma. Zhangfeng town is divided into several smaller areas. 
The official border crossing point is in Laying area and thus known as Laying Passage. Laying 
camps mentioned by Kachin participants (see sec III) were located in Laying area in Zhangfeng. 
In Zhangfeng, the Chinese-Myanmar border is at many parts mere an invisible line going right 
through agricultural fields and is very close to residential areas. There are many unofficial 
crossings and pathways along the border. It is a semi-open business for local motor bike drivers 
to bring people across the border via unofficial pathways. It is somehow ironic that at some of 
these unofficial pathways, local villagers set up their “unofficial” checkpoint with a bamboo pole 
to charge a small amount of “crossing fees”.  
A substantial proportion of the displaced Kachins repatriated in August 2012 from Laying were 
accommodated in camps at Ma Ja Yang. Although attacks from the Myanmar government army 
resumed soon after the repatriation and Mai Ja Yang was heavily shelled in January 2013, there 
has been no report of large scale cross-border movement from Mai Ja Yang area to Zhangfeng. 
The situation in Nabang and Zhangfeng showed that border control was not tight in mid-April 
2013. It seemed that the flow of the displaced Kachins was, to some extent, controlled by both 
sides. By achieving a mutual agreement with the KIA to keep most of the displaced Kachins on 
the Myanmar side of the border and tolerating a certain degree of freedom of border-crossing, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
620 KIO provides rice and basic health services to the IDPs.  
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China has avoided the dilemma of how to balance its legal and humanitarian responsibilities to 
the displaced Kachins and its need to maintain good relations with the Myanmar government to 
protect Chinese investments in Myanmar.   
III Voices from Refugees and Humanitarian Workers 
A Absence of Assessment of Individual Situations  
Participants confirmed that, as far as they knew, Chinese authorities did not conduct individual 
interviews or collect detailed individual information of the displaced persons in the case of the 
Vietnamese refugees, the Kachins, or North Koreans. The Vietnamese and Kachin participants 
said that there was, however, some form of registration, where basic information of the incomers, 
such as hometown and occupation, was collected by Chinese authorities. 
1 Vietnamese 
The Vietnamese participant said that upon arrival at Dongxing town, Guangxi Zhuang 
Autonomous Region, China, which was a main entry point for the refugees from Vietnam 
between 1978 and 1982, refugees registered with the Dongxing local authority: 
 
Right! We registered. Collectively. We told them where we came from. 
 
However, due to the quick arrival rate and the large number of the incomers, it was impossible to 
investigate the situation of all incomers one by one: 
  
They asked some people [for more details], but not everyone. The local residents in Dongxing 
had vouched for many people [refugees from Vietnam].621 They [Chinese officials] did not have 
enough time to ask every person. There were too many people. 
 
2 North Koreans 
In the case of the North Koreans, a humanitarian worker interviewed, who worked with North 
Korean escapees, said that the Chinese authorities usually did basic investigations with North 
Koreans caught to obtain their identify information, although he was not sure whether the 
Chinese authorities kept a record of such information. For obvious reasons, the two North 
Korean participants avoided contact with Chinese authorities. 
3 Kachins 
The Kachin participants admitted that basic information of the displaced Kachins living in the 
self-established camps, including name, age, gender, home village, and the total number of 
people living in the camp, was submitted to Chinese authorities. There were different accounts 
of how and why the information was collected. According to one participant who stayed in a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
621 Many ethnic Chinese living in Vietnam originally emigrated from Guangxi and had relatives and friends in 
Guangxi. 
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camp in Laying town, the information was gathered and submitted to the local Chinese public 
security bureau by the village headmen at the camp: 
 
The headman of each village wrote down … our names, gender and age and handed it [the 
information collected] to the local public security bureau. 
 
She saw it as both a custom and an attempt to obtain the local authorities approval of their stay: 
 
On the one hand, in Myanmar when people have guests [from outside the village], they have to 
register the guests with village head. With that in mind, we registered with the local public 
security bureau when we were in Laying. It was a voluntary act, not a requirement from the local 
public security bureau. On the other hand, it was part of our attempt to apply for their approval of 
letting us remain at the refugee camps. 
 
Another Kachin participant, who also stayed in a camp in Laying town,622 recalled that Chinese 
officials came to the camp at least four times to collect information about residents at the camp: 
 
They [the Chinese officials] collect like gender, male or female. … They just come [to the camp] 
and take the record and detail in the compound. … At least I remember, four times. They are like 
checking, these people are still staying in this camp or where did it go. 
 
She said that the information was required by two local Chinese government bodies: 
 
Police and another administration department. … Administration just means they are township, 
regional administration department. 
 
A third Kachin participant mentioned that Chinese officials also checked their room and tried to 
obtain information of organisations supporting the Kachins: 
 
When the police come, they investigate everywhere. Every room. And when they saw even rice 
bag, who support you? Which organisation come and support you? They ask this kind of question. 
 
However, a Kachin participant who was previously in a camp in Nongdao town said that 
Chinese officials did not register her information: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
622 There were four unofficial refugee camps in Laying. See below interviews with humanitarian workers. 
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No, they did not register my name. Government officials only came to take photos when the 
houses [shelters] were built. 
 
Two aid workers interviewed, who worked with the displaced Kachins in China, were aware that 
basic information of the displaced Kachins living in camps was submitted to the Chinese 
authorities. According to one of them, the data was required by the Chinese authorities:  
They asked the information, the data, the people, names, age, how many people, they asked to the 
camp committee and they gave. 623 
The other one held that the requirement for residents of Myanmar to register with local Chinese 
authorities after their entry into China had existed before the conflict: 
 
It is a long-established practice. … Most border residents … normally follow that practice, 
because according to the Chinese government’s provisions, they would provide this information 
to register with the local [authorities]. 
 
Indeed, according to arts 11, 12 and 13 of the 1990 Yunnan Province Administrative Rules for 
Entry-Exit of Foreign Border Residents in Chinese-Myanmar Border Areas,624 border residents 
from Myanmar are required to register with Chinese public security authorities if they want to 
stay in China overnight or longer. 
B Reasons for fleeing 
All Category I participants were asked why they went to China.  
1 Vietnamese  
The Vietnamese participant said that she was forced to leave by the Vietnamese authorities: 
 
I was born in Vietnam and grew up in China. My family had lived in Vietnam for four 
generations. Despite this, I was marginalised in Vietnam. The Vietnamese government had 
summoned me to the police station in 1977. They asked me why I lived in Vietnam. Not only us. 
All huaqiao,625 even those with a passport.626 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
623 The camp committee is a self-governance team formed by the displaced Kachins at the camp. 
624 See chapter III. 
625 The term huaqiao is legally defined as Chinese nationals settled overseas, but may not necessarily be used in the 
strict legal sense in a casual context, see above n 482. From the context of this interview with the Vietnamese 
refugee, it is clear that she referred to person with Chinese nationality who settled in Vietnam. 
626 A passport probaly was not required by either China or Vietnam for Chinese or Vietnamese citizens travelling 
between the two countries for many years. A special arrangement in 1955 betwwen China and Vietnam allowed 
citizens of each country to travel across the border with a number of documents other than passport, Guangxi Local 
Chronicles Editorial Committee Guangxi tongzhi – waishi zhi [Guangxi Local Chronicles – Foreign Affairs 
Chronicles] (online ed 1996) Guangxi Local Information Web 
<http://www.gxdqw.com/bin/mse.exe?seachword=&K=a&A=25&rec=16&run=13> (accessed 18 February 2013).  
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Her response illustrates the complex nationality issue of the ethnic Chinese fleeing to China 
during the Indochinese refugee crisis. She said: 
 
I was huaqiao. Vietnam marginalised huaqiao. Vietnam wanted us to take Vietnamese 
nationality.  
 
Later in the interview, she brought the issue up again: 
 
In 1966, they [the Vietnamese authorities] forced all of us to take Vietnamese nationality. Local 
[Chinese] intellectuals stood up. They were heroes. huaqiao went on the streets to demonstrate. 
They said: “No Vietnamese nationalities! Huaqiao is huaqiao!” 
 
When asked if she would be allowed to stay in Vietnam if she was willing to take Vietnamese 
nationality, she exclaimed in protest: 
  
I would not take [Vietnamese nationality]! 
 
She also recalled: 
 
China issued passport. There were witnesses and other certificates. Real passport! [Vietnam] still 
charged us of [illegally] crossing the border and being spies. Why? 
 
This appears to confirm that Vietnam was still not authorised to issue regular passports to the 
ethnic Chinese in Vietnam prior to the exodus.627  
2 North Koreans 
Both North Korean participants said they left North Korea for China mainly to meet family 
members who had escaped to China before them. Both crossed the border as minors without the 
company of adults. For example, one of them said: 
 
[I went to China] to unite with my mother. She had been in China for a few years. My uncle is a 
Chinese citizen in China. 
 
She added that her mother left North Korea for “economic freedom”. 
The other North Korean gave similar reasons for her departure from North Korea: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
627 See Chang above n 470, at 197; chapter IV.I.A The Crisis and China’s Response. 
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For family reasons. My stepfather’s sibling is a Chinese citizen and was living in China. I went to 
Chinese to meet my family. Life was very difficult in North Korea. I left North Korea alone for 
China. 
 
Their experience illustrates that there are close connections (in their cases, family ties) between 
North Koreans and China, which is usually considered as one of the “pull factors” for North 
Koreans to China, and that economic hardship was one of the push factors for North Korean 
escapees. Their experience also indicates that unaccompanied minors may not be an exceptional 
or rare phenomenon in the situation of the North Korean escapees. The situation of 
unaccompanied North Korean minors demands urgent attention and humanitarian response. 
3 Kachins 
Attributing their departure to the armed conflict between the Myanmar government troops and 
the KIA, the Kachin participants commonly highlighted their fear of Burmese soldiers: 
 
I was afraid if we are staying in the village or in this [Kachin State] side, if they find, if the 
Burmese soldier found me or us, they will hit or, hit us, or ask many question or, instead, in case, 
I could die, instead. One day, when they push the Burmese frontline, then I decided I would be 
more suitable to cross to China side and stay in the China side. (Kachin participant A) 
Our village was close to the Burmese controlled area. We heard that the Burmese soldiers were 
evil, like the Japanese. We were scared when we heard that Burmese soldiers were coming, 
therefore, we fled to Laying. When we arrived in Laying, we felt that we were no longer in 
danger. We felt relieved. (Kachin participant B) 
Burmese soldiers, when they meet with women, they rape; and when they meet with men, hit 
them and even sometime kill. That is why I am afraid of this kind of situation. That is why I left 
my village and enter into the China side. (Kachin participant C) 
 
The response of the Kachin participants clearly illustrates the inter-ethnic group tension between 
the Burmese, who control the central government and government army, and the ethnic Kachins. 
They demonstrated a unmistakable fear of the “coming of Burmese soldiers”, rather than merely 
a fear of gunfire. Description of harsh treatment by the Burmese-controlled Myanmar 
government also came abundantly from the ethnic Kachins I met in Laiza and Mai Ja Yang.  
C Unavailability of Refugee Status Determination Services for North Koreans and Kachins	  
Responses of the North Korean and Kachin participants illustrate that RSD procedures were 
generally not available for the North Korean escapees and the displaced Kachins in China.  
1 North Koreans 
One North Korean participant said she heard “nothing” about applying for refugee status in 
China. The other North Korean participant believed that China did not accept refugees: 
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I know [the word “refugee”]. Refugees are given a status. I did not hear anything about applying 
for refugee status in China. I only heard that China did not accept [refugees]. Therefore, we 
bought our fake identity papers. 
 
They did not hear of UNHCR in China either. One of them asked: 
 
Is that [UNHCR] an embassy? … That [UNHCR] I did not heard of, really. I only heard that 
there was South Korean embassy in Beijing. If one gets in there, one can go directly to South 
Korea. But it would be very dangerous. I do not like taking risk. 
 
2 Kachins 
Most of the Kachin participants said that they did not apply for refugee status or any other legal 
status in China or had never heard of refugee status. One mentioned that she was warned by the 
Chinese border securities not to claim to be a refugee: 
 
No[, I did not apply for refugee status]. At the border, the Chinese border authorities did not 
allowed us to admit that we were refugees. We were afraid to say the word “refugee”. 
 
One asserted that people at her camp did not apply to the Chinese authorities for a legal status 
because they thought it was obvious that the Chinese authorities did not want them to stay 
anyway: 
 
It seems, they [the Chinese authorities] do not want to, they do not want [us] to legally stay. They 
do not want to allow, in my point of view. When I was staying in Laying, many authority come, 
many reason, and they push, many times they push to return back. 
 
Another one did not know about refugee status: 
 
As for me, I do not know about that refugee status, … But I do not know, I do not know about the 
refugee status when we are, while we are staying in the Laying camp. 
 
She and other displaced Kachins at the camp, however, did try to optimise their chance to stay in 
China by cleaning up the camp, after knowing that sanitation at the camp was a concern to the 
local Chinese officials: 
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 [I]f we are dirty, our environment, then, if we do like these bad habits, the authority they do not 
want [us] to stay. So we will try as good as we can, clean the environment, we do by themselves, 
without any person pushing us. 
 
Notably, one Kachin participant said the displaced Kachins at her camp tried to obtain refugee 
status through the local Laying police station: 
 
We made an attempt to obtain a status. We had little money, but we put our money together to 
buy gifts and went to the police station to apply for refugee status. 
 
Judging from her description, what they did probably was more like a plea or negotiation for 
approval for their stay than an application for a legitimate status. No assessment or investigation 
was consequently carried out by the police who did not take their gift and dismissively told them 
higher authorities had instructed them to return to their home country: 
 
They did not accept and told us “the above” ordered us to go back to Myanmar. 
 
None of the Kachin participants knew about the office of UNHCR in China. For example, one 
Kachin participant said:  
 
No[, I did not hear of the UNHCR in China]. We heard that the Chinese government denied the 
existence of the refugees after refugees entered China. 
 
Another Kachin participant, when asked if she tried to contact UNHCR in China, replied: 
 
I have never heard about it. 
 
Aid workers interviewed also confirmed that Kachin community leaders negotiated with the 
local Chinese authorities to enable the displaced Kachins to stay in China longer. One aid worker 
mentioned that a friend of hers working in a camp wrote a letter to the local Chinese government 
to ask for their approval of the stay of the displaced Kachins: 
 
 
	  
147 
They have been try to write, how you call that, letter to local authority to let them to stay at that 
time they have to leave, forced to leave. Before they are forced to leave, they also write a letter to 
local government. 
 
Another aid worker believed that leaders among the displaced Kachins had tried to obtain a legal 
status or a status whatsoever approved by the Chinese authorities: 
 
One core member of the camp committee said to me at that time that the [Chinese] government 
was driving them out and they were negotiating with the local government. Therefore, I think this 
to some extent demonstrates that they made an effort. 
 
He also indicated that if the Kachin leaders did not work to gain approval from the Chinese 
authorities, many Kachins would not have been able to force their way into China against armed 
Chinese border securities or to stay in China for more than a year. He further offered his insight 
as to why China denied the existence of “Kachin refugees” on its territory: 
 
If China admits the existence of refugees, it will have to shoulder the moral and humanitarian 
responsibilities to the refugees. … In that case, the investments of both parties will be affected. 
Chinese investment in Myanmar is rather sizable. … Probably there are many complicated 
factors in this situation. There was no way to actually achieve [an agreement]. 
 
At the same time, however, he expressed his doubt on how informed Beijing might have been of 
what had been happening on the Chinese-Myanmar border: 
 
I am not sure, whether [Beijing] really did not know or because of this kind of, because, you 
know, it is really difficult to know what actually happened if a person does not come here.  
 
Indeed, unlike in 2009 during the Kokang Incident, no officials were sent from Beijing to 
Yunnan Province to lead the work of handling the incoming displaced Kachins. 
D Legal Basis for China’s Treatment of Displaced Kachins 
Kachin participants had different experiences at the Myanmar-Chinese border in the course of 
their escape to China. Generally, their experiences illustrate that those who had the so-called 
“passport” (a travel document issued by Myanmar immigration offices along the Myanmar-
Chinese border) were allowed to enter China with no problem at any time. Those who did not 
have a “passport” were sometimes denied entry, but it appears that, although China tightened up 
security along the Yunnan-Kachin border, it did not enforce a strict no-entry policy on those 
without a proper entry document during the Kachin influx. 
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For example, a Kachin participant, who had a “passport” and fled to Nongdao town, China in 
July 2011, reported that she was allowed to cross the border by Chinese border securities but 
those without a “passport” and taking a lot of things with them were pushed back: 
 
Some people had passport. Those from the mountains did not have passport. They were 
questioned. Some of them were pushed back but others were allowed to enter. If one brought a 
lot of things, [the Chinese border securities] asked the person to go back.  
 
She added that: 
 
They only asked us if there was war at our home town. We said there was war. But the Chinese 
border security blocked the border. They said if the war became worse, they would let everyone 
in. They said many people did not need to entered China now and they drove them back. They 
did not really give reasons. They just did not let them in. After the war broke out, the border 
control was really tightened by the Chinese border authorities. 
 
A Kachin participant, who fled to China in mid-June 2011 with her baby, said that she and her 
fellow fleeing villagers did not have a “passport” and that they were initially barred from 
crossing the border:   
 
There were many people at the border area. The Chinese border security does not allow to enter 
many people because they do not have, no passport.  
 
While no one else was allowed in on that day, she and another woman, who also had a baby with 
her, were later waved in by a Chinese border security officer: 
 
Just wave. Just waving. I and a friend of mine, also the baby. … I think the police, one of the 
police is like a little bit young, and he hear the baby was crying. This police just called me like 
this [waving]. 
 
Two other Kachin participants, neither of who had a “passport”, had a more curious experience. 
They, along with many other displaced Kachins, pushed against Chinese securities, who tried to 
prevent them from crossing, and forced their way into China. One of them escaped with fellow 
villagers from their village in the mountains to the Chinese border near Laying town around 
mid-June 2011: 
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Many people rushed to the border from the mountain villages when they hear the gunfires. Some 
escaped with nothing except the clothes they were wearing. Others came by motorbike, four or 
five people on one motorbike. … We were really frightened. The Chinese border securities asked 
us not to enter China. We desperately pushed our way through across the border. … The Chinese 
border securities were not able to stop us. 
 
She estimated that there were several hundred people with her at the border at that time:628 
 
Several hundred at a time. Totally more than 3,000 people crossed to Laying. 
 
The other one entered China near Nongdao town in April 2012:  
 
On the bridge, there is many [Chinese] police are waiting. These policemen are waiting, not 
allow to cross. The people, even though the policemen are waiting and not allow to cross, but 
they are trying, pushing. … Chinese policemen are also pushing, the IDP [displaced Kachins] 
also pushing, and they are enter. 
 
They said that after they pushed their way into China, they did not have difficulty in going 
further from the border area to the camp in Laying and Nongdao. 
Two other Kachin participants, who crossed into China in June and November 2011 respectively, 
voluntarily described how they avoided the Chinese border checkpoints to enter China via 
“unofficial” paths: 
 
On that day, there are many people, many IDP [displace Kachins], coming down, want to flee to 
the China side. Same situation, many policemen, many soldier, are waiting around the border 
area. He is hiding, waiting in the bush. I was hiding and cross that bush. And entered Laying. 
(Kachin participant D) 
I was the, like, division, like, hiding with too, close the border, I need to rent a motorbike or I had 
to pay 150 Yuan on that day. Although I illegally crossing. (Kachin participant E) 
 
The experiences of the Kachin participants indicates that the 1997 Chinese-Myanmar bilateral 
protocol and the 1990 Yunnan Entry-Exit Rules for of Foreign Border Residents in Chinese-
Myanmar Border Areas are likely to have served as the legal basis for China’s treatment of the 
displaced Kachins. As mentioned in chapter III, art 20(2) of the 1997 Chinese-Myanmar bilateral 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
628 It is perhaps not unusual that fear and desperation drove the whole village to flee together during the conflict in 
Kachin state. I heard similar stories from people internally displaced in camps in Laiza, Kachin State. 
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agreement allows border residents of either party to the agreement to cross the border with a 
border pass at designated crossings, exempting them from a normal visa. The 1990 Yunnan 
Entry-Exit Rules allow holders of the “exit-entry pass for foreign border residents” to enter and 
stay in Yunnan for from 15 days to up to two years (including extension).629 
Kachin participants, as well as aid workers supporting displaced Kachins in China, confirmed 
that the so-call “passport”, obtained from Myanmar immigration office along the border, 
normally enables them to enter and stay up to seven days in China without a visa: 
 
[The border pass] enables us to stay in China for up to seven days per entry. After seven days, we 
had to go back. We went back and forth. (participant F) 
We hold border pass document, you know, the one that like this. People from Burma have to hold 
temporary pass, border pass document. We crossed with this, no problem. … We got seven days, 
like a visa, you know. We got seven days to stay in China. After seven days, we can, we should 
leave China. (participant G) 
 
Article 20(2) of the 1997 Chinese-Myanmar bilateral agreement also specifies that the border 
pass is valid for travel within border areas agreed on by both parties and that holders of the 
border pass is allowed to take with them persons under 16 years of age as long as the number of 
persons they are taking as well as their name and age are specified on the border pass. Kachin 
participants reported that each holder of the border pass was able to take one person without a 
border pass, regardless of age, with him or her until the conflict broke out in June 2011: 
 
Previously, the holder of a border pass was allowed to bring an extra person. At that time [during 
the Kachin influx], the holder were allowed to enter but not allowed to bring an extra person. 
 
In light of the above, it is likely that China admitted the displaced Kachins according to with the 
1997 Chinese-Myanmar bilateral agreement and the 1990 Yunnan Exit-Entry Rules, although 
China’s current practice seems to be slightly different from the provisions of the two documents.  
It should be pointed out that, in the absence of relevant bilateral arrangements and national legal 
provisions, China’s admission of displaced Kachins who did not hold a border pass is a plausible 
effort to respond to the urgent protection needs of the displaced in the situation of mass influx. 
E Lack of Assistance from Chinese Authorities  
The Kachin participants confirmed that there was very limited or no assistance from the Chinese 
government. For example, one participant who stayed in Nongdao town recalled that a medical 
team visited the camp once in April or May 2012: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
629 Article 6. See above n 419. 
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When I was staying in the Nongdao camp, I get, I remember, some medical treatment team come 
and they do medical treatment. I remember only one time. 
 
Another participant who stayed in Laying town said that medical treatment was provided around 
June or July 2012 shortly before their repatriation in August 2012: 
 
When the children or women also some people get the disease, a disease, or some skin disorder, 
skin disorder that time, three day, two day, get medical treatment, after that they had to return 
back. 
 
Two participants’ family members were treated for skin disorder: 
 
In my family, my grandson, only their grandson. Skin disorder and he get medical treatment. 
My children, like, young two, very young, very young two, around 14, boy, just skin disorder, 
they get medical treatment. 
 
One Kachin participant was of the opinion that the Chinese authorities used the medical 
treatment as part of their tactic to kick out the displaced Kachins at the camp. Her opinion seems 
to coincide with another participant who said that there was no assistance from the Chinese 
government: 
 
They [the Chinese authorities] also came when there was disease, for example malaria or severe 
illness [at the camp]. Their purpose was to take that chance to push us back. 
 
It should be pointed out that the Kachin participants who denied having received any help from 
the Chinese government often emphasised their gratitude for the assistance from the Chinese 
civilian society. One participant who stayed at a camp in Nongdao town said: 
 
No government assistance. I have never heard of that. There were kind Chinese residents and 
charity groups [who helped us]. The strongest support came from the brothers and sisters of our 
church. 
 
Another participant who stayed at a camp in Laying said: 
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No government assistance. The brothers and sisters from our church helped us. The World Health 
Organisation as well. 
 
Instead, she added, the Chinese authorities intervened in their setting up of the shelters: 
  
The Chinese border authorities asked us not to build [shelters]. We first lived in a warehouse 
owned by a timber businessman. Later, we went to Laying’s rubbish dumping ground, cleaned it 
and built tents. 
 
Aid workers working with the displaced Kachins confirmed that there was some but very limited 
assistance from the local Chinese authorities. For example, an aid worker from Myanmar 
mentioned that the health departments of Ruili City and Longchuan County provided 
vaccinations to the displaced Kachins in Nongdao and Laying respectively:  
     
I know they [the displaced Kachins in Nongdao] got health assistance, health care. Like vaccine 
from Ruili health department. … Laying camp they also got the vaccine … from Longchuan. 
 
Yet, she saw the assistance more as a result of China’s fear for disease spreading from the 
displaced Kachins than genuine willingness to help the displaced. She laughed politely and 
gently: 
 
Maybe it is because they [Chinese authorities] were afraid of, just to prevent, prevention of the 
diseases. 
 
Obviously, she, to some extent, shared the view of some of the Category I Kachin participants 
who, as mentioned above, regarded the medical assistance from the Chinese authorities as part of 
China’s effort to push away unwanted guests.  
A Chinese independent humanitarian worker, however, offered a different interpretation of 
China’s treatment of the displaced Kachins. He agreed that China’s limited assistance was 
largely health-related: 
 
Within their jurisdiction, they [local authorities] sent health workers to sanitize [the camps], or 
prevent epidemics. In addition, some village clinics also provided relevant medical services for 
the refugees from Myanmar. 
 
 
	  
153 
Additionally, he mentioned police service as a form of assistance provided by the local 
government: 
 
A small portion of the services [provided to the Kachins by the Chinese authorities], of course, 
included local police service. Their work in maintaining the public security is crucial, because the 
location [of the camps] is on the border, very sensitive.  
 
However, he emphasised the humanitarian characteristics of China’s assistance: 
 
I think the Chinese government shouldered some responsibilities from humanitarian aspect. … 
After all, the Chinese government provided some help unofficially. … It just did not do it too 
obviously, but did provide some assistance.  
 
He believed that the Chinese government opted to remain low key and not to officially assist the 
displaced Kachins in order to protect China’s economic interest in Myanmar: 
  
It really has no other ways to deal with the government of Myanmar, because the government of 
Myanmar is actually controlled by the military authorities. … China and Myanmar has, the 
government has many business projects [in Myanmar]. 
 
F Repatriation of the Displaced Kachins  
Accoridng to the Kachins interviewed, Chinese authorities had persistently persuaded them to 
return to Myanmar prior to their repatriation in August and September 2012.  
For example, a participant previously in Nongdao town recalled that Chinese officers used to 
come to the camp almost every day: 
 
They came to negotiate with us and told us that we were given one year [and that] we would be 
kicked out after one year. They came almost every day at that time. 
 
Another participant previously at Laying recalled that during her six-month stay at the camp, 
Chinese officers visited the camp eight to ten times: 
 
I remember nearly ten time, eight time, authority come and [said] why are you staying until now? 
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According to the participants, two main reasons used by the Chinese officers to persuade them to 
return Myanmar were: (1) there was no more fighting in Kachin State, and (2) residents at the 
camp would spread diseases to Chinese civilians:  
  
The reason, the main reason is right now fighting is stopped. Go back. Go back. Another one is 
that you are like living in a compound, very crowded, very crowded and the environment is dirty. 
So in case some disease or some virus spread, we are afraid, we are afraid to spread into our 
civilian. So that is why you must return back. That is the one reason. (participant H) 
They said, you Myanmar have such and such disease and have brought [in China] such and such 
disease. (participant I) 
 
Several Chinese authorities, including the Chinese border securities, the police, and the local 
municipal government, were involved: 
 
Yes, they came. Not only border securities. Some from Mangshi city. We did not know exactly 
where they all were from. Many departments. …We just say those people were from “the above”. 
(participant J) 
Mostly regional administration and sometime police. (participant K) 
 
Most Kachin participants confirmed that many of the displaced Kachins in the self-established 
camps were forcibly repatriated in August and September 2012: 
 
When we were pushed back, we left with our heart filled with sadness. During the process, at 6 in 
the morning, more than 100 border securities and police. Several trucks were also came. Some 
people were cooking. There were children. The Chinese police torn down the house and drove us 
out like cattle. We came back with great sadness. 
In the end, we who remained in China were kicked out. They [the Chinese authorities] tore down 
our houses [shelters] and burned them down. 
 
One Kachin participant, who stayed in a camp in Laying town, said he returned to Myanmar 
voluntarily: 
 
As for me, I want, do not want to stay longer in Laying, China side. That is why [when officials 
went] check, who, now, who like to come, return back, I mentioned my name. 
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An aid worker interviewed believed that the Chinese government had asked for coorporation 
from the KIO to persuade the Kachins to return home: 
 
Some says from the Yunnan government officially announced, officially tell to the Kachin local 
authority, “Hey call your people.” But they are not ready. At that time, the local Kachin leader 
was not ready, not prepared for the IDP/refugee to stay at the camp. Since that time, they forced 
many times, the Chinese government forced the refugees to return to this side. 
 
Another aid worker mentioned that the intervention from the higher level of the Chinese 
government might have significantly contributed to the abrupt repatriation of the displaced 
Kachins in August and September 2012: 
 
I understand that some local authorities of nearby border towns were handling it for a few months. 
However, due to the growing number of the displaced persons and political concerns, the 
handling [of the displaced Kachins] was centralised later on, hence the more rigid attitude and 
repatriation. 
 
G Blurred Identity of Indochinese Refugees in China 
The Vietnamese participant referred to herself as huaqiao most of the time and as refugee only 
twice during the 45 minute long interview. She emphasised several times that she, as well as 
“tens of thousands” of people whom she fled with from Vietnam had Chinese nationality.  
She recalled that she and her family, along with many others fleeing from Vietnam to China, 
were received by officers from overseas Chinese affairs organisations: 
 
 [We were received by] huqiao organisations. They were awaiting us. Once we crossed the 
border, they met with us. 
 
When asked why they were called refugees nowadays, she paused, looking confused, and said 
hesitantly that: 
 
They [the Vietnamese authorities] expelled us. 
 
When asked if she knew the ORSIRs, she again looked puzzled and was hesitant: 
 
Indochinese? It [Vietnam] was French Indochinese. Then it is us, the huaqiao. I think so. But I 
only know, [pause] there was no such a name at that time. 
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The response of the Vietnamese participant appears to confirm that the Vietnamese refugees 
were initially received as returning Chinese nationals and that they are, as mentioned in chapter 
IV,630 probably still regarded by the Chinese government as Chinese nationals for domestic 
purpose. 
IV Conclusion 
The voices of the participants are a strong cry for meaningful and humanitarian protection as 
well as clear and regulated criteria for refugee status and predictable and fair RSD procedures in 
China, in particular criteria and procedures suitable for mass influx situations. The experience of 
the Kachin and North Korean participants illustrates that the protection needs of some persons, 
who may well qualify for refugee status under the Convention and Protocol, are left unmet as a 
result of China’s current policy.  
China mainly relied on the 1997 Chinese-Myanmar bilateral protocol and the 1990 Yunnan 
Entry-Exit Rules for of Foreign Border Residents in Chinese-Myanmar Border Areas to respond 
to the displaced Kachins entering China. Nevertheless, China’s tolerance of the entry and stay of 
the displaced Kachins not covered by these two documents reflects the growing willingness of 
Chinese authorities to deal with refugees and other displaced foreigners in a less restrictive and 
more humanitarian manner.  
The status quo of the border towns I visited illustrates the fluidity along the Chinese-Myanmar 
border. Border crossing has long been accepted by the local people, and probably also by the 
local authorities, as a normal practice in everyday life. This acceptance to a large extent explains 
China’s relatively tolerant stance on the displaced Kachins.  
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Conclusion  
 
China is in an opportune position to further enhance refugee protection in China and play a 
leading role in the region. 
– Veerapong Vongvarotai, former UNHCR Regional Representative for China & Mongolia631 
 
I  Chinese Refugee Law and Policy at a Crossroad 
China is at a critical juncture in advancing its refugee law and policy. On the one hand, the 
rapidly increasing number of displaced foreigners calls for predictable, regulated responses. On 
the other hand, China has clearly demonstrated a growing interest in addressing the refugee issue 
within a more formalised framework. 
In the present situation, Chinese law falls short of providing a sufficient legal framework for 
assessing refugee claims and safeguarding the principles of non-refoulement and non-
penalisation. First, there is a gap between the criteria for asylum contained in art 32 of the 1982 
Chinese Constitution and the criteria for refugee status contained in the Convention Refugee 
Definition. Second, Chinese law in general contains very few provisions which distinguish 
refugees from other migrants. Third, as the provisions of the Convention and Protocol have not 
been incorporated into Chinese law, the Chinese legal system cannot provide effective 
implementation of the provisions of the Convention and Protocol, which themselves are known 
for the limitations in their supervision mechanisms and the lack of refugee status determination 
procedures.  
Traditionally, the Chinese government has associated the concept of asylum mainly with 
political concerns. In general, it has perceived refugees as a threat to social stability and national 
security. Such perception essentially is rooted in the mistrust of foreigners by the Chinese 
government since 1949. It is also because China’s experience with refugees and other displaced 
foreigners is characterised by large-scale inflows from neighbours. 
The scale of the inflows is a key factor affecting the Chinese government’s response to displaced 
foreigners entering China. China’s current policy on refugee status determination, in effect, 
distinguishes between displaced foreigners who are part of a large-scale inflow and those who 
are not. While the latter are allowed to access RSD procedures administered by UNHCR, the 
former depend on the policy decisions of the Chinese government. 
In mass influx situations where the Chinese government determines the status of the displaced 
foreigners concerned, the security, political, and strategic interests of China have overshadowed 
the commitment of China under relevant international treaties. The relations between the 
Chinese government and the ruling authorities in the place of origin of the displaced foreigners 
have usually been an important consideration in this regard. The Chinese government has also 
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favoured bilateral agreements with the place of origin of the displaced foreigners over 
multilateral treaties. As a result, the protection needs of some displaced foreigners, who may 
well qualify as refugees under the Convention and Protocol, have been left unmet. 
The displaced foreigners’ ethnic and cultural links with the majority Chinese population are 
likely to have been another key factor affecting China’s receptivity towards displaced foreigners. 
A likely explanation is that the Chinese government probably considers foreigners who have 
strong ethnic and cultural links with China as a lesser threat to social stability, which is a top 
priority of the Chinese government. 
Generally speaking, China has been cautious about recognising displaced foreigners as refugees. 
Non-recognition of refugee status does not necessarily exclude protection by the Chinese 
government. On the other hand, refugee status in China does not entail the full range of rights 
afforded by the Convention and Protocol or entitlement to the same rights among persons with 
refugee status.  
China has not involved itself to substantial and constructive conversation on refugee recognition 
issues with the international community. However, China has demonstrated a growing interest in 
engaging in the international refugee protection regime, especially at the regional level, in recent 
years. As China’s engagement in the international refugee protection regime deepens, it will 
have more dialogue and greater cooperation with the key stakeholders in the regime. It is 
inevitable that China’s conception of refugees will evolve through these dialogues and 
cooperation. 
Essentially, the advances of Chinese law and policy on refugee status are part of, and depend on, 
the broader processes China is going through as it emerges as a world power. These processes 
include the strengthening of the rule of law, its gradual, inevitable, and sometimes painful 
integration with the international human rights system, and the evolution of China’s perception 
of “self” and “others” in the era of globalisation. As China is vigorously working towards the 
better rule of law, the improvement of human rights, and a harmonious and tolerant society, 
there are reasons to believe that a predictable and fair national mechanism for refugee status 
determination is in line with China’s interest.  
II  Towards a Predictable and Fair National Mechanism  
In the past few years, China has made progress in formalising its protection for refugees and 
asylum seekers through legislation. In particular, the national refugee regulation that is being 
drafted will, when passed, undoubtedly have a profound and positive impact on refugee status 
recognition in China.  
The recommendation in this thesis is that China pass the draft national refugee regulation as 
soon as possible. The national refugee regulation needs to provide a definition of a refugee. That 
definition must be in accordance with the Convention Refugee Definition. In establishing the 
definition, consideration should be given to the humanitarian response needed in mass influx 
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situations and, ideally, also to regional instruments relating to refugees such as the Bangkok 
Principles.  
Further, the national regulation needs to include clear and fair RSD procedures, which specify 
the authorities responsible for processing applications for refugee status, set out a reasonable 
time frame for responses and decision making, and include review or appeal mechanisms. In 
particular, the RSD procedures to be established by the national refugee regulation should 
contain mechanisms – usually group determination on a prima facie basis – suitable for RSD in 
mass influx situations. Applicants should have access to legal assistance and should be given 
reasons for the decision on their status. 
Establishing a predictable and fair mechanism for refugee status determination would be the first 
step, not the last, for China to enhance refugee protection. A RSD mechanism, however well-
designed, is not a guaranteed solution for all issues relating to forced cross-border displacement 
for any country. The main challenge for China in determining refugee status, as for many other 
countries, is to find a balance between its international legal obligations and the State interest. 
China’s political will to accept and protect refugees and China’s economic capacity to 
accommodate the protection needs of refugees are two decisive factors of Chinese refugee law 
and policy. As reforms in China continue to yield remarkable achievements, there is every 
reason to be confident that China’s political will and economic capacity to accept and protect 
refugees on its territory will increase in the years to come. 
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